直播：后台 JWT 推流、前台画中画；WebRTC 服务与 Nginx WebSocket 代理

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server/vendor/github.com/pion/datachannel/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+### JetBrains IDE ###
+#####################
+.idea/
+
+### Emacs Temporary Files ###
+#############################
+*~
+
+### Folders ###
+###############
+bin/
+vendor/
+node_modules/
+
+### Files ###
+#############
+*.ivf
+*.ogg
+tags
+cover.out
+*.sw[poe]
+*.wasm
+examples/sfu-ws/cert.pem
+examples/sfu-ws/key.pem
+wasm_exec.js

server/vendor/github.com/pion/datachannel/.golangci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+linters-settings:
+  govet:
+    enable:
+      - shadow
+  misspell:
+    locale: US
+  exhaustive:
+    default-signifies-exhaustive: true
+  gomodguard:
+    blocked:
+      modules:
+        - github.com/pkg/errors:
+            recommendations:
+              - errors
+  forbidigo:
+    forbid:
+      - ^fmt.Print(f|ln)?$
+      - ^log.(Panic|Fatal|Print)(f|ln)?$
+      - ^os.Exit$
+      - ^panic$
+      - ^print(ln)?$
+
+linters:
+  enable:
+    - asciicheck       # Simple linter to check that your code does not contain non-ASCII identifiers
+    - bidichk          # Checks for dangerous unicode character sequences
+    - bodyclose        # checks whether HTTP response body is closed successfully
+    - contextcheck     # check the function whether use a non-inherited context
+    - decorder         # check declaration order and count of types, constants, variables and functions
+    - dogsled          # Checks assignments with too many blank identifiers (e.g. x, _, _, _, := f())
+    - dupl             # Tool for code clone detection
+    - durationcheck    # check for two durations multiplied together
+    - errcheck         # Errcheck is a program for checking for unchecked errors in go programs. These unchecked errors can be critical bugs in some cases
+    - errchkjson       # Checks types passed to the json encoding functions. Reports unsupported types and optionally reports occations, where the check for the returned error can be omitted.
+    - errname          # Checks that sentinel errors are prefixed with the `Err` and error types are suffixed with the `Error`.
+    - errorlint        # errorlint is a linter for that can be used to find code that will cause problems with the error wrapping scheme introduced in Go 1.13.
+    - exhaustive       # check exhaustiveness of enum switch statements
+    - exportloopref    # checks for pointers to enclosing loop variables
+    - forbidigo        # Forbids identifiers
+    - forcetypeassert  # finds forced type assertions
+    - gci              # Gci control golang package import order and make it always deterministic.
+    - gochecknoglobals # Checks that no globals are present in Go code
+    - gochecknoinits   # Checks that no init functions are present in Go code
+    - gocognit         # Computes and checks the cognitive complexity of functions
+    - goconst          # Finds repeated strings that could be replaced by a constant
+    - gocritic         # The most opinionated Go source code linter
+    - godox            # Tool for detection of FIXME, TODO and other comment keywords
+    - goerr113         # Golang linter to check the errors handling expressions
+    - gofmt            # Gofmt checks whether code was gofmt-ed. By default this tool runs with -s option to check for code simplification
+    - gofumpt          # Gofumpt checks whether code was gofumpt-ed.
+    - goheader         # Checks is file header matches to pattern
+    - goimports        # Goimports does everything that gofmt does. Additionally it checks unused imports
+    - gomoddirectives  # Manage the use of 'replace', 'retract', and 'excludes' directives in go.mod.
+    - gomodguard       # Allow and block list linter for direct Go module dependencies. This is different from depguard where there are different block types for example version constraints and module recommendations.
+    - goprintffuncname # Checks that printf-like functions are named with `f` at the end
+    - gosec            # Inspects source code for security problems
+    - gosimple         # Linter for Go source code that specializes in simplifying a code
+    - govet            # Vet examines Go source code and reports suspicious constructs, such as Printf calls whose arguments do not align with the format string
+    - grouper          # An analyzer to analyze expression groups.
+    - importas         # Enforces consistent import aliases
+    - ineffassign      # Detects when assignments to existing variables are not used
+    - misspell         # Finds commonly misspelled English words in comments
+    - nilerr           # Finds the code that returns nil even if it checks that the error is not nil.
+    - nilnil           # Checks that there is no simultaneous return of `nil` error and an invalid value.
+    - noctx            # noctx finds sending http request without context.Context
+    - predeclared      # find code that shadows one of Go's predeclared identifiers
+    - revive           # golint replacement, finds style mistakes
+    - staticcheck      # Staticcheck is a go vet on steroids, applying a ton of static analysis checks
+    - stylecheck       # Stylecheck is a replacement for golint
+    - tagliatelle      # Checks the struct tags.
+    - tenv             # tenv is analyzer that detects using os.Setenv instead of t.Setenv since Go1.17
+    - tparallel        # tparallel detects inappropriate usage of t.Parallel() method in your Go test codes
+    - typecheck        # Like the front-end of a Go compiler, parses and type-checks Go code
+    - unconvert        # Remove unnecessary type conversions
+    - unparam          # Reports unused function parameters
+    - unused           # Checks Go code for unused constants, variables, functions and types
+    - wastedassign     # wastedassign finds wasted assignment statements
+    - whitespace       # Tool for detection of leading and trailing whitespace
+  disable:
+    - depguard         # Go linter that checks if package imports are in a list of acceptable packages
+    - containedctx     # containedctx is a linter that detects struct contained context.Context field
+    - cyclop           # checks function and package cyclomatic complexity
+    - exhaustivestruct # Checks if all struct's fields are initialized
+    - funlen           # Tool for detection of long functions
+    - gocyclo          # Computes and checks the cyclomatic complexity of functions
+    - godot            # Check if comments end in a period
+    - gomnd            # An analyzer to detect magic numbers.
+    - ifshort          # Checks that your code uses short syntax for if-statements whenever possible
+    - ireturn          # Accept Interfaces, Return Concrete Types
+    - lll              # Reports long lines
+    - maintidx         # maintidx measures the maintainability index of each function.
+    - makezero         # Finds slice declarations with non-zero initial length
+    - maligned         # Tool to detect Go structs that would take less memory if their fields were sorted
+    - nakedret         # Finds naked returns in functions greater than a specified function length
+    - nestif           # Reports deeply nested if statements
+    - nlreturn         # nlreturn checks for a new line before return and branch statements to increase code clarity
+    - nolintlint       # Reports ill-formed or insufficient nolint directives
+    - paralleltest     # paralleltest detects missing usage of t.Parallel() method in your Go test
+    - prealloc         # Finds slice declarations that could potentially be preallocated
+    - promlinter       # Check Prometheus metrics naming via promlint
+    - rowserrcheck     # checks whether Err of rows is checked successfully
+    - sqlclosecheck    # Checks that sql.Rows and sql.Stmt are closed.
+    - testpackage      # linter that makes you use a separate _test package
+    - thelper          # thelper detects golang test helpers without t.Helper() call and checks the consistency of test helpers
+    - varnamelen       # checks that the length of a variable's name matches its scope
+    - wrapcheck        # Checks that errors returned from external packages are wrapped
+    - wsl              # Whitespace Linter - Forces you to use empty lines!
+
+issues:
+  exclude-use-default: false
+  exclude-dirs-use-default: false
+  exclude-rules:
+    # Allow complex tests and examples, better to be self contained
+    - path: (examples|main\.go|_test\.go)
+      linters:
+        - forbidigo
+        - gocognit
+
+    # Allow forbidden identifiers in CLI commands
+    - path: cmd
+      linters:
+        - forbidigo

server/vendor/github.com/pion/datachannel/.goreleaser.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+builds:
+- skip: true

server/vendor/github.com/pion/datachannel/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.

server/vendor/github.com/pion/datachannel/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+<h1 align="center">
+  <br>
+  Pion Data Channels
+  <br>
+</h1>
+<h4 align="center">A Go implementation of WebRTC Data Channels</h4>
+<p align="center">
+  <a href="https://pion.ly"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/pion-datachannel-gray.svg?longCache=true&colorB=brightgreen" alt="Pion Data Channels"></a>
+  <a href="https://pion.ly/slack"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/join-us%20on%20slack-gray.svg?longCache=true&logo=slack&colorB=brightgreen" alt="Slack Widget"></a>
+  <br>
+  <img alt="GitHub Workflow Status" src="https://img.shields.io/github/actions/workflow/status/pion/datachannel/test.yaml">
+  <a href="https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/pion/datachannel"><img src="https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/pion/datachannel.svg" alt="Go Reference"></a>
+  <a href="https://codecov.io/gh/pion/datachannel"><img src="https://codecov.io/gh/pion/datachannel/branch/master/graph/badge.svg" alt="Coverage Status"></a>
+  <a href="https://goreportcard.com/report/github.com/pion/datachannel"><img src="https://goreportcard.com/badge/github.com/pion/datachannel" alt="Go Report Card"></a>
+  <a href="LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg" alt="License: MIT"></a>
+</p>
+<br>
+
+### Roadmap
+The library is used as a part of our WebRTC implementation. Please refer to that [roadmap](https://github.com/pion/webrtc/issues/9) to track our major milestones.
+
+### Community
+Pion has an active community on the [Slack](https://pion.ly/slack).
+
+Follow the [Pion Twitter](https://twitter.com/_pion) for project updates and important WebRTC news.
+
+We are always looking to support **your projects**. Please reach out if you have something to build!
+If you need commercial support or don't want to use public methods you can contact us at [team@pion.ly](mailto:team@pion.ly)
+
+### Contributing
+Check out the [contributing wiki](https://github.com/pion/webrtc/wiki/Contributing) to join the group of amazing people making this project possible
+
+### License
+MIT License - see [LICENSE](LICENSE) for full text

server/vendor/github.com/pion/datachannel/codecov.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#
+# DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE
+#
+# It is automatically copied from https://github.com/pion/.goassets repository.
+#
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+coverage:
+  status:
+    project:
+      default:
+        # Allow decreasing 2% of total coverage to avoid noise.
+        threshold: 2%
+    patch:
+      default:
+        target: 70%
+        only_pulls: true
+
+ignore:
+  - "examples/*"
+  - "examples/**/*"

server/vendor/github.com/pion/datachannel/datachannel.go

@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package datachannel implements WebRTC Data Channels
+package datachannel
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/pion/logging"
+	"github.com/pion/sctp"
+)
+
+const receiveMTU = 8192
+
+// Reader is an extended io.Reader
+// that also returns if the message is text.
+type Reader interface {
+	ReadDataChannel([]byte) (int, bool, error)
+}
+
+// ReadDeadliner extends an io.Reader to expose setting a read deadline.
+type ReadDeadliner interface {
+	SetReadDeadline(time.Time) error
+}
+
+// Writer is an extended io.Writer
+// that also allows indicating if a message is text.
+type Writer interface {
+	WriteDataChannel([]byte, bool) (int, error)
+}
+
+// ReadWriteCloser is an extended io.ReadWriteCloser
+// that also implements our Reader and Writer.
+type ReadWriteCloser interface {
+	io.Reader
+	io.Writer
+	Reader
+	Writer
+	io.Closer
+}
+
+// DataChannel represents a data channel
+type DataChannel struct {
+	Config
+
+	// stats
+	messagesSent     uint32
+	messagesReceived uint32
+	bytesSent        uint64
+	bytesReceived    uint64
+
+	mu                      sync.Mutex
+	onOpenCompleteHandler   func()
+	openCompleteHandlerOnce sync.Once
+
+	stream *sctp.Stream
+	log    logging.LeveledLogger
+}
+
+// Config is used to configure the data channel.
+type Config struct {
+	ChannelType          ChannelType
+	Negotiated           bool
+	Priority             uint16
+	ReliabilityParameter uint32
+	Label                string
+	Protocol             string
+	LoggerFactory        logging.LoggerFactory
+}
+
+func newDataChannel(stream *sctp.Stream, config *Config) *DataChannel {
+	return &DataChannel{
+		Config: *config,
+		stream: stream,
+		log:    config.LoggerFactory.NewLogger("datachannel"),
+	}
+}
+
+// Dial opens a data channels over SCTP
+func Dial(a *sctp.Association, id uint16, config *Config) (*DataChannel, error) {
+	stream, err := a.OpenStream(id, sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCBinary)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	dc, err := Client(stream, config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return dc, nil
+}
+
+// Client opens a data channel over an SCTP stream
+func Client(stream *sctp.Stream, config *Config) (*DataChannel, error) {
+	msg := &channelOpen{
+		ChannelType:          config.ChannelType,
+		Priority:             config.Priority,
+		ReliabilityParameter: config.ReliabilityParameter,
+
+		Label:    []byte(config.Label),
+		Protocol: []byte(config.Protocol),
+	}
+
+	if !config.Negotiated {
+		rawMsg, err := msg.Marshal()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal ChannelOpen %w", err)
+		}
+
+		if _, err = stream.WriteSCTP(rawMsg, sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCDCEP); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to send ChannelOpen %w", err)
+		}
+	}
+	dc := newDataChannel(stream, config)
+
+	if err := dc.commitReliabilityParams(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return dc, nil
+}
+
+// Accept is used to accept incoming data channels over SCTP
+func Accept(a *sctp.Association, config *Config, existingChannels ...*DataChannel) (*DataChannel, error) {
+	stream, err := a.AcceptStream()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	for _, ch := range existingChannels {
+		if ch.StreamIdentifier() == stream.StreamIdentifier() {
+			ch.stream.SetDefaultPayloadType(sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCBinary)
+			return ch, nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	stream.SetDefaultPayloadType(sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCBinary)
+
+	dc, err := Server(stream, config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return dc, nil
+}
+
+// Server accepts a data channel over an SCTP stream
+func Server(stream *sctp.Stream, config *Config) (*DataChannel, error) {
+	buffer := make([]byte, receiveMTU)
+	n, ppi, err := stream.ReadSCTP(buffer)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if ppi != sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCDCEP {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w %s", ErrInvalidPayloadProtocolIdentifier, ppi)
+	}
+
+	openMsg, err := parseExpectDataChannelOpen(buffer[:n])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse DataChannelOpen packet %w", err)
+	}
+
+	config.ChannelType = openMsg.ChannelType
+	config.Priority = openMsg.Priority
+	config.ReliabilityParameter = openMsg.ReliabilityParameter
+	config.Label = string(openMsg.Label)
+	config.Protocol = string(openMsg.Protocol)
+
+	dataChannel := newDataChannel(stream, config)
+
+	err = dataChannel.writeDataChannelAck()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	err = dataChannel.commitReliabilityParams()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return dataChannel, nil
+}
+
+// Read reads a packet of len(p) bytes as binary data
+func (c *DataChannel) Read(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	n, _, err := c.ReadDataChannel(p)
+	return n, err
+}
+
+// ReadDataChannel reads a packet of len(p) bytes
+func (c *DataChannel) ReadDataChannel(p []byte) (int, bool, error) {
+	for {
+		n, ppi, err := c.stream.ReadSCTP(p)
+		if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+			// When the peer sees that an incoming stream was
+			// reset, it also resets its corresponding outgoing stream.
+			if closeErr := c.stream.Close(); closeErr != nil {
+				return 0, false, closeErr
+			}
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return 0, false, err
+		}
+
+		if ppi == sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCDCEP {
+			if err = c.handleDCEP(p[:n]); err != nil {
+				c.log.Errorf("Failed to handle DCEP: %s", err.Error())
+			}
+			continue
+		} else if ppi == sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCBinaryEmpty || ppi == sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCStringEmpty {
+			n = 0
+		}
+
+		atomic.AddUint32(&c.messagesReceived, 1)
+		atomic.AddUint64(&c.bytesReceived, uint64(n))
+
+		isString := ppi == sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCString || ppi == sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCStringEmpty
+		return n, isString, err
+	}
+}
+
+// SetReadDeadline sets a deadline for reads to return
+func (c *DataChannel) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error {
+	return c.stream.SetReadDeadline(t)
+}
+
+// MessagesSent returns the number of messages sent
+func (c *DataChannel) MessagesSent() uint32 {
+	return atomic.LoadUint32(&c.messagesSent)
+}
+
+// MessagesReceived returns the number of messages received
+func (c *DataChannel) MessagesReceived() uint32 {
+	return atomic.LoadUint32(&c.messagesReceived)
+}
+
+// OnOpen sets an event handler which is invoked when
+// a DATA_CHANNEL_ACK message is received.
+// The handler is called only on thefor the channel opened
+// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-data-protocol-09#section-5.2
+func (c *DataChannel) OnOpen(f func()) {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	c.openCompleteHandlerOnce = sync.Once{}
+	c.onOpenCompleteHandler = f
+	c.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (c *DataChannel) onOpenComplete() {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	hdlr := c.onOpenCompleteHandler
+	c.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if hdlr != nil {
+		go c.openCompleteHandlerOnce.Do(func() {
+			hdlr()
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// BytesSent returns the number of bytes sent
+func (c *DataChannel) BytesSent() uint64 {
+	return atomic.LoadUint64(&c.bytesSent)
+}
+
+// BytesReceived returns the number of bytes received
+func (c *DataChannel) BytesReceived() uint64 {
+	return atomic.LoadUint64(&c.bytesReceived)
+}
+
+// StreamIdentifier returns the Stream identifier associated to the stream.
+func (c *DataChannel) StreamIdentifier() uint16 {
+	return c.stream.StreamIdentifier()
+}
+
+func (c *DataChannel) handleDCEP(data []byte) error {
+	msg, err := parse(data)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse DataChannel packet %w", err)
+	}
+
+	switch msg := msg.(type) {
+	case *channelAck:
+		c.onOpenComplete()
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w, wanted ACK got %v", ErrUnexpectedDataChannelType, msg)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Write writes len(p) bytes from p as binary data
+func (c *DataChannel) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	return c.WriteDataChannel(p, false)
+}
+
+// WriteDataChannel writes len(p) bytes from p
+func (c *DataChannel) WriteDataChannel(p []byte, isString bool) (n int, err error) {
+	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-data-channel-12#section-6.6
+	// SCTP does not support the sending of empty user messages.  Therefore,
+	// if an empty message has to be sent, the appropriate PPID (WebRTC
+	// String Empty or WebRTC Binary Empty) is used and the SCTP user
+	// message of one zero byte is sent.  When receiving an SCTP user
+	// message with one of these PPIDs, the receiver MUST ignore the SCTP
+	// user message and process it as an empty message.
+	var ppi sctp.PayloadProtocolIdentifier
+	switch {
+	case !isString && len(p) > 0:
+		ppi = sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCBinary
+	case !isString && len(p) == 0:
+		ppi = sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCBinaryEmpty
+	case isString && len(p) > 0:
+		ppi = sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCString
+	case isString && len(p) == 0:
+		ppi = sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCStringEmpty
+	}
+
+	atomic.AddUint32(&c.messagesSent, 1)
+	atomic.AddUint64(&c.bytesSent, uint64(len(p)))
+
+	if len(p) == 0 {
+		_, err := c.stream.WriteSCTP([]byte{0}, ppi)
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return c.stream.WriteSCTP(p, ppi)
+}
+
+func (c *DataChannel) writeDataChannelAck() error {
+	ack := channelAck{}
+	ackMsg, err := ack.Marshal()
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal ChannelOpen ACK: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if _, err = c.stream.WriteSCTP(ackMsg, sctp.PayloadTypeWebRTCDCEP); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed to send ChannelOpen ACK: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return err
+}
+
+// Close closes the DataChannel and the underlying SCTP stream.
+func (c *DataChannel) Close() error {
+	// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-data-channel-13#section-6.7
+	// Closing of a data channel MUST be signaled by resetting the
+	// corresponding outgoing streams [RFC6525].  This means that if one
+	// side decides to close the data channel, it resets the corresponding
+	// outgoing stream.  When the peer sees that an incoming stream was
+	// reset, it also resets its corresponding outgoing stream.  Once this
+	// is completed, the data channel is closed.  Resetting a stream sets
+	// the Stream Sequence Numbers (SSNs) of the stream back to 'zero' with
+	// a corresponding notification to the application layer that the reset
+	// has been performed.  Streams are available for reuse after a reset
+	// has been performed.
+	return c.stream.Close()
+}
+
+// BufferedAmount returns the number of bytes of data currently queued to be
+// sent over this stream.
+func (c *DataChannel) BufferedAmount() uint64 {
+	return c.stream.BufferedAmount()
+}
+
+// BufferedAmountLowThreshold returns the number of bytes of buffered outgoing
+// data that is considered "low." Defaults to 0.
+func (c *DataChannel) BufferedAmountLowThreshold() uint64 {
+	return c.stream.BufferedAmountLowThreshold()
+}
+
+// SetBufferedAmountLowThreshold is used to update the threshold.
+// See BufferedAmountLowThreshold().
+func (c *DataChannel) SetBufferedAmountLowThreshold(th uint64) {
+	c.stream.SetBufferedAmountLowThreshold(th)
+}
+
+// OnBufferedAmountLow sets the callback handler which would be called when the
+// number of bytes of outgoing data buffered is lower than the threshold.
+func (c *DataChannel) OnBufferedAmountLow(f func()) {
+	c.stream.OnBufferedAmountLow(f)
+}
+
+func (c *DataChannel) commitReliabilityParams() error {
+	switch c.Config.ChannelType {
+	case ChannelTypeReliable:
+		c.stream.SetReliabilityParams(false, sctp.ReliabilityTypeReliable, c.Config.ReliabilityParameter)
+	case ChannelTypeReliableUnordered:
+		c.stream.SetReliabilityParams(true, sctp.ReliabilityTypeReliable, c.Config.ReliabilityParameter)
+	case ChannelTypePartialReliableRexmit:
+		c.stream.SetReliabilityParams(false, sctp.ReliabilityTypeRexmit, c.Config.ReliabilityParameter)
+	case ChannelTypePartialReliableRexmitUnordered:
+		c.stream.SetReliabilityParams(true, sctp.ReliabilityTypeRexmit, c.Config.ReliabilityParameter)
+	case ChannelTypePartialReliableTimed:
+		c.stream.SetReliabilityParams(false, sctp.ReliabilityTypeTimed, c.Config.ReliabilityParameter)
+	case ChannelTypePartialReliableTimedUnordered:
+		c.stream.SetReliabilityParams(true, sctp.ReliabilityTypeTimed, c.Config.ReliabilityParameter)
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w %v", ErrInvalidChannelType, c.Config.ChannelType)
+	}
+	return nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/datachannel/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package datachannel
+
+import "errors"
+
+var (
+	// ErrDataChannelMessageTooShort means that the data isn't long enough to be a valid DataChannel message
+	ErrDataChannelMessageTooShort = errors.New("DataChannel message is not long enough to determine type")
+
+	// ErrInvalidPayloadProtocolIdentifier means that we got a DataChannel messages with a Payload Protocol Identifier
+	// we don't know how to handle
+	ErrInvalidPayloadProtocolIdentifier = errors.New("DataChannel message Payload Protocol Identifier is value we can't handle")
+
+	// ErrInvalidChannelType means that the remote requested a channel type that we don't support
+	ErrInvalidChannelType = errors.New("invalid Channel Type")
+
+	// ErrInvalidMessageType is returned when a DataChannel Message has a type we don't support
+	ErrInvalidMessageType = errors.New("invalid Message Type")
+
+	// ErrExpectedAndActualLengthMismatch is when the declared length and actual length don't match
+	ErrExpectedAndActualLengthMismatch = errors.New("expected and actual length do not match")
+
+	// ErrUnexpectedDataChannelType is when a message type does not match the expected type
+	ErrUnexpectedDataChannelType = errors.New("expected and actual message type does not match")
+)

server/vendor/github.com/pion/datachannel/message.go

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package datachannel
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+)
+
+// message is a parsed DataChannel message
+type message interface {
+	Marshal() ([]byte, error)
+	Unmarshal([]byte) error
+	String() string
+}
+
+// messageType is the first byte in a DataChannel message that specifies type
+type messageType byte
+
+// DataChannel Message Types
+const (
+	dataChannelAck  messageType = 0x02
+	dataChannelOpen messageType = 0x03
+)
+
+func (t messageType) String() string {
+	switch t {
+	case dataChannelAck:
+		return "DataChannelAck"
+	case dataChannelOpen:
+		return "DataChannelOpen"
+	default:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("Unknown MessageType: %d", t)
+	}
+}
+
+// parse accepts raw input and returns a DataChannel message
+func parse(raw []byte) (message, error) {
+	if len(raw) == 0 {
+		return nil, ErrDataChannelMessageTooShort
+	}
+
+	var msg message
+	switch messageType(raw[0]) {
+	case dataChannelOpen:
+		msg = &channelOpen{}
+	case dataChannelAck:
+		msg = &channelAck{}
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w %v", ErrInvalidMessageType, messageType(raw[0]))
+	}
+
+	if err := msg.Unmarshal(raw); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return msg, nil
+}
+
+// parseExpectDataChannelOpen parses a DataChannelOpen message
+// or throws an error
+func parseExpectDataChannelOpen(raw []byte) (*channelOpen, error) {
+	if len(raw) == 0 {
+		return nil, ErrDataChannelMessageTooShort
+	}
+
+	if actualTyp := messageType(raw[0]); actualTyp != dataChannelOpen {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w expected(%s) actual(%s)", ErrUnexpectedDataChannelType, actualTyp, dataChannelOpen)
+	}
+
+	msg := &channelOpen{}
+	if err := msg.Unmarshal(raw); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return msg, nil
+}
+
+// TryMarshalUnmarshal attempts to marshal and unmarshal a message. Added for fuzzing.
+func TryMarshalUnmarshal(msg []byte) int {
+	message, err := parse(msg)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0
+	}
+
+	_, err = message.Marshal()
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0
+	}
+
+	return 1
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/datachannel/message_channel_ack.go

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package datachannel
+
+// channelAck is used to ACK a DataChannel open
+type channelAck struct{}
+
+const (
+	channelOpenAckLength = 4
+)
+
+// Marshal returns raw bytes for the given message
+func (c *channelAck) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	raw := make([]byte, channelOpenAckLength)
+	raw[0] = uint8(dataChannelAck)
+
+	return raw, nil
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the struct with the given raw data
+func (c *channelAck) Unmarshal(_ []byte) error {
+	// Message type already checked in Parse and there is no further data
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c channelAck) String() string {
+	return "ACK"
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/datachannel/message_channel_open.go

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package datachannel
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"fmt"
+)
+
+/*
+channelOpen represents a DATA_CHANNEL_OPEN Message
+
+	0                   1                   2                   3
+	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+|  Message Type |  Channel Type |            Priority           |
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+|                    Reliability Parameter                      |
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+|         Label Length          |       Protocol Length         |
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+|                                                               |
+|                             Label                             |
+|                                                               |
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+|                                                               |
+|                            Protocol                           |
+|                                                               |
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+*/
+type channelOpen struct {
+	ChannelType          ChannelType
+	Priority             uint16
+	ReliabilityParameter uint32
+
+	Label    []byte
+	Protocol []byte
+}
+
+const (
+	channelOpenHeaderLength = 12
+)
+
+// ChannelType determines the reliability of the WebRTC DataChannel
+type ChannelType byte
+
+// ChannelType enums
+const (
+	// ChannelTypeReliable determines the Data Channel provides a
+	// reliable in-order bi-directional communication.
+	ChannelTypeReliable ChannelType = 0x00
+	// ChannelTypeReliableUnordered determines the Data Channel
+	// provides a reliable unordered bi-directional communication.
+	ChannelTypeReliableUnordered ChannelType = 0x80
+	// ChannelTypePartialReliableRexmit determines the Data Channel
+	// provides a partially-reliable in-order bi-directional communication.
+	// User messages will not be retransmitted more times than specified in the Reliability Parameter.
+	ChannelTypePartialReliableRexmit ChannelType = 0x01
+	// ChannelTypePartialReliableRexmitUnordered determines
+	//  the Data Channel provides a partial reliable unordered bi-directional communication.
+	// User messages will not be retransmitted more times than specified in the Reliability Parameter.
+	ChannelTypePartialReliableRexmitUnordered ChannelType = 0x81
+	// ChannelTypePartialReliableTimed determines the Data Channel
+	// provides a partial reliable in-order bi-directional communication.
+	// User messages might not be transmitted or retransmitted after
+	// a specified life-time given in milli- seconds in the Reliability Parameter.
+	// This life-time starts when providing the user message to the protocol stack.
+	ChannelTypePartialReliableTimed ChannelType = 0x02
+	// The Data Channel provides a partial reliable unordered bi-directional
+	// communication.  User messages might not be transmitted or retransmitted
+	// after a specified life-time given in milli- seconds in the Reliability Parameter.
+	// This life-time starts when providing the user message to the protocol stack.
+	ChannelTypePartialReliableTimedUnordered ChannelType = 0x82
+)
+
+func (c ChannelType) String() string {
+	switch c {
+	case ChannelTypeReliable:
+	case ChannelTypeReliableUnordered:
+		return "ReliableUnordered"
+	case ChannelTypePartialReliableRexmit:
+		return "PartialReliableRexmit"
+	case ChannelTypePartialReliableRexmitUnordered:
+		return "PartialReliableRexmitUnordered"
+	case ChannelTypePartialReliableTimed:
+		return "PartialReliableTimed"
+	case ChannelTypePartialReliableTimedUnordered:
+		return "PartialReliableTimedUnordered"
+	}
+	return "Unknown"
+}
+
+// ChannelPriority enums
+const (
+	ChannelPriorityBelowNormal uint16 = 128
+	ChannelPriorityNormal      uint16 = 256
+	ChannelPriorityHigh        uint16 = 512
+	ChannelPriorityExtraHigh   uint16 = 1024
+)
+
+// Marshal returns raw bytes for the given message
+func (c *channelOpen) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	labelLength := len(c.Label)
+	protocolLength := len(c.Protocol)
+
+	totalLen := channelOpenHeaderLength + labelLength + protocolLength
+	raw := make([]byte, totalLen)
+
+	raw[0] = uint8(dataChannelOpen)
+	raw[1] = byte(c.ChannelType)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(raw[2:], c.Priority)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(raw[4:], c.ReliabilityParameter)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(raw[8:], uint16(labelLength))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(raw[10:], uint16(protocolLength))
+	endLabel := channelOpenHeaderLength + labelLength
+	copy(raw[channelOpenHeaderLength:endLabel], c.Label)
+	copy(raw[endLabel:endLabel+protocolLength], c.Protocol)
+
+	return raw, nil
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the struct with the given raw data
+func (c *channelOpen) Unmarshal(raw []byte) error {
+	if len(raw) < channelOpenHeaderLength {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w expected(%d) actual(%d)", ErrExpectedAndActualLengthMismatch, channelOpenHeaderLength, len(raw))
+	}
+	c.ChannelType = ChannelType(raw[1])
+	c.Priority = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[2:])
+	c.ReliabilityParameter = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(raw[4:])
+
+	labelLength := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[8:])
+	protocolLength := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(raw[10:])
+
+	if expectedLen := channelOpenHeaderLength + int(labelLength) + int(protocolLength); len(raw) != expectedLen {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%w expected(%d) actual(%d)", ErrExpectedAndActualLengthMismatch, expectedLen, len(raw))
+	}
+
+	c.Label = raw[channelOpenHeaderLength : channelOpenHeaderLength+labelLength]
+	c.Protocol = raw[channelOpenHeaderLength+labelLength : channelOpenHeaderLength+labelLength+protocolLength]
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c channelOpen) String() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("Open ChannelType(%s) Priority(%v) ReliabilityParameter(%d) Label(%s) Protocol(%s)", c.ChannelType, c.Priority, c.ReliabilityParameter, string(c.Label), string(c.Protocol))
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/datachannel/renovate.json

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://docs.renovatebot.com/renovate-schema.json",
+  "extends": [
+    "github>pion/renovate-config"
+  ]
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/.editorconfig

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# http://editorconfig.org/
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+root = true
+
+[*]
+charset = utf-8
+insert_final_newline = true
+trim_trailing_whitespace = true
+end_of_line = lf
+
+[*.go]
+indent_style = tab
+indent_size = 4
+
+[{*.yml,*.yaml}]
+indent_style = space
+indent_size = 2
+
+# Makefiles always use tabs for indentation
+[Makefile]
+indent_style = tab

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+### JetBrains IDE ###
+#####################
+.idea/
+
+### Emacs Temporary Files ###
+#############################
+*~
+
+### Folders ###
+###############
+bin/
+vendor/
+node_modules/
+
+### Files ###
+#############
+*.ivf
+*.ogg
+tags
+cover.out
+*.sw[poe]
+*.wasm
+examples/sfu-ws/cert.pem
+examples/sfu-ws/key.pem
+wasm_exec.js

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/.golangci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+linters-settings:
+  govet:
+    check-shadowing: true
+  misspell:
+    locale: US
+  exhaustive:
+    default-signifies-exhaustive: true
+  gomodguard:
+    blocked:
+      modules:
+        - github.com/pkg/errors:
+            recommendations:
+              - errors
+  forbidigo:
+    forbid:
+      - ^fmt.Print(f|ln)?$
+      - ^log.(Panic|Fatal|Print)(f|ln)?$
+      - ^os.Exit$
+      - ^panic$
+      - ^print(ln)?$
+
+linters:
+  enable:
+    - asciicheck       # Simple linter to check that your code does not contain non-ASCII identifiers
+    - bidichk          # Checks for dangerous unicode character sequences
+    - bodyclose        # checks whether HTTP response body is closed successfully
+    - contextcheck     # check the function whether use a non-inherited context
+    - decorder         # check declaration order and count of types, constants, variables and functions
+    - depguard         # Go linter that checks if package imports are in a list of acceptable packages
+    - dogsled          # Checks assignments with too many blank identifiers (e.g. x, _, _, _, := f())
+    - dupl             # Tool for code clone detection
+    - durationcheck    # check for two durations multiplied together
+    - errcheck         # Errcheck is a program for checking for unchecked errors in go programs. These unchecked errors can be critical bugs in some cases
+    - errchkjson       # Checks types passed to the json encoding functions. Reports unsupported types and optionally reports occations, where the check for the returned error can be omitted.
+    - errname          # Checks that sentinel errors are prefixed with the `Err` and error types are suffixed with the `Error`.
+    - errorlint        # errorlint is a linter for that can be used to find code that will cause problems with the error wrapping scheme introduced in Go 1.13.
+    - exhaustive       # check exhaustiveness of enum switch statements
+    - exportloopref    # checks for pointers to enclosing loop variables
+    - forbidigo        # Forbids identifiers
+    - forcetypeassert  # finds forced type assertions
+    - gci              # Gci control golang package import order and make it always deterministic.
+    - gochecknoglobals # Checks that no globals are present in Go code
+    - gochecknoinits   # Checks that no init functions are present in Go code
+    - gocognit         # Computes and checks the cognitive complexity of functions
+    - goconst          # Finds repeated strings that could be replaced by a constant
+    - gocritic         # The most opinionated Go source code linter
+    - godox            # Tool for detection of FIXME, TODO and other comment keywords
+    - goerr113         # Golang linter to check the errors handling expressions
+    - gofmt            # Gofmt checks whether code was gofmt-ed. By default this tool runs with -s option to check for code simplification
+    - gofumpt          # Gofumpt checks whether code was gofumpt-ed.
+    - goheader         # Checks is file header matches to pattern
+    - goimports        # Goimports does everything that gofmt does. Additionally it checks unused imports
+    - gomoddirectives  # Manage the use of 'replace', 'retract', and 'excludes' directives in go.mod.
+    - gomodguard       # Allow and block list linter for direct Go module dependencies. This is different from depguard where there are different block types for example version constraints and module recommendations.
+    - goprintffuncname # Checks that printf-like functions are named with `f` at the end
+    - gosec            # Inspects source code for security problems
+    - gosimple         # Linter for Go source code that specializes in simplifying a code
+    - govet            # Vet examines Go source code and reports suspicious constructs, such as Printf calls whose arguments do not align with the format string
+    - grouper          # An analyzer to analyze expression groups.
+    - importas         # Enforces consistent import aliases
+    - ineffassign      # Detects when assignments to existing variables are not used
+    - misspell         # Finds commonly misspelled English words in comments
+    - nakedret         # Finds naked returns in functions greater than a specified function length
+    - nilerr           # Finds the code that returns nil even if it checks that the error is not nil.
+    - nilnil           # Checks that there is no simultaneous return of `nil` error and an invalid value.
+    - noctx            # noctx finds sending http request without context.Context
+    - predeclared      # find code that shadows one of Go's predeclared identifiers
+    - revive           # golint replacement, finds style mistakes
+    - staticcheck      # Staticcheck is a go vet on steroids, applying a ton of static analysis checks
+    - stylecheck       # Stylecheck is a replacement for golint
+    - tagliatelle      # Checks the struct tags.
+    - tenv             # tenv is analyzer that detects using os.Setenv instead of t.Setenv since Go1.17
+    - tparallel        # tparallel detects inappropriate usage of t.Parallel() method in your Go test codes
+    - typecheck        # Like the front-end of a Go compiler, parses and type-checks Go code
+    - unconvert        # Remove unnecessary type conversions
+    - unparam          # Reports unused function parameters
+    - unused           # Checks Go code for unused constants, variables, functions and types
+    - wastedassign     # wastedassign finds wasted assignment statements
+    - whitespace       # Tool for detection of leading and trailing whitespace
+  disable:
+    - containedctx     # containedctx is a linter that detects struct contained context.Context field
+    - cyclop           # checks function and package cyclomatic complexity
+    - exhaustivestruct # Checks if all struct's fields are initialized
+    - funlen           # Tool for detection of long functions
+    - gocyclo          # Computes and checks the cyclomatic complexity of functions
+    - godot            # Check if comments end in a period
+    - gomnd            # An analyzer to detect magic numbers.
+    - ifshort          # Checks that your code uses short syntax for if-statements whenever possible
+    - ireturn          # Accept Interfaces, Return Concrete Types
+    - lll              # Reports long lines
+    - maintidx         # maintidx measures the maintainability index of each function.
+    - makezero         # Finds slice declarations with non-zero initial length
+    - maligned         # Tool to detect Go structs that would take less memory if their fields were sorted
+    - nestif           # Reports deeply nested if statements
+    - nlreturn         # nlreturn checks for a new line before return and branch statements to increase code clarity
+    - nolintlint       # Reports ill-formed or insufficient nolint directives
+    - paralleltest     # paralleltest detects missing usage of t.Parallel() method in your Go test
+    - prealloc         # Finds slice declarations that could potentially be preallocated
+    - promlinter       # Check Prometheus metrics naming via promlint
+    - rowserrcheck     # checks whether Err of rows is checked successfully
+    - sqlclosecheck    # Checks that sql.Rows and sql.Stmt are closed.
+    - testpackage      # linter that makes you use a separate _test package
+    - thelper          # thelper detects golang test helpers without t.Helper() call and checks the consistency of test helpers
+    - varnamelen       # checks that the length of a variable's name matches its scope
+    - wrapcheck        # Checks that errors returned from external packages are wrapped
+    - wsl              # Whitespace Linter - Forces you to use empty lines!
+
+issues:
+  exclude-use-default: false
+  exclude-rules:
+    # Allow complex tests, better to be self contained
+    - path: _test\.go
+      linters:
+        - gocognit
+        - forbidigo
+
+    # Allow complex main function in examples
+    - path: examples
+      text: "of func `main` is high"
+      linters:
+        - gocognit
+    
+    # Allow forbidden identifiers in examples
+    - path: examples
+      linters:
+        - forbidigo
+
+    # Allow forbidden identifiers in CLI commands
+    - path: cmd
+      linters:
+        - forbidigo
+
+run:
+  skip-dirs-use-default: false

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/.goreleaser.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+builds:
+- skip: true

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/AUTHORS.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Thank you to everyone that made Pion possible. If you are interested in contributing
+# we would love to have you https://github.com/pion/webrtc/wiki/Contributing
+#
+# This file is auto generated, using git to list all individuals contributors.
+# see https://github.com/pion/.goassets/blob/master/scripts/generate-authors.sh for the scripting
+Aleksandr Razumov <ar@gortc.io>
+alvarowolfx <alvarowolfx@gmail.com>
+Arlo Breault <arlolra@gmail.com>
+Atsushi Watanabe <atsushi.w@ieee.org>
+backkem <mail@backkem.me>
+bjdgyc <bjdgyc@163.com>
+boks1971 <raja.gobi@tutanota.com>
+Bragadeesh <bragboy@gmail.com>
+Carson Hoffman <c@rsonhoffman.com>
+Cecylia Bocovich <cohosh@torproject.org>
+Chris Hiszpanski <thinkski@users.noreply.github.com>
+cnderrauber <zengjie9004@gmail.com>
+Daniele Sluijters <daenney@users.noreply.github.com>
+folbrich <frank.olbricht@gmail.com>
+Hayden James <hayden.james@gmail.com>
+Hugo Arregui <hugo.arregui@gmail.com>
+Hugo Arregui <hugo@decentraland.org>
+igolaizola <11333576+igolaizola@users.noreply.github.com>
+Jeffrey Stoke <me@arhat.dev>
+Jeroen de Bruijn <vidavidorra+jdbruijn@gmail.com>
+Jeroen de Bruijn <vidavidorra@gmail.com>
+Jim Wert <jimwert@gmail.com>
+jinleileiking <jinleileiking@gmail.com>
+Jozef Kralik <jojo.lwin@gmail.com>
+Julien Salleyron <julien.salleyron@gmail.com>
+Juliusz Chroboczek <jch@irif.fr>
+Kegan Dougal <kegan@matrix.org>
+Kevin Wang <kevmo314@gmail.com>
+Lander Noterman <lander.noterman@basalte.be>
+Len <len@hpcnt.com>
+Lukas Lihotzki <lukas@lihotzki.de>
+ManuelBk <26275612+ManuelBk@users.noreply.github.com>
+Michael Zabka <zabka.michael@gmail.com>
+Michiel De Backker <mail@backkem.me>
+Rachel Chen <rachel@chens.email>
+Robert Eperjesi <eperjesi@uber.com>
+Ryan Gordon <ryan.gordon@getcruise.com>
+Sam Lancia <sam.lancia@motorolasolutions.com>
+Sean DuBois <duboisea@justin.tv>
+Sean DuBois <seaduboi@amazon.com>
+Sean DuBois <sean@siobud.com>
+Shelikhoo <xiaokangwang@outlook.com>
+Stefan Tatschner <stefan@rumpelsepp.org>
+Steffen Vogel <post@steffenvogel.de>
+Vadim <fffilimonov@yandex.ru>
+Vadim Filimonov <fffilimonov@yandex.ru>
+wmiao <wu.miao@viasat.com>
+ZHENK <chengzhenyang@gmail.com>
+吕海涛 <hi@taoshu.in>
+
+# List of contributors not appearing in Git history
+

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+<h1 align="center">
+  <br>
+  Pion DTLS
+  <br>
+</h1>
+<h4 align="center">A Go implementation of DTLS</h4>
+<p align="center">
+  <a href="https://pion.ly"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/pion-dtls-gray.svg?longCache=true&colorB=brightgreen" alt="Pion DTLS"></a>
+  <a href="https://sourcegraph.com/github.com/pion/dtls"><img src="https://sourcegraph.com/github.com/pion/dtls/-/badge.svg" alt="Sourcegraph Widget"></a>
+  <a href="https://pion.ly/slack"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/join-us%20on%20slack-gray.svg?longCache=true&logo=slack&colorB=brightgreen" alt="Slack Widget"></a>
+  <br>
+  <img alt="GitHub Workflow Status" src="https://img.shields.io/github/actions/workflow/status/pion/dtls/test.yaml">
+  <a href="https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/pion/dtls/v2"><img src="https://pkg.go.dev/badge/github.com/pion/dtls/v2.svg" alt="Go Reference"></a>
+  <a href="https://codecov.io/gh/pion/dtls"><img src="https://codecov.io/gh/pion/dtls/branch/master/graph/badge.svg" alt="Coverage Status"></a>
+  <a href="https://goreportcard.com/report/github.com/pion/dtls/v2"><img src="https://goreportcard.com/badge/github.com/pion/dtls/v2" alt="Go Report Card"></a>
+  <a href="LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg" alt="License: MIT"></a>
+</p>
+<br>
+
+Native [DTLS 1.2][rfc6347] implementation in the Go programming language.
+
+A long term goal is a professional security review, and maybe an inclusion in stdlib.
+
+### RFCs
+#### Implemented
+- **RFC 6347**: [Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2][rfc6347]
+- **RFC 5705**: [Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)][rfc5705]
+- **RFC 7627**: [Transport Layer Security (TLS) - Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension][rfc7627]
+- **RFC 7301**: [Transport Layer Security (TLS) - Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension][rfc7301]
+
+[rfc5289]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5289
+[rfc5487]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5487
+[rfc5489]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5489
+[rfc5705]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5705
+[rfc6347]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6347
+[rfc6655]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6655
+[rfc7301]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301
+[rfc7627]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7627
+[rfc8422]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8422
+
+### Goals/Progress
+This will only be targeting DTLS 1.2, and the most modern/common cipher suites.
+We would love contributions that fall under the 'Planned Features' and any bug fixes!
+
+#### Current features
+* DTLS 1.2 Client/Server
+* Key Exchange via ECDHE(curve25519, nistp256, nistp384) and PSK
+* Packet loss and re-ordering is handled during handshaking
+* Key export ([RFC 5705][rfc5705])
+* Serialization and Resumption of sessions
+* Extended Master Secret extension ([RFC 7627][rfc7627])
+* ALPN extension ([RFC 7301][rfc7301])
+
+#### Supported ciphers
+
+##### ECDHE
+
+* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM ([RFC 6655][rfc6655])
+* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 ([RFC 6655][rfc6655])
+* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ([RFC 5289][rfc5289])
+* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ([RFC 5289][rfc5289])
+* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ([RFC 5289][rfc5289])
+* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ([RFC 5289][rfc5289])
+* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ([RFC 8422][rfc8422])
+* TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ([RFC 8422][rfc8422])
+
+##### PSK
+
+* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM ([RFC 6655][rfc6655])
+* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 ([RFC 6655][rfc6655])
+* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 ([RFC 6655][rfc6655])
+* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ([RFC 5487][rfc5487])
+* TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ([RFC 5487][rfc5487])
+
+##### ECDHE & PSK
+
+* TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ([RFC 5489][rfc5489])
+
+#### Planned Features
+* Chacha20Poly1305
+
+#### Excluded Features
+* DTLS 1.0
+* Renegotiation
+* Compression
+
+### Using
+
+This library needs at least Go 1.13, and you should have [Go modules
+enabled](https://github.com/golang/go/wiki/Modules).
+
+#### Pion DTLS
+For a DTLS 1.2 Server that listens on 127.0.0.1:4444
+```sh
+go run examples/listen/selfsign/main.go
+```
+
+For a DTLS 1.2 Client that connects to 127.0.0.1:4444
+```sh
+go run examples/dial/selfsign/main.go
+```
+
+#### OpenSSL
+Pion DTLS can connect to itself and OpenSSL.
+```
+  // Generate a certificate
+  openssl ecparam -out key.pem -name prime256v1 -genkey
+  openssl req -new -sha256 -key key.pem -out server.csr
+  openssl x509 -req -sha256 -days 365 -in server.csr -signkey key.pem -out cert.pem
+
+  // Use with examples/dial/selfsign/main.go
+  openssl s_server -dtls1_2 -cert cert.pem -key key.pem -accept 4444
+
+  // Use with examples/listen/selfsign/main.go
+  openssl s_client -dtls1_2 -connect 127.0.0.1:4444 -debug -cert cert.pem -key key.pem
+```
+
+### Using with PSK
+Pion DTLS also comes with examples that do key exchange via PSK
+
+#### Pion DTLS
+```sh
+go run examples/listen/psk/main.go
+```
+
+```sh
+go run examples/dial/psk/main.go
+```
+
+#### OpenSSL
+```
+  // Use with examples/dial/psk/main.go
+  openssl s_server -dtls1_2 -accept 4444 -nocert -psk abc123 -cipher PSK-AES128-CCM8
+
+  // Use with examples/listen/psk/main.go
+  openssl s_client -dtls1_2 -connect 127.0.0.1:4444 -psk abc123 -cipher PSK-AES128-CCM8
+```
+
+### Community
+Pion has an active community on the [Slack](https://pion.ly/slack).
+
+Follow the [Pion Twitter](https://twitter.com/_pion) for project updates and important WebRTC news.
+
+We are always looking to support **your projects**. Please reach out if you have something to build!
+If you need commercial support or don't want to use public methods you can contact us at [team@pion.ly](mailto:team@pion.ly)
+
+### Contributing
+Check out the [contributing wiki](https://github.com/pion/webrtc/wiki/Contributing) to join the group of amazing people making this project possible: [AUTHORS.txt](./AUTHORS.txt)
+
+### License
+MIT License - see [LICENSE](LICENSE) for full text

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/certificate.go

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// ClientHelloInfo contains information from a ClientHello message in order to
+// guide application logic in the GetCertificate.
+type ClientHelloInfo struct {
+	// ServerName indicates the name of the server requested by the client
+	// in order to support virtual hosting. ServerName is only set if the
+	// client is using SNI (see RFC 4366, Section 3.1).
+	ServerName string
+
+	// CipherSuites lists the CipherSuites supported by the client (e.g.
+	// TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256).
+	CipherSuites []CipherSuiteID
+}
+
+// CertificateRequestInfo contains information from a server's
+// CertificateRequest message, which is used to demand a certificate and proof
+// of control from a client.
+type CertificateRequestInfo struct {
+	// AcceptableCAs contains zero or more, DER-encoded, X.501
+	// Distinguished Names. These are the names of root or intermediate CAs
+	// that the server wishes the returned certificate to be signed by. An
+	// empty slice indicates that the server has no preference.
+	AcceptableCAs [][]byte
+}
+
+// SupportsCertificate returns nil if the provided certificate is supported by
+// the server that sent the CertificateRequest. Otherwise, it returns an error
+// describing the reason for the incompatibility.
+// NOTE: original src: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/29b9a328d268d53833d2cc063d1d8b4bf6852675/src/crypto/tls/common.go#L1273
+func (cri *CertificateRequestInfo) SupportsCertificate(c *tls.Certificate) error {
+	if len(cri.AcceptableCAs) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	for j, cert := range c.Certificate {
+		x509Cert := c.Leaf
+		// Parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf node, or if
+		// chain.Leaf was nil.
+		if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil {
+			var err error
+			if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse certificate #%d in the chain: %w", j, err)
+			}
+		}
+
+		for _, ca := range cri.AcceptableCAs {
+			if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) {
+				return nil
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return errNotAcceptableCertificateChain
+}
+
+func (c *handshakeConfig) setNameToCertificateLocked() {
+	nameToCertificate := make(map[string]*tls.Certificate)
+	for i := range c.localCertificates {
+		cert := &c.localCertificates[i]
+		x509Cert := cert.Leaf
+		if x509Cert == nil {
+			var parseErr error
+			x509Cert, parseErr = x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0])
+			if parseErr != nil {
+				continue
+			}
+		}
+		if len(x509Cert.Subject.CommonName) > 0 {
+			nameToCertificate[strings.ToLower(x509Cert.Subject.CommonName)] = cert
+		}
+		for _, san := range x509Cert.DNSNames {
+			nameToCertificate[strings.ToLower(san)] = cert
+		}
+	}
+	c.nameToCertificate = nameToCertificate
+}
+
+func (c *handshakeConfig) getCertificate(clientHelloInfo *ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if c.localGetCertificate != nil &&
+		(len(c.localCertificates) == 0 || len(clientHelloInfo.ServerName) > 0) {
+		cert, err := c.localGetCertificate(clientHelloInfo)
+		if cert != nil || err != nil {
+			return cert, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if c.nameToCertificate == nil {
+		c.setNameToCertificateLocked()
+	}
+
+	if len(c.localCertificates) == 0 {
+		return nil, errNoCertificates
+	}
+
+	if len(c.localCertificates) == 1 {
+		// There's only one choice, so no point doing any work.
+		return &c.localCertificates[0], nil
+	}
+
+	if len(clientHelloInfo.ServerName) == 0 {
+		return &c.localCertificates[0], nil
+	}
+
+	name := strings.TrimRight(strings.ToLower(clientHelloInfo.ServerName), ".")
+
+	if cert, ok := c.nameToCertificate[name]; ok {
+		return cert, nil
+	}
+
+	// try replacing labels in the name with wildcards until we get a
+	// match.
+	labels := strings.Split(name, ".")
+	for i := range labels {
+		labels[i] = "*"
+		candidate := strings.Join(labels, ".")
+		if cert, ok := c.nameToCertificate[candidate]; ok {
+			return cert, nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	// If nothing matches, return the first certificate.
+	return &c.localCertificates[0], nil
+}
+
+// NOTE: original src: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/29b9a328d268d53833d2cc063d1d8b4bf6852675/src/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go#L974
+func (c *handshakeConfig) getClientCertificate(cri *CertificateRequestInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	if c.localGetClientCertificate != nil {
+		return c.localGetClientCertificate(cri)
+	}
+
+	for i := range c.localCertificates {
+		chain := c.localCertificates[i]
+		if err := cri.SupportsCertificate(&chain); err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		return &chain, nil
+	}
+
+	// No acceptable certificate found. Don't send a certificate.
+	return new(tls.Certificate), nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/cipher_suite.go

@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+// CipherSuiteID is an ID for our supported CipherSuites
+type CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.ID
+
+// Supported Cipher Suites
+const (
+	// AES-128-CCM
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM   CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM   //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+
+	// AES-128-GCM-SHA256
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+
+	// AES-256-CBC-SHA
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA   CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA   //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+
+	TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM        CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM        //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8      CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8      //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8      CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8      //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+
+	TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 CipherSuiteID = ciphersuite.TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+)
+
+// CipherSuiteAuthenticationType controls what authentication method is using during the handshake for a CipherSuite
+type CipherSuiteAuthenticationType = ciphersuite.AuthenticationType
+
+// AuthenticationType Enums
+const (
+	CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypeCertificate  CipherSuiteAuthenticationType = ciphersuite.AuthenticationTypeCertificate
+	CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypePreSharedKey CipherSuiteAuthenticationType = ciphersuite.AuthenticationTypePreSharedKey
+	CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypeAnonymous    CipherSuiteAuthenticationType = ciphersuite.AuthenticationTypeAnonymous
+)
+
+// CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithm controls what exchange algorithm is using during the handshake for a CipherSuite
+type CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithm = ciphersuite.KeyExchangeAlgorithm
+
+// CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithm Bitmask
+const (
+	CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmNone  CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithm = ciphersuite.KeyExchangeAlgorithmNone
+	CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk   CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithm = ciphersuite.KeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk
+	CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithm = ciphersuite.KeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe
+)
+
+var _ = allCipherSuites() // Necessary until this function isn't only used by Go 1.14
+
+// CipherSuite is an interface that all DTLS CipherSuites must satisfy
+type CipherSuite interface {
+	// String of CipherSuite, only used for logging
+	String() string
+
+	// ID of CipherSuite.
+	ID() CipherSuiteID
+
+	// What type of Certificate does this CipherSuite use
+	CertificateType() clientcertificate.Type
+
+	// What Hash function is used during verification
+	HashFunc() func() hash.Hash
+
+	// AuthenticationType controls what authentication method is using during the handshake
+	AuthenticationType() CipherSuiteAuthenticationType
+
+	// KeyExchangeAlgorithm controls what exchange algorithm is using during the handshake
+	KeyExchangeAlgorithm() CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithm
+
+	// ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) determines whether ECC extesions will be send during handshake.
+	// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4492#page-10
+	ECC() bool
+
+	// Called when keying material has been generated, should initialize the internal cipher
+	Init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, isClient bool) error
+	IsInitialized() bool
+	Encrypt(pkt *recordlayer.RecordLayer, raw []byte) ([]byte, error)
+	Decrypt(in []byte) ([]byte, error)
+}
+
+// CipherSuiteName provides the same functionality as tls.CipherSuiteName
+// that appeared first in Go 1.14.
+//
+// Our implementation differs slightly in that it takes in a CiperSuiteID,
+// like the rest of our library, instead of a uint16 like crypto/tls.
+func CipherSuiteName(id CipherSuiteID) string {
+	suite := cipherSuiteForID(id, nil)
+	if suite != nil {
+		return suite.String()
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("0x%04X", uint16(id))
+}
+
+// Taken from https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml
+// A cipherSuite is a specific combination of key agreement, cipher and MAC
+// function.
+func cipherSuiteForID(id CipherSuiteID, customCiphers func() []CipherSuite) CipherSuite {
+	switch id { //nolint:exhaustive
+	case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM:
+		return ciphersuite.NewTLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128Ccm()
+	case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8:
+		return ciphersuite.NewTLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128Ccm8()
+	case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+		return &ciphersuite.TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256{}
+	case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+		return &ciphersuite.TLSEcdheRsaWithAes128GcmSha256{}
+	case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+		return &ciphersuite.TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha{}
+	case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+		return &ciphersuite.TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256CbcSha{}
+	case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM:
+		return ciphersuite.NewTLSPskWithAes128Ccm()
+	case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8:
+		return ciphersuite.NewTLSPskWithAes128Ccm8()
+	case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8:
+		return ciphersuite.NewTLSPskWithAes256Ccm8()
+	case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+		return &ciphersuite.TLSPskWithAes128GcmSha256{}
+	case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+		return &ciphersuite.TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256{}
+	case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+		return &ciphersuite.TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256GcmSha384{}
+	case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+		return &ciphersuite.TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256GcmSha384{}
+	case TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+		return ciphersuite.NewTLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256()
+	}
+
+	if customCiphers != nil {
+		for _, c := range customCiphers() {
+			if c.ID() == id {
+				return c
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// CipherSuites we support in order of preference
+func defaultCipherSuites() []CipherSuite {
+	return []CipherSuite{
+		&ciphersuite.TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256{},
+		&ciphersuite.TLSEcdheRsaWithAes128GcmSha256{},
+		&ciphersuite.TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha{},
+		&ciphersuite.TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256CbcSha{},
+		&ciphersuite.TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256GcmSha384{},
+		&ciphersuite.TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256GcmSha384{},
+	}
+}
+
+func allCipherSuites() []CipherSuite {
+	return []CipherSuite{
+		ciphersuite.NewTLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128Ccm(),
+		ciphersuite.NewTLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128Ccm8(),
+		&ciphersuite.TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256{},
+		&ciphersuite.TLSEcdheRsaWithAes128GcmSha256{},
+		&ciphersuite.TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha{},
+		&ciphersuite.TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256CbcSha{},
+		ciphersuite.NewTLSPskWithAes128Ccm(),
+		ciphersuite.NewTLSPskWithAes128Ccm8(),
+		ciphersuite.NewTLSPskWithAes256Ccm8(),
+		&ciphersuite.TLSPskWithAes128GcmSha256{},
+		&ciphersuite.TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256GcmSha384{},
+		&ciphersuite.TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256GcmSha384{},
+	}
+}
+
+func cipherSuiteIDs(cipherSuites []CipherSuite) []uint16 {
+	rtrn := []uint16{}
+	for _, c := range cipherSuites {
+		rtrn = append(rtrn, uint16(c.ID()))
+	}
+	return rtrn
+}
+
+func parseCipherSuites(userSelectedSuites []CipherSuiteID, customCipherSuites func() []CipherSuite, includeCertificateSuites, includePSKSuites bool) ([]CipherSuite, error) {
+	cipherSuitesForIDs := func(ids []CipherSuiteID) ([]CipherSuite, error) {
+		cipherSuites := []CipherSuite{}
+		for _, id := range ids {
+			c := cipherSuiteForID(id, nil)
+			if c == nil {
+				return nil, &invalidCipherSuiteError{id}
+			}
+			cipherSuites = append(cipherSuites, c)
+		}
+		return cipherSuites, nil
+	}
+
+	var (
+		cipherSuites []CipherSuite
+		err          error
+		i            int
+	)
+	if userSelectedSuites != nil {
+		cipherSuites, err = cipherSuitesForIDs(userSelectedSuites)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	} else {
+		cipherSuites = defaultCipherSuites()
+	}
+
+	// Put CustomCipherSuites before ID selected suites
+	if customCipherSuites != nil {
+		cipherSuites = append(customCipherSuites(), cipherSuites...)
+	}
+
+	var foundCertificateSuite, foundPSKSuite, foundAnonymousSuite bool
+	for _, c := range cipherSuites {
+		switch {
+		case includeCertificateSuites && c.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypeCertificate:
+			foundCertificateSuite = true
+		case includePSKSuites && c.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypePreSharedKey:
+			foundPSKSuite = true
+		case c.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypeAnonymous:
+			foundAnonymousSuite = true
+		default:
+			continue
+		}
+		cipherSuites[i] = c
+		i++
+	}
+
+	switch {
+	case includeCertificateSuites && !foundCertificateSuite && !foundAnonymousSuite:
+		return nil, errNoAvailableCertificateCipherSuite
+	case includePSKSuites && !foundPSKSuite:
+		return nil, errNoAvailablePSKCipherSuite
+	case i == 0:
+		return nil, errNoAvailableCipherSuites
+	}
+
+	return cipherSuites[:i], nil
+}
+
+func filterCipherSuitesForCertificate(cert *tls.Certificate, cipherSuites []CipherSuite) []CipherSuite {
+	if cert == nil || cert.PrivateKey == nil {
+		return cipherSuites
+	}
+	var certType clientcertificate.Type
+	switch cert.PrivateKey.(type) {
+	case ed25519.PrivateKey, *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+		certType = clientcertificate.ECDSASign
+	case *rsa.PrivateKey:
+		certType = clientcertificate.RSASign
+	}
+
+	filtered := []CipherSuite{}
+	for _, c := range cipherSuites {
+		if c.AuthenticationType() != CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypeCertificate || certType == c.CertificateType() {
+			filtered = append(filtered, c)
+		}
+	}
+	return filtered
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/cipher_suite_go114.go

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+//go:build go1.14
+// +build go1.14
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto/tls"
+)
+
+// VersionDTLS12 is the DTLS version in the same style as
+// VersionTLSXX from crypto/tls
+const VersionDTLS12 = 0xfefd
+
+// Convert from our cipherSuite interface to a tls.CipherSuite struct
+func toTLSCipherSuite(c CipherSuite) *tls.CipherSuite {
+	return &tls.CipherSuite{
+		ID:                uint16(c.ID()),
+		Name:              c.String(),
+		SupportedVersions: []uint16{VersionDTLS12},
+		Insecure:          false,
+	}
+}
+
+// CipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by this
+// package, excluding those with security issues, which are returned by
+// InsecureCipherSuites.
+func CipherSuites() []*tls.CipherSuite {
+	suites := allCipherSuites()
+	res := make([]*tls.CipherSuite, len(suites))
+	for i, c := range suites {
+		res[i] = toTLSCipherSuite(c)
+	}
+	return res
+}
+
+// InsecureCipherSuites returns a list of cipher suites currently implemented by
+// this package and which have security issues.
+func InsecureCipherSuites() []*tls.CipherSuite {
+	var res []*tls.CipherSuite
+	return res
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/codecov.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#
+# DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE
+#
+# It is automatically copied from https://github.com/pion/.goassets repository.
+#
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+coverage:
+  status:
+    project:
+      default:
+        # Allow decreasing 2% of total coverage to avoid noise.
+        threshold: 2%
+    patch:
+      default:
+        target: 70%
+        only_pulls: true
+
+ignore:
+  - "examples/*"
+  - "examples/**/*"

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/compression_method.go

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import "github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+
+func defaultCompressionMethods() []*protocol.CompressionMethod {
+	return []*protocol.CompressionMethod{
+		{},
+	}
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/config.go

@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"io"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/elliptic"
+	"github.com/pion/logging"
+)
+
+const keyLogLabelTLS12 = "CLIENT_RANDOM"
+
+// Config is used to configure a DTLS client or server.
+// After a Config is passed to a DTLS function it must not be modified.
+type Config struct {
+	// Certificates contains certificate chain to present to the other side of the connection.
+	// Server MUST set this if PSK is non-nil
+	// client SHOULD sets this so CertificateRequests can be handled if PSK is non-nil
+	Certificates []tls.Certificate
+
+	// CipherSuites is a list of supported cipher suites.
+	// If CipherSuites is nil, a default list is used
+	CipherSuites []CipherSuiteID
+
+	// CustomCipherSuites is a list of CipherSuites that can be
+	// provided by the user. This allow users to user Ciphers that are reserved
+	// for private usage.
+	CustomCipherSuites func() []CipherSuite
+
+	// SignatureSchemes contains the signature and hash schemes that the peer requests to verify.
+	SignatureSchemes []tls.SignatureScheme
+
+	// SRTPProtectionProfiles are the supported protection profiles
+	// Clients will send this via use_srtp and assert that the server properly responds
+	// Servers will assert that clients send one of these profiles and will respond as needed
+	SRTPProtectionProfiles []SRTPProtectionProfile
+
+	// ClientAuth determines the server's policy for
+	// TLS Client Authentication. The default is NoClientCert.
+	ClientAuth ClientAuthType
+
+	// RequireExtendedMasterSecret determines if the "Extended Master Secret" extension
+	// should be disabled, requested, or required (default requested).
+	ExtendedMasterSecret ExtendedMasterSecretType
+
+	// FlightInterval controls how often we send outbound handshake messages
+	// defaults to time.Second
+	FlightInterval time.Duration
+
+	// PSK sets the pre-shared key used by this DTLS connection
+	// If PSK is non-nil only PSK CipherSuites will be used
+	PSK             PSKCallback
+	PSKIdentityHint []byte
+
+	// InsecureSkipVerify controls whether a client verifies the
+	// server's certificate chain and host name.
+	// If InsecureSkipVerify is true, TLS accepts any certificate
+	// presented by the server and any host name in that certificate.
+	// In this mode, TLS is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks.
+	// This should be used only for testing.
+	InsecureSkipVerify bool
+
+	// InsecureHashes allows the use of hashing algorithms that are known
+	// to be vulnerable.
+	InsecureHashes bool
+
+	// VerifyPeerCertificate, if not nil, is called after normal
+	// certificate verification by either a client or server. It
+	// receives the certificate provided by the peer and also a flag
+	// that tells if normal verification has succeedded. If it returns a
+	// non-nil error, the handshake is aborted and that error results.
+	//
+	// If normal verification fails then the handshake will abort before
+	// considering this callback. If normal verification is disabled by
+	// setting InsecureSkipVerify, or (for a server) when ClientAuth is
+	// RequestClientCert or RequireAnyClientCert, then this callback will
+	// be considered but the verifiedChains will always be nil.
+	VerifyPeerCertificate func(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error
+
+	// VerifyConnection, if not nil, is called after normal certificate
+	// verification/PSK and after VerifyPeerCertificate by either a TLS client
+	// or server. If it returns a non-nil error, the handshake is aborted
+	// and that error results.
+	//
+	// If normal verification fails then the handshake will abort before
+	// considering this callback. This callback will run for all connections
+	// regardless of InsecureSkipVerify or ClientAuth settings.
+	VerifyConnection func(*State) error
+
+	// RootCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities
+	// that one peer uses when verifying the other peer's certificates.
+	// If RootCAs is nil, TLS uses the host's root CA set.
+	RootCAs *x509.CertPool
+
+	// ClientCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities
+	// that servers use if required to verify a client certificate
+	// by the policy in ClientAuth.
+	ClientCAs *x509.CertPool
+
+	// ServerName is used to verify the hostname on the returned
+	// certificates unless InsecureSkipVerify is given.
+	ServerName string
+
+	LoggerFactory logging.LoggerFactory
+
+	// ConnectContextMaker is a function to make a context used in Dial(),
+	// Client(), Server(), and Accept(). If nil, the default ConnectContextMaker
+	// is used. It can be implemented as following.
+	//
+	// 	func ConnectContextMaker() (context.Context, func()) {
+	// 		return context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
+	// 	}
+	ConnectContextMaker func() (context.Context, func())
+
+	// MTU is the length at which handshake messages will be fragmented to
+	// fit within the maximum transmission unit (default is 1200 bytes)
+	MTU int
+
+	// ReplayProtectionWindow is the size of the replay attack protection window.
+	// Duplication of the sequence number is checked in this window size.
+	// Packet with sequence number older than this value compared to the latest
+	// accepted packet will be discarded. (default is 64)
+	ReplayProtectionWindow int
+
+	// KeyLogWriter optionally specifies a destination for TLS master secrets
+	// in NSS key log format that can be used to allow external programs
+	// such as Wireshark to decrypt TLS connections.
+	// See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format.
+	// Use of KeyLogWriter compromises security and should only be
+	// used for debugging.
+	KeyLogWriter io.Writer
+
+	// SessionStore is the container to store session for resumption.
+	SessionStore SessionStore
+
+	// List of application protocols the peer supports, for ALPN
+	SupportedProtocols []string
+
+	// List of Elliptic Curves to use
+	//
+	// If an ECC ciphersuite is configured and EllipticCurves is empty
+	// it will default to X25519, P-256, P-384 in this specific order.
+	EllipticCurves []elliptic.Curve
+
+	// GetCertificate returns a Certificate based on the given
+	// ClientHelloInfo. It will only be called if the client supplies SNI
+	// information or if Certificates is empty.
+	//
+	// If GetCertificate is nil or returns nil, then the certificate is
+	// retrieved from NameToCertificate. If NameToCertificate is nil, the
+	// best element of Certificates will be used.
+	GetCertificate func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error)
+
+	// GetClientCertificate, if not nil, is called when a server requests a
+	// certificate from a client. If set, the contents of Certificates will
+	// be ignored.
+	//
+	// If GetClientCertificate returns an error, the handshake will be
+	// aborted and that error will be returned. Otherwise
+	// GetClientCertificate must return a non-nil Certificate. If
+	// Certificate.Certificate is empty then no certificate will be sent to
+	// the server. If this is unacceptable to the server then it may abort
+	// the handshake.
+	GetClientCertificate func(*CertificateRequestInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error)
+
+	// InsecureSkipVerifyHello, if true and when acting as server, allow client to
+	// skip hello verify phase and receive ServerHello after initial ClientHello.
+	// This have implication on DoS attack resistance.
+	InsecureSkipVerifyHello bool
+}
+
+func defaultConnectContextMaker() (context.Context, func()) {
+	return context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
+}
+
+func (c *Config) connectContextMaker() (context.Context, func()) {
+	if c.ConnectContextMaker == nil {
+		return defaultConnectContextMaker()
+	}
+	return c.ConnectContextMaker()
+}
+
+func (c *Config) includeCertificateSuites() bool {
+	return c.PSK == nil || len(c.Certificates) > 0 || c.GetCertificate != nil || c.GetClientCertificate != nil
+}
+
+const defaultMTU = 1200 // bytes
+
+var defaultCurves = []elliptic.Curve{elliptic.X25519, elliptic.P256, elliptic.P384} //nolint:gochecknoglobals
+
+// PSKCallback is called once we have the remote's PSKIdentityHint.
+// If the remote provided none it will be nil
+type PSKCallback func([]byte) ([]byte, error)
+
+// ClientAuthType declares the policy the server will follow for
+// TLS Client Authentication.
+type ClientAuthType int
+
+// ClientAuthType enums
+const (
+	NoClientCert ClientAuthType = iota
+	RequestClientCert
+	RequireAnyClientCert
+	VerifyClientCertIfGiven
+	RequireAndVerifyClientCert
+)
+
+// ExtendedMasterSecretType declares the policy the client and server
+// will follow for the Extended Master Secret extension
+type ExtendedMasterSecretType int
+
+// ExtendedMasterSecretType enums
+const (
+	RequestExtendedMasterSecret ExtendedMasterSecretType = iota
+	RequireExtendedMasterSecret
+	DisableExtendedMasterSecret
+)
+
+func validateConfig(config *Config) error {
+	switch {
+	case config == nil:
+		return errNoConfigProvided
+	case config.PSKIdentityHint != nil && config.PSK == nil:
+		return errIdentityNoPSK
+	}
+
+	for _, cert := range config.Certificates {
+		if cert.Certificate == nil {
+			return errInvalidCertificate
+		}
+		if cert.PrivateKey != nil {
+			switch cert.PrivateKey.(type) {
+			case ed25519.PrivateKey:
+			case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+			case *rsa.PrivateKey:
+			default:
+				return errInvalidPrivateKey
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	_, err := parseCipherSuites(config.CipherSuites, config.CustomCipherSuites, config.includeCertificateSuites(), config.PSK != nil)
+	return err
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/crypto.go

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/asn1"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"math/big"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/elliptic"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/hash"
+)
+
+type ecdsaSignature struct {
+	R, S *big.Int
+}
+
+func valueKeyMessage(clientRandom, serverRandom, publicKey []byte, namedCurve elliptic.Curve) []byte {
+	serverECDHParams := make([]byte, 4)
+	serverECDHParams[0] = 3 // named curve
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(serverECDHParams[1:], uint16(namedCurve))
+	serverECDHParams[3] = byte(len(publicKey))
+
+	plaintext := []byte{}
+	plaintext = append(plaintext, clientRandom...)
+	plaintext = append(plaintext, serverRandom...)
+	plaintext = append(plaintext, serverECDHParams...)
+	plaintext = append(plaintext, publicKey...)
+
+	return plaintext
+}
+
+// If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all
+// certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a
+// hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.2
+func generateKeySignature(clientRandom, serverRandom, publicKey []byte, namedCurve elliptic.Curve, privateKey crypto.PrivateKey, hashAlgorithm hash.Algorithm) ([]byte, error) {
+	msg := valueKeyMessage(clientRandom, serverRandom, publicKey, namedCurve)
+	switch p := privateKey.(type) {
+	case ed25519.PrivateKey:
+		// https://crypto.stackexchange.com/a/55483
+		return p.Sign(rand.Reader, msg, crypto.Hash(0))
+	case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+		hashed := hashAlgorithm.Digest(msg)
+		return p.Sign(rand.Reader, hashed, hashAlgorithm.CryptoHash())
+	case *rsa.PrivateKey:
+		hashed := hashAlgorithm.Digest(msg)
+		return p.Sign(rand.Reader, hashed, hashAlgorithm.CryptoHash())
+	}
+
+	return nil, errKeySignatureGenerateUnimplemented
+}
+
+func verifyKeySignature(message, remoteKeySignature []byte, hashAlgorithm hash.Algorithm, rawCertificates [][]byte) error { //nolint:dupl
+	if len(rawCertificates) == 0 {
+		return errLengthMismatch
+	}
+	certificate, err := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCertificates[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	switch p := certificate.PublicKey.(type) {
+	case ed25519.PublicKey:
+		if ok := ed25519.Verify(p, message, remoteKeySignature); !ok {
+			return errKeySignatureMismatch
+		}
+		return nil
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		ecdsaSig := &ecdsaSignature{}
+		if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(remoteKeySignature, ecdsaSig); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if ecdsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || ecdsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
+			return errInvalidECDSASignature
+		}
+		hashed := hashAlgorithm.Digest(message)
+		if !ecdsa.Verify(p, hashed, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S) {
+			return errKeySignatureMismatch
+		}
+		return nil
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		switch certificate.SignatureAlgorithm {
+		case x509.SHA1WithRSA, x509.SHA256WithRSA, x509.SHA384WithRSA, x509.SHA512WithRSA:
+			hashed := hashAlgorithm.Digest(message)
+			return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(p, hashAlgorithm.CryptoHash(), hashed, remoteKeySignature)
+		default:
+			return errKeySignatureVerifyUnimplemented
+		}
+	}
+
+	return errKeySignatureVerifyUnimplemented
+}
+
+// If the server has sent a CertificateRequest message, the client MUST send the Certificate
+// message.  The ClientKeyExchange message is now sent, and the content
+// of that message will depend on the public key algorithm selected
+// between the ClientHello and the ServerHello.  If the client has sent
+// a certificate with signing ability, a digitally-signed
+// CertificateVerify message is sent to explicitly verify possession of
+// the private key in the certificate.
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.3
+func generateCertificateVerify(handshakeBodies []byte, privateKey crypto.PrivateKey, hashAlgorithm hash.Algorithm) ([]byte, error) {
+	if p, ok := privateKey.(ed25519.PrivateKey); ok {
+		// https://pkg.go.dev/crypto/ed25519#PrivateKey.Sign
+		// Sign signs the given message with priv. Ed25519 performs two passes over
+		// messages to be signed and therefore cannot handle pre-hashed messages.
+		return p.Sign(rand.Reader, handshakeBodies, crypto.Hash(0))
+	}
+
+	h := sha256.New()
+	if _, err := h.Write(handshakeBodies); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	hashed := h.Sum(nil)
+
+	switch p := privateKey.(type) {
+	case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+		return p.Sign(rand.Reader, hashed, hashAlgorithm.CryptoHash())
+	case *rsa.PrivateKey:
+		return p.Sign(rand.Reader, hashed, hashAlgorithm.CryptoHash())
+	}
+
+	return nil, errInvalidSignatureAlgorithm
+}
+
+func verifyCertificateVerify(handshakeBodies []byte, hashAlgorithm hash.Algorithm, remoteKeySignature []byte, rawCertificates [][]byte) error { //nolint:dupl
+	if len(rawCertificates) == 0 {
+		return errLengthMismatch
+	}
+	certificate, err := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCertificates[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	switch p := certificate.PublicKey.(type) {
+	case ed25519.PublicKey:
+		if ok := ed25519.Verify(p, handshakeBodies, remoteKeySignature); !ok {
+			return errKeySignatureMismatch
+		}
+		return nil
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		ecdsaSig := &ecdsaSignature{}
+		if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(remoteKeySignature, ecdsaSig); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		if ecdsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || ecdsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
+			return errInvalidECDSASignature
+		}
+		hash := hashAlgorithm.Digest(handshakeBodies)
+		if !ecdsa.Verify(p, hash, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S) {
+			return errKeySignatureMismatch
+		}
+		return nil
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		switch certificate.SignatureAlgorithm {
+		case x509.SHA1WithRSA, x509.SHA256WithRSA, x509.SHA384WithRSA, x509.SHA512WithRSA:
+			hash := hashAlgorithm.Digest(handshakeBodies)
+			return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(p, hashAlgorithm.CryptoHash(), hash, remoteKeySignature)
+		default:
+			return errKeySignatureVerifyUnimplemented
+		}
+	}
+
+	return errKeySignatureVerifyUnimplemented
+}
+
+func loadCerts(rawCertificates [][]byte) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
+	if len(rawCertificates) == 0 {
+		return nil, errLengthMismatch
+	}
+
+	certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, 0, len(rawCertificates))
+	for _, rawCert := range rawCertificates {
+		cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(rawCert)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		certs = append(certs, cert)
+	}
+	return certs, nil
+}
+
+func verifyClientCert(rawCertificates [][]byte, roots *x509.CertPool) (chains [][]*x509.Certificate, err error) {
+	certificate, err := loadCerts(rawCertificates)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	intermediateCAPool := x509.NewCertPool()
+	for _, cert := range certificate[1:] {
+		intermediateCAPool.AddCert(cert)
+	}
+	opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
+		Roots:         roots,
+		CurrentTime:   time.Now(),
+		Intermediates: intermediateCAPool,
+		KeyUsages:     []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
+	}
+	return certificate[0].Verify(opts)
+}
+
+func verifyServerCert(rawCertificates [][]byte, roots *x509.CertPool, serverName string) (chains [][]*x509.Certificate, err error) {
+	certificate, err := loadCerts(rawCertificates)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	intermediateCAPool := x509.NewCertPool()
+	for _, cert := range certificate[1:] {
+		intermediateCAPool.AddCert(cert)
+	}
+	opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
+		Roots:         roots,
+		CurrentTime:   time.Now(),
+		DNSName:       serverName,
+		Intermediates: intermediateCAPool,
+	}
+	return certificate[0].Verify(opts)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/dtls.go

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package dtls implements Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 1.2
+package dtls

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net"
+	"os"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert"
+)
+
+// Typed errors
+var (
+	ErrConnClosed = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("conn is closed")} //nolint:goerr113
+
+	errDeadlineExceeded   = &TimeoutError{Err: fmt.Errorf("read/write timeout: %w", context.DeadlineExceeded)}
+	errInvalidContentType = &TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("invalid content type")} //nolint:goerr113
+
+	errBufferTooSmall               = &TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("buffer is too small")}                                        //nolint:goerr113
+	errContextUnsupported           = &TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("context is not supported for ExportKeyingMaterial")}          //nolint:goerr113
+	errHandshakeInProgress          = &TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("handshake is in progress")}                                   //nolint:goerr113
+	errReservedExportKeyingMaterial = &TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("ExportKeyingMaterial can not be used with a reserved label")} //nolint:goerr113
+	errApplicationDataEpochZero     = &TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("ApplicationData with epoch of 0")}                            //nolint:goerr113
+	errUnhandledContextType         = &TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("unhandled contentType")}                                      //nolint:goerr113
+
+	errCertificateVerifyNoCertificate    = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("client sent certificate verify but we have no certificate to verify")}                      //nolint:goerr113
+	errCipherSuiteNoIntersection         = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("client+server do not support any shared cipher suites")}                                    //nolint:goerr113
+	errClientCertificateNotVerified      = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("client sent certificate but did not verify it")}                                            //nolint:goerr113
+	errClientCertificateRequired         = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("server required client verification, but got none")}                                        //nolint:goerr113
+	errClientNoMatchingSRTPProfile       = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("server responded with SRTP Profile we do not support")}                                     //nolint:goerr113
+	errClientRequiredButNoServerEMS      = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("client required Extended Master Secret extension, but server does not support it")}         //nolint:goerr113
+	errCookieMismatch                    = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("client+server cookie does not match")}                                                      //nolint:goerr113
+	errIdentityNoPSK                     = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("PSK Identity Hint provided but PSK is nil")}                                                //nolint:goerr113
+	errInvalidCertificate                = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("no certificate provided")}                                                                  //nolint:goerr113
+	errInvalidCipherSuite                = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("invalid or unknown cipher suite")}                                                          //nolint:goerr113
+	errInvalidECDSASignature             = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("ECDSA signature contained zero or negative values")}                                        //nolint:goerr113
+	errInvalidPrivateKey                 = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("invalid private key type")}                                                                 //nolint:goerr113
+	errInvalidSignatureAlgorithm         = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("invalid signature algorithm")}                                                              //nolint:goerr113
+	errKeySignatureMismatch              = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("expected and actual key signature do not match")}                                           //nolint:goerr113
+	errNilNextConn                       = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("Conn can not be created with a nil nextConn")}                                              //nolint:goerr113
+	errNoAvailableCipherSuites           = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("connection can not be created, no CipherSuites satisfy this Config")}                       //nolint:goerr113
+	errNoAvailablePSKCipherSuite         = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("connection can not be created, pre-shared key present but no compatible CipherSuite")}      //nolint:goerr113
+	errNoAvailableCertificateCipherSuite = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("connection can not be created, certificate present but no compatible CipherSuite")}         //nolint:goerr113
+	errNoAvailableSignatureSchemes       = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("connection can not be created, no SignatureScheme satisfy this Config")}                    //nolint:goerr113
+	errNoCertificates                    = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("no certificates configured")}                                                               //nolint:goerr113
+	errNoConfigProvided                  = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("no config provided")}                                                                       //nolint:goerr113
+	errNoSupportedEllipticCurves         = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("client requested zero or more elliptic curves that are not supported by the server")}       //nolint:goerr113
+	errUnsupportedProtocolVersion        = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("unsupported protocol version")}                                                             //nolint:goerr113
+	errPSKAndIdentityMustBeSetForClient  = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("PSK and PSK Identity Hint must both be set for client")}                                    //nolint:goerr113
+	errRequestedButNoSRTPExtension       = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("SRTP support was requested but server did not respond with use_srtp extension")}            //nolint:goerr113
+	errServerNoMatchingSRTPProfile       = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("client requested SRTP but we have no matching profiles")}                                   //nolint:goerr113
+	errServerRequiredButNoClientEMS      = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("server requires the Extended Master Secret extension, but the client does not support it")} //nolint:goerr113
+	errVerifyDataMismatch                = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("expected and actual verify data does not match")}                                           //nolint:goerr113
+	errNotAcceptableCertificateChain     = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("certificate chain is not signed by an acceptable CA")}                                      //nolint:goerr113
+
+	errInvalidFlight                     = &InternalError{Err: errors.New("invalid flight number")}                           //nolint:goerr113
+	errKeySignatureGenerateUnimplemented = &InternalError{Err: errors.New("unable to generate key signature, unimplemented")} //nolint:goerr113
+	errKeySignatureVerifyUnimplemented   = &InternalError{Err: errors.New("unable to verify key signature, unimplemented")}   //nolint:goerr113
+	errLengthMismatch                    = &InternalError{Err: errors.New("data length and declared length do not match")}    //nolint:goerr113
+	errSequenceNumberOverflow            = &InternalError{Err: errors.New("sequence number overflow")}                        //nolint:goerr113
+	errInvalidFSMTransition              = &InternalError{Err: errors.New("invalid state machine transition")}                //nolint:goerr113
+	errFailedToAccessPoolReadBuffer      = &InternalError{Err: errors.New("failed to access pool read buffer")}               //nolint:goerr113
+	errFragmentBufferOverflow            = &InternalError{Err: errors.New("fragment buffer overflow")}                        //nolint:goerr113
+)
+
+// FatalError indicates that the DTLS connection is no longer available.
+// It is mainly caused by wrong configuration of server or client.
+type FatalError = protocol.FatalError
+
+// InternalError indicates and internal error caused by the implementation, and the DTLS connection is no longer available.
+// It is mainly caused by bugs or tried to use unimplemented features.
+type InternalError = protocol.InternalError
+
+// TemporaryError indicates that the DTLS connection is still available, but the request was failed temporary.
+type TemporaryError = protocol.TemporaryError
+
+// TimeoutError indicates that the request was timed out.
+type TimeoutError = protocol.TimeoutError
+
+// HandshakeError indicates that the handshake failed.
+type HandshakeError = protocol.HandshakeError
+
+// errInvalidCipherSuite indicates an attempt at using an unsupported cipher suite.
+type invalidCipherSuiteError struct {
+	id CipherSuiteID
+}
+
+func (e *invalidCipherSuiteError) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("CipherSuite with id(%d) is not valid", e.id)
+}
+
+func (e *invalidCipherSuiteError) Is(err error) bool {
+	var other *invalidCipherSuiteError
+	if errors.As(err, &other) {
+		return e.id == other.id
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// errAlert wraps DTLS alert notification as an error
+type alertError struct {
+	*alert.Alert
+}
+
+func (e *alertError) Error() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("alert: %s", e.Alert.String())
+}
+
+func (e *alertError) IsFatalOrCloseNotify() bool {
+	return e.Level == alert.Fatal || e.Description == alert.CloseNotify
+}
+
+func (e *alertError) Is(err error) bool {
+	var other *alertError
+	if errors.As(err, &other) {
+		return e.Level == other.Level && e.Description == other.Description
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// netError translates an error from underlying Conn to corresponding net.Error.
+func netError(err error) error {
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, io.EOF), errors.Is(err, context.Canceled), errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded):
+		// Return io.EOF and context errors as is.
+		return err
+	}
+
+	var (
+		ne      net.Error
+		opError *net.OpError
+		se      *os.SyscallError
+	)
+
+	if errors.As(err, &opError) {
+		if errors.As(opError, &se) {
+			if se.Timeout() {
+				return &TimeoutError{Err: err}
+			}
+			if isOpErrorTemporary(se) {
+				return &TemporaryError{Err: err}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if errors.As(err, &ne) {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return &FatalError{Err: err}
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/errors_errno.go

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+//go:build aix || darwin || dragonfly || freebsd || linux || nacl || nacljs || netbsd || openbsd || solaris || windows
+// +build aix darwin dragonfly freebsd linux nacl nacljs netbsd openbsd solaris windows
+
+// For systems having syscall.Errno.
+// Update build targets by following command:
+// $ grep -R ECONN $(go env GOROOT)/src/syscall/zerrors_*.go \
+//     | tr "." "_" | cut -d"_" -f"2" | sort | uniq
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"syscall"
+)
+
+func isOpErrorTemporary(err *os.SyscallError) bool {
+	return errors.Is(err.Err, syscall.ECONNREFUSED)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/errors_noerrno.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+//go:build !aix && !darwin && !dragonfly && !freebsd && !linux && !nacl && !nacljs && !netbsd && !openbsd && !solaris && !windows
+// +build !aix,!darwin,!dragonfly,!freebsd,!linux,!nacl,!nacljs,!netbsd,!openbsd,!solaris,!windows
+
+// For systems without syscall.Errno.
+// Build targets must be inverse of errors_errno.go
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"os"
+)
+
+func isOpErrorTemporary(err *os.SyscallError) bool {
+	return false
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/flight.go

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+/*
+  DTLS messages are grouped into a series of message flights, according
+  to the diagrams below.  Although each flight of messages may consist
+  of a number of messages, they should be viewed as monolithic for the
+  purpose of timeout and retransmission.
+  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4347#section-4.2.4
+
+  Message flights for full handshake:
+
+  Client                                          Server
+  ------                                          ------
+                                      Waiting                 Flight 0
+
+  ClientHello             -------->                           Flight 1
+
+                          <-------    HelloVerifyRequest      Flight 2
+
+  ClientHello              -------->                           Flight 3
+
+                                             ServerHello    \
+                                            Certificate*     \
+                                      ServerKeyExchange*      Flight 4
+                                     CertificateRequest*     /
+                          <--------      ServerHelloDone    /
+
+  Certificate*                                              \
+  ClientKeyExchange                                          \
+  CertificateVerify*                                          Flight 5
+  [ChangeCipherSpec]                                         /
+  Finished                -------->                         /
+
+                                      [ChangeCipherSpec]    \ Flight 6
+                          <--------             Finished    /
+
+  Message flights for session-resuming handshake (no cookie exchange):
+
+  Client                                          Server
+  ------                                          ------
+                                      Waiting                 Flight 0
+
+  ClientHello             -------->                           Flight 1
+
+                                             ServerHello    \
+                                      [ChangeCipherSpec]      Flight 4b
+                          <--------             Finished    /
+
+  [ChangeCipherSpec]                                        \ Flight 5b
+  Finished                -------->                         /
+
+                                      [ChangeCipherSpec]    \ Flight 6
+                          <--------             Finished    /
+*/
+
+type flightVal uint8
+
+const (
+	flight0 flightVal = iota + 1
+	flight1
+	flight2
+	flight3
+	flight4
+	flight4b
+	flight5
+	flight5b
+	flight6
+)
+
+func (f flightVal) String() string {
+	switch f {
+	case flight0:
+		return "Flight 0"
+	case flight1:
+		return "Flight 1"
+	case flight2:
+		return "Flight 2"
+	case flight3:
+		return "Flight 3"
+	case flight4:
+		return "Flight 4"
+	case flight4b:
+		return "Flight 4b"
+	case flight5:
+		return "Flight 5"
+	case flight5b:
+		return "Flight 5b"
+	case flight6:
+		return "Flight 6"
+	default:
+		return "Invalid Flight"
+	}
+}
+
+func (f flightVal) isLastSendFlight() bool {
+	return f == flight6 || f == flight5b
+}
+
+func (f flightVal) isLastRecvFlight() bool {
+	return f == flight5 || f == flight4b
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/flight0handler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/elliptic"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/handshake"
+)
+
+func flight0Parse(_ context.Context, _ flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	seq, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(0, state.cipherSuite,
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		// No valid message received. Keep reading
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+	state.handshakeRecvSequence = seq
+
+	var clientHello *handshake.MessageClientHello
+
+	// Validate type
+	if clientHello, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeClientHello].(*handshake.MessageClientHello); !ok {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil
+	}
+
+	if !clientHello.Version.Equal(protocol.Version1_2) {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.ProtocolVersion}, errUnsupportedProtocolVersion
+	}
+
+	state.remoteRandom = clientHello.Random
+
+	cipherSuites := []CipherSuite{}
+	for _, id := range clientHello.CipherSuiteIDs {
+		if c := cipherSuiteForID(CipherSuiteID(id), cfg.customCipherSuites); c != nil {
+			cipherSuites = append(cipherSuites, c)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if state.cipherSuite, ok = findMatchingCipherSuite(cipherSuites, cfg.localCipherSuites); !ok {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errCipherSuiteNoIntersection
+	}
+
+	for _, val := range clientHello.Extensions {
+		switch e := val.(type) {
+		case *extension.SupportedEllipticCurves:
+			if len(e.EllipticCurves) == 0 {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errNoSupportedEllipticCurves
+			}
+			state.namedCurve = e.EllipticCurves[0]
+		case *extension.UseSRTP:
+			profile, ok := findMatchingSRTPProfile(e.ProtectionProfiles, cfg.localSRTPProtectionProfiles)
+			if !ok {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errServerNoMatchingSRTPProfile
+			}
+			state.setSRTPProtectionProfile(profile)
+		case *extension.UseExtendedMasterSecret:
+			if cfg.extendedMasterSecret != DisableExtendedMasterSecret {
+				state.extendedMasterSecret = true
+			}
+		case *extension.ServerName:
+			state.serverName = e.ServerName // remote server name
+		case *extension.ALPN:
+			state.peerSupportedProtocols = e.ProtocolNameList
+		}
+	}
+
+	if cfg.extendedMasterSecret == RequireExtendedMasterSecret && !state.extendedMasterSecret {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errServerRequiredButNoClientEMS
+	}
+
+	if state.localKeypair == nil {
+		var err error
+		state.localKeypair, err = elliptic.GenerateKeypair(state.namedCurve)
+		if err != nil {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.IllegalParameter}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	nextFlight := flight2
+
+	if cfg.insecureSkipHelloVerify {
+		nextFlight = flight4
+	}
+
+	return handleHelloResume(clientHello.SessionID, state, cfg, nextFlight)
+}
+
+func handleHelloResume(sessionID []byte, state *State, cfg *handshakeConfig, next flightVal) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	if len(sessionID) > 0 && cfg.sessionStore != nil {
+		if s, err := cfg.sessionStore.Get(sessionID); err != nil {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		} else if s.ID != nil {
+			cfg.log.Tracef("[handshake] resume session: %x", sessionID)
+
+			state.SessionID = sessionID
+			state.masterSecret = s.Secret
+
+			if err := state.initCipherSuite(); err != nil {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+			}
+
+			clientRandom := state.localRandom.MarshalFixed()
+			cfg.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, clientRandom[:], state.masterSecret)
+
+			return flight4b, nil, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return next, nil, nil
+}
+
+func flight0Generate(_ flightConn, state *State, _ *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) ([]*packet, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	// Initialize
+	if !cfg.insecureSkipHelloVerify {
+		state.cookie = make([]byte, cookieLength)
+		if _, err := rand.Read(state.cookie); err != nil {
+			return nil, nil, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	var zeroEpoch uint16
+	state.localEpoch.Store(zeroEpoch)
+	state.remoteEpoch.Store(zeroEpoch)
+	state.namedCurve = defaultNamedCurve
+
+	if err := state.localRandom.Populate(); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	return nil, nil, nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/flight1handler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/elliptic"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/handshake"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+func flight1Parse(ctx context.Context, c flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	// HelloVerifyRequest can be skipped by the server,
+	// so allow ServerHello during flight1 also
+	seq, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence, state.cipherSuite,
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeHelloVerifyRequest, cfg.initialEpoch, false, true},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, cfg.initialEpoch, false, true},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		// No valid message received. Keep reading
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	if _, ok := msgs[handshake.TypeServerHello]; ok {
+		// Flight1 and flight2 were skipped.
+		// Parse as flight3.
+		return flight3Parse(ctx, c, state, cache, cfg)
+	}
+
+	if h, ok := msgs[handshake.TypeHelloVerifyRequest].(*handshake.MessageHelloVerifyRequest); ok {
+		// DTLS 1.2 clients must not assume that the server will use the protocol version
+		// specified in HelloVerifyRequest message. RFC 6347 Section 4.2.1
+		if !h.Version.Equal(protocol.Version1_0) && !h.Version.Equal(protocol.Version1_2) {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.ProtocolVersion}, errUnsupportedProtocolVersion
+		}
+		state.cookie = append([]byte{}, h.Cookie...)
+		state.handshakeRecvSequence = seq
+		return flight3, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil
+}
+
+func flight1Generate(c flightConn, state *State, _ *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) ([]*packet, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	var zeroEpoch uint16
+	state.localEpoch.Store(zeroEpoch)
+	state.remoteEpoch.Store(zeroEpoch)
+	state.namedCurve = defaultNamedCurve
+	state.cookie = nil
+
+	if err := state.localRandom.Populate(); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	extensions := []extension.Extension{
+		&extension.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms{
+			SignatureHashAlgorithms: cfg.localSignatureSchemes,
+		},
+		&extension.RenegotiationInfo{
+			RenegotiatedConnection: 0,
+		},
+	}
+
+	var setEllipticCurveCryptographyClientHelloExtensions bool
+	for _, c := range cfg.localCipherSuites {
+		if c.ECC() {
+			setEllipticCurveCryptographyClientHelloExtensions = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	if setEllipticCurveCryptographyClientHelloExtensions {
+		extensions = append(extensions, []extension.Extension{
+			&extension.SupportedEllipticCurves{
+				EllipticCurves: cfg.ellipticCurves,
+			},
+			&extension.SupportedPointFormats{
+				PointFormats: []elliptic.CurvePointFormat{elliptic.CurvePointFormatUncompressed},
+			},
+		}...)
+	}
+
+	if len(cfg.localSRTPProtectionProfiles) > 0 {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.UseSRTP{
+			ProtectionProfiles: cfg.localSRTPProtectionProfiles,
+		})
+	}
+
+	if cfg.extendedMasterSecret == RequestExtendedMasterSecret ||
+		cfg.extendedMasterSecret == RequireExtendedMasterSecret {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.UseExtendedMasterSecret{
+			Supported: true,
+		})
+	}
+
+	if len(cfg.serverName) > 0 {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.ServerName{ServerName: cfg.serverName})
+	}
+
+	if len(cfg.supportedProtocols) > 0 {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.ALPN{ProtocolNameList: cfg.supportedProtocols})
+	}
+
+	if cfg.sessionStore != nil {
+		cfg.log.Tracef("[handshake] try to resume session")
+		if s, err := cfg.sessionStore.Get(c.sessionKey()); err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		} else if s.ID != nil {
+			cfg.log.Tracef("[handshake] get saved session: %x", s.ID)
+
+			state.SessionID = s.ID
+			state.masterSecret = s.Secret
+		}
+	}
+
+	return []*packet{
+		{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+					Message: &handshake.MessageClientHello{
+						Version:            protocol.Version1_2,
+						SessionID:          state.SessionID,
+						Cookie:             state.cookie,
+						Random:             state.localRandom,
+						CipherSuiteIDs:     cipherSuiteIDs(cfg.localCipherSuites),
+						CompressionMethods: defaultCompressionMethods(),
+						Extensions:         extensions,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+		},
+	}, nil, nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/flight2handler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/handshake"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+func flight2Parse(ctx context.Context, c flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	seq, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence, state.cipherSuite,
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		// Client may retransmit the first ClientHello when HelloVerifyRequest is dropped.
+		// Parse as flight 0 in this case.
+		return flight0Parse(ctx, c, state, cache, cfg)
+	}
+	state.handshakeRecvSequence = seq
+
+	var clientHello *handshake.MessageClientHello
+
+	// Validate type
+	if clientHello, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeClientHello].(*handshake.MessageClientHello); !ok {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil
+	}
+
+	if !clientHello.Version.Equal(protocol.Version1_2) {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.ProtocolVersion}, errUnsupportedProtocolVersion
+	}
+
+	if len(clientHello.Cookie) == 0 {
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(state.cookie, clientHello.Cookie) {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.AccessDenied}, errCookieMismatch
+	}
+	return flight4, nil, nil
+}
+
+func flight2Generate(_ flightConn, state *State, _ *handshakeCache, _ *handshakeConfig) ([]*packet, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	state.handshakeSendSequence = 0
+	return []*packet{
+		{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+					Message: &handshake.MessageHelloVerifyRequest{
+						Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+						Cookie:  state.cookie,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+		},
+	}, nil, nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/flight3handler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/types"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/elliptic"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/handshake"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+func flight3Parse(ctx context.Context, c flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) { //nolint:gocognit
+	// Clients may receive multiple HelloVerifyRequest messages with different cookies.
+	// Clients SHOULD handle this by sending a new ClientHello with a cookie in response
+	// to the new HelloVerifyRequest. RFC 6347 Section 4.2.1
+	seq, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence, state.cipherSuite,
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeHelloVerifyRequest, cfg.initialEpoch, false, true},
+	)
+	if ok {
+		if h, msgOk := msgs[handshake.TypeHelloVerifyRequest].(*handshake.MessageHelloVerifyRequest); msgOk {
+			// DTLS 1.2 clients must not assume that the server will use the protocol version
+			// specified in HelloVerifyRequest message. RFC 6347 Section 4.2.1
+			if !h.Version.Equal(protocol.Version1_0) && !h.Version.Equal(protocol.Version1_2) {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.ProtocolVersion}, errUnsupportedProtocolVersion
+			}
+			state.cookie = append([]byte{}, h.Cookie...)
+			state.handshakeRecvSequence = seq
+			return flight3, nil, nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	_, msgs, ok = cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence, state.cipherSuite,
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		// Don't have enough messages. Keep reading
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	if h, msgOk := msgs[handshake.TypeServerHello].(*handshake.MessageServerHello); msgOk {
+		if !h.Version.Equal(protocol.Version1_2) {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.ProtocolVersion}, errUnsupportedProtocolVersion
+		}
+		for _, v := range h.Extensions {
+			switch e := v.(type) {
+			case *extension.UseSRTP:
+				profile, found := findMatchingSRTPProfile(e.ProtectionProfiles, cfg.localSRTPProtectionProfiles)
+				if !found {
+					return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.IllegalParameter}, errClientNoMatchingSRTPProfile
+				}
+				state.setSRTPProtectionProfile(profile)
+			case *extension.UseExtendedMasterSecret:
+				if cfg.extendedMasterSecret != DisableExtendedMasterSecret {
+					state.extendedMasterSecret = true
+				}
+			case *extension.ALPN:
+				if len(e.ProtocolNameList) > 1 { // This should be exactly 1, the zero case is handle when unmarshalling
+					return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, extension.ErrALPNInvalidFormat // Meh, internal error?
+				}
+				state.NegotiatedProtocol = e.ProtocolNameList[0]
+			}
+		}
+		if cfg.extendedMasterSecret == RequireExtendedMasterSecret && !state.extendedMasterSecret {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errClientRequiredButNoServerEMS
+		}
+		if len(cfg.localSRTPProtectionProfiles) > 0 && state.getSRTPProtectionProfile() == 0 {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errRequestedButNoSRTPExtension
+		}
+
+		remoteCipherSuite := cipherSuiteForID(CipherSuiteID(*h.CipherSuiteID), cfg.customCipherSuites)
+		if remoteCipherSuite == nil {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errCipherSuiteNoIntersection
+		}
+
+		selectedCipherSuite, found := findMatchingCipherSuite([]CipherSuite{remoteCipherSuite}, cfg.localCipherSuites)
+		if !found {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errInvalidCipherSuite
+		}
+
+		state.cipherSuite = selectedCipherSuite
+		state.remoteRandom = h.Random
+		cfg.log.Tracef("[handshake] use cipher suite: %s", selectedCipherSuite.String())
+
+		if len(h.SessionID) > 0 && bytes.Equal(state.SessionID, h.SessionID) {
+			return handleResumption(ctx, c, state, cache, cfg)
+		}
+
+		if len(state.SessionID) > 0 {
+			cfg.log.Tracef("[handshake] clean old session : %s", state.SessionID)
+			if err := cfg.sessionStore.Del(state.SessionID); err != nil {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+			}
+		}
+
+		if cfg.sessionStore == nil {
+			state.SessionID = []byte{}
+		} else {
+			state.SessionID = h.SessionID
+		}
+
+		state.masterSecret = []byte{}
+	}
+
+	if cfg.localPSKCallback != nil {
+		seq, msgs, ok = cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence+1, state.cipherSuite,
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, false, true},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHelloDone, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+		)
+	} else {
+		seq, msgs, ok = cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence+1, state.cipherSuite,
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, false, true},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateRequest, cfg.initialEpoch, false, true},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHelloDone, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+		)
+	}
+	if !ok {
+		// Don't have enough messages. Keep reading
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+	state.handshakeRecvSequence = seq
+
+	if h, ok := msgs[handshake.TypeCertificate].(*handshake.MessageCertificate); ok {
+		state.PeerCertificates = h.Certificate
+	} else if state.cipherSuite.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypeCertificate {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.NoCertificate}, errInvalidCertificate
+	}
+
+	if h, ok := msgs[handshake.TypeServerKeyExchange].(*handshake.MessageServerKeyExchange); ok {
+		alertPtr, err := handleServerKeyExchange(c, state, cfg, h)
+		if err != nil {
+			return 0, alertPtr, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if _, ok := msgs[handshake.TypeCertificateRequest].(*handshake.MessageCertificateRequest); ok {
+		state.remoteRequestedCertificate = true
+	}
+
+	return flight5, nil, nil
+}
+
+func handleResumption(ctx context.Context, c flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	if err := state.initCipherSuite(); err != nil {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+	}
+
+	// Now, encrypted packets can be handled
+	if err := c.handleQueuedPackets(ctx); err != nil {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+	}
+
+	_, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence+1, state.cipherSuite,
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, false, false},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		// No valid message received. Keep reading
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	var finished *handshake.MessageFinished
+	if finished, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeFinished].(*handshake.MessageFinished); !ok {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil
+	}
+	plainText := cache.pullAndMerge(
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+	)
+
+	expectedVerifyData, err := prf.VerifyDataServer(state.masterSecret, plainText, state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(expectedVerifyData, finished.VerifyData) {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.HandshakeFailure}, errVerifyDataMismatch
+	}
+
+	clientRandom := state.localRandom.MarshalFixed()
+	cfg.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, clientRandom[:], state.masterSecret)
+
+	return flight5b, nil, nil
+}
+
+func handleServerKeyExchange(_ flightConn, state *State, cfg *handshakeConfig, h *handshake.MessageServerKeyExchange) (*alert.Alert, error) {
+	var err error
+	if state.cipherSuite == nil {
+		return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errInvalidCipherSuite
+	}
+	if cfg.localPSKCallback != nil {
+		var psk []byte
+		if psk, err = cfg.localPSKCallback(h.IdentityHint); err != nil {
+			return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+		state.IdentityHint = h.IdentityHint
+		switch state.cipherSuite.KeyExchangeAlgorithm() {
+		case types.KeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk:
+			state.preMasterSecret = prf.PSKPreMasterSecret(psk)
+		case (types.KeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe | types.KeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk):
+			if state.localKeypair, err = elliptic.GenerateKeypair(h.NamedCurve); err != nil {
+				return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+			}
+			state.preMasterSecret, err = prf.EcdhePSKPreMasterSecret(psk, h.PublicKey, state.localKeypair.PrivateKey, state.localKeypair.Curve)
+			if err != nil {
+				return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+			}
+		default:
+			return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errInvalidCipherSuite
+		}
+	} else {
+		if state.localKeypair, err = elliptic.GenerateKeypair(h.NamedCurve); err != nil {
+			return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+
+		if state.preMasterSecret, err = prf.PreMasterSecret(h.PublicKey, state.localKeypair.PrivateKey, state.localKeypair.Curve); err != nil {
+			return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil
+}
+
+func flight3Generate(_ flightConn, state *State, _ *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) ([]*packet, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	extensions := []extension.Extension{
+		&extension.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms{
+			SignatureHashAlgorithms: cfg.localSignatureSchemes,
+		},
+		&extension.RenegotiationInfo{
+			RenegotiatedConnection: 0,
+		},
+	}
+	if state.namedCurve != 0 {
+		extensions = append(extensions, []extension.Extension{
+			&extension.SupportedEllipticCurves{
+				EllipticCurves: []elliptic.Curve{elliptic.X25519, elliptic.P256, elliptic.P384},
+			},
+			&extension.SupportedPointFormats{
+				PointFormats: []elliptic.CurvePointFormat{elliptic.CurvePointFormatUncompressed},
+			},
+		}...)
+	}
+
+	if len(cfg.localSRTPProtectionProfiles) > 0 {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.UseSRTP{
+			ProtectionProfiles: cfg.localSRTPProtectionProfiles,
+		})
+	}
+
+	if cfg.extendedMasterSecret == RequestExtendedMasterSecret ||
+		cfg.extendedMasterSecret == RequireExtendedMasterSecret {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.UseExtendedMasterSecret{
+			Supported: true,
+		})
+	}
+
+	if len(cfg.serverName) > 0 {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.ServerName{ServerName: cfg.serverName})
+	}
+
+	if len(cfg.supportedProtocols) > 0 {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.ALPN{ProtocolNameList: cfg.supportedProtocols})
+	}
+
+	return []*packet{
+		{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+					Message: &handshake.MessageClientHello{
+						Version:            protocol.Version1_2,
+						SessionID:          state.SessionID,
+						Cookie:             state.cookie,
+						Random:             state.localRandom,
+						CipherSuiteIDs:     cipherSuiteIDs(cfg.localCipherSuites),
+						CompressionMethods: defaultCompressionMethods(),
+						Extensions:         extensions,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+		},
+	}, nil, nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/flight4bhandler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/handshake"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+func flight4bParse(_ context.Context, _ flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	_, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence, state.cipherSuite,
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, true, false},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		// No valid message received. Keep reading
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	var finished *handshake.MessageFinished
+	if finished, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeFinished].(*handshake.MessageFinished); !ok {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil
+	}
+
+	plainText := cache.pullAndMerge(
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, false, false},
+	)
+
+	expectedVerifyData, err := prf.VerifyDataClient(state.masterSecret, plainText, state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(expectedVerifyData, finished.VerifyData) {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.HandshakeFailure}, errVerifyDataMismatch
+	}
+
+	// Other party may re-transmit the last flight. Keep state to be flight4b.
+	return flight4b, nil, nil
+}
+
+func flight4bGenerate(_ flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) ([]*packet, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	var pkts []*packet
+
+	extensions := []extension.Extension{&extension.RenegotiationInfo{
+		RenegotiatedConnection: 0,
+	}}
+	if (cfg.extendedMasterSecret == RequestExtendedMasterSecret ||
+		cfg.extendedMasterSecret == RequireExtendedMasterSecret) && state.extendedMasterSecret {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.UseExtendedMasterSecret{
+			Supported: true,
+		})
+	}
+	if state.getSRTPProtectionProfile() != 0 {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.UseSRTP{
+			ProtectionProfiles: []SRTPProtectionProfile{state.getSRTPProtectionProfile()},
+		})
+	}
+
+	selectedProto, err := extension.ALPNProtocolSelection(cfg.supportedProtocols, state.peerSupportedProtocols)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.NoApplicationProtocol}, err
+	}
+	if selectedProto != "" {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.ALPN{
+			ProtocolNameList: []string{selectedProto},
+		})
+		state.NegotiatedProtocol = selectedProto
+	}
+
+	cipherSuiteID := uint16(state.cipherSuite.ID())
+	serverHello := &handshake.Handshake{
+		Message: &handshake.MessageServerHello{
+			Version:           protocol.Version1_2,
+			Random:            state.localRandom,
+			SessionID:         state.SessionID,
+			CipherSuiteID:     &cipherSuiteID,
+			CompressionMethod: defaultCompressionMethods()[0],
+			Extensions:        extensions,
+		},
+	}
+
+	serverHello.Header.MessageSequence = uint16(state.handshakeSendSequence)
+
+	if len(state.localVerifyData) == 0 {
+		plainText := cache.pullAndMerge(
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+		)
+		raw, err := serverHello.Marshal()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+		plainText = append(plainText, raw...)
+
+		state.localVerifyData, err = prf.VerifyDataServer(state.masterSecret, plainText, state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	pkts = append(pkts,
+		&packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: serverHello,
+			},
+		},
+		&packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: &protocol.ChangeCipherSpec{},
+			},
+		},
+		&packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+					Epoch:   1,
+				},
+				Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+					Message: &handshake.MessageFinished{
+						VerifyData: state.localVerifyData,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+			shouldEncrypt:            true,
+			resetLocalSequenceNumber: true,
+		},
+	)
+
+	return pkts, nil, nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/flight4handler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/x509"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/elliptic"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/signaturehash"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/handshake"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+func flight4Parse(ctx context.Context, c flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) { //nolint:gocognit
+	seq, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence, state.cipherSuite,
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, true, true},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateVerify, cfg.initialEpoch, true, true},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		// No valid message received. Keep reading
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	// Validate type
+	var clientKeyExchange *handshake.MessageClientKeyExchange
+	if clientKeyExchange, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange].(*handshake.MessageClientKeyExchange); !ok {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil
+	}
+
+	if h, hasCert := msgs[handshake.TypeCertificate].(*handshake.MessageCertificate); hasCert {
+		state.PeerCertificates = h.Certificate
+		// If the client offer its certificate, just disable session resumption.
+		// Otherwise, we have to store the certificate identitfication and expire time.
+		// And we have to check whether this certificate expired, revoked or changed.
+		//
+		// https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2016-5419.html
+		state.SessionID = nil
+	}
+
+	if h, hasCertVerify := msgs[handshake.TypeCertificateVerify].(*handshake.MessageCertificateVerify); hasCertVerify {
+		if state.PeerCertificates == nil {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.NoCertificate}, errCertificateVerifyNoCertificate
+		}
+
+		plainText := cache.pullAndMerge(
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateRequest, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHelloDone, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+		)
+
+		// Verify that the pair of hash algorithm and signiture is listed.
+		var validSignatureScheme bool
+		for _, ss := range cfg.localSignatureSchemes {
+			if ss.Hash == h.HashAlgorithm && ss.Signature == h.SignatureAlgorithm {
+				validSignatureScheme = true
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		if !validSignatureScheme {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errNoAvailableSignatureSchemes
+		}
+
+		if err := verifyCertificateVerify(plainText, h.HashAlgorithm, h.Signature, state.PeerCertificates); err != nil {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err
+		}
+		var chains [][]*x509.Certificate
+		var err error
+		var verified bool
+		if cfg.clientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven {
+			if chains, err = verifyClientCert(state.PeerCertificates, cfg.clientCAs); err != nil {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err
+			}
+			verified = true
+		}
+		if cfg.verifyPeerCertificate != nil {
+			if err := cfg.verifyPeerCertificate(state.PeerCertificates, chains); err != nil {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err
+			}
+		}
+		state.peerCertificatesVerified = verified
+	} else if state.PeerCertificates != nil {
+		// A certificate was received, but we haven't seen a CertificateVerify
+		// keep reading until we receive one
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	if !state.cipherSuite.IsInitialized() {
+		serverRandom := state.localRandom.MarshalFixed()
+		clientRandom := state.remoteRandom.MarshalFixed()
+
+		var err error
+		var preMasterSecret []byte
+		if state.cipherSuite.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypePreSharedKey {
+			var psk []byte
+			if psk, err = cfg.localPSKCallback(clientKeyExchange.IdentityHint); err != nil {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+			}
+			state.IdentityHint = clientKeyExchange.IdentityHint
+			switch state.cipherSuite.KeyExchangeAlgorithm() {
+			case CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk:
+				preMasterSecret = prf.PSKPreMasterSecret(psk)
+			case (CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk | CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe):
+				if preMasterSecret, err = prf.EcdhePSKPreMasterSecret(psk, clientKeyExchange.PublicKey, state.localKeypair.PrivateKey, state.localKeypair.Curve); err != nil {
+					return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+				}
+			default:
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, errInvalidCipherSuite
+			}
+		} else {
+			preMasterSecret, err = prf.PreMasterSecret(clientKeyExchange.PublicKey, state.localKeypair.PrivateKey, state.localKeypair.Curve)
+			if err != nil {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.IllegalParameter}, err
+			}
+		}
+
+		if state.extendedMasterSecret {
+			var sessionHash []byte
+			sessionHash, err = cache.sessionHash(state.cipherSuite.HashFunc(), cfg.initialEpoch)
+			if err != nil {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+			}
+
+			state.masterSecret, err = prf.ExtendedMasterSecret(preMasterSecret, sessionHash, state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())
+			if err != nil {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+			}
+		} else {
+			state.masterSecret, err = prf.MasterSecret(preMasterSecret, clientRandom[:], serverRandom[:], state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())
+			if err != nil {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+			}
+		}
+
+		if err := state.cipherSuite.Init(state.masterSecret, clientRandom[:], serverRandom[:], false); err != nil {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+		cfg.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, clientRandom[:], state.masterSecret)
+	}
+
+	if len(state.SessionID) > 0 {
+		s := Session{
+			ID:     state.SessionID,
+			Secret: state.masterSecret,
+		}
+		cfg.log.Tracef("[handshake] save new session: %x", s.ID)
+		if err := cfg.sessionStore.Set(state.SessionID, s); err != nil {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Now, encrypted packets can be handled
+	if err := c.handleQueuedPackets(ctx); err != nil {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+	}
+
+	seq, msgs, ok = cache.fullPullMap(seq, state.cipherSuite,
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, true, false},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		// No valid message received. Keep reading
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+	state.handshakeRecvSequence = seq
+
+	if _, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeFinished].(*handshake.MessageFinished); !ok {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil
+	}
+
+	if state.cipherSuite.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypeAnonymous {
+		if cfg.verifyConnection != nil {
+			if err := cfg.verifyConnection(state.clone()); err != nil {
+				return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err
+			}
+		}
+		return flight6, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	switch cfg.clientAuth {
+	case RequireAnyClientCert:
+		if state.PeerCertificates == nil {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.NoCertificate}, errClientCertificateRequired
+		}
+	case VerifyClientCertIfGiven:
+		if state.PeerCertificates != nil && !state.peerCertificatesVerified {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, errClientCertificateNotVerified
+		}
+	case RequireAndVerifyClientCert:
+		if state.PeerCertificates == nil {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.NoCertificate}, errClientCertificateRequired
+		}
+		if !state.peerCertificatesVerified {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, errClientCertificateNotVerified
+		}
+	case NoClientCert, RequestClientCert:
+		// go to flight6
+	}
+	if cfg.verifyConnection != nil {
+		if err := cfg.verifyConnection(state.clone()); err != nil {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	return flight6, nil, nil
+}
+
+func flight4Generate(_ flightConn, state *State, _ *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) ([]*packet, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	extensions := []extension.Extension{&extension.RenegotiationInfo{
+		RenegotiatedConnection: 0,
+	}}
+	if (cfg.extendedMasterSecret == RequestExtendedMasterSecret ||
+		cfg.extendedMasterSecret == RequireExtendedMasterSecret) && state.extendedMasterSecret {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.UseExtendedMasterSecret{
+			Supported: true,
+		})
+	}
+	if state.getSRTPProtectionProfile() != 0 {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.UseSRTP{
+			ProtectionProfiles: []SRTPProtectionProfile{state.getSRTPProtectionProfile()},
+		})
+	}
+	if state.cipherSuite.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypeCertificate {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.SupportedPointFormats{
+			PointFormats: []elliptic.CurvePointFormat{elliptic.CurvePointFormatUncompressed},
+		})
+	}
+
+	selectedProto, err := extension.ALPNProtocolSelection(cfg.supportedProtocols, state.peerSupportedProtocols)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.NoApplicationProtocol}, err
+	}
+	if selectedProto != "" {
+		extensions = append(extensions, &extension.ALPN{
+			ProtocolNameList: []string{selectedProto},
+		})
+		state.NegotiatedProtocol = selectedProto
+	}
+
+	var pkts []*packet
+	cipherSuiteID := uint16(state.cipherSuite.ID())
+
+	if cfg.sessionStore != nil {
+		state.SessionID = make([]byte, sessionLength)
+		if _, err := rand.Read(state.SessionID); err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	pkts = append(pkts, &packet{
+		record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+			Header: recordlayer.Header{
+				Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+			},
+			Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+				Message: &handshake.MessageServerHello{
+					Version:           protocol.Version1_2,
+					Random:            state.localRandom,
+					SessionID:         state.SessionID,
+					CipherSuiteID:     &cipherSuiteID,
+					CompressionMethod: defaultCompressionMethods()[0],
+					Extensions:        extensions,
+				},
+			},
+		},
+	})
+
+	switch {
+	case state.cipherSuite.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypeCertificate:
+		certificate, err := cfg.getCertificate(&ClientHelloInfo{
+			ServerName:   state.serverName,
+			CipherSuites: []ciphersuite.ID{state.cipherSuite.ID()},
+		})
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.HandshakeFailure}, err
+		}
+
+		pkts = append(pkts, &packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+					Message: &handshake.MessageCertificate{
+						Certificate: certificate.Certificate,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+		})
+
+		serverRandom := state.localRandom.MarshalFixed()
+		clientRandom := state.remoteRandom.MarshalFixed()
+
+		// Find compatible signature scheme
+		signatureHashAlgo, err := signaturehash.SelectSignatureScheme(cfg.localSignatureSchemes, certificate.PrivateKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, err
+		}
+
+		signature, err := generateKeySignature(clientRandom[:], serverRandom[:], state.localKeypair.PublicKey, state.namedCurve, certificate.PrivateKey, signatureHashAlgo.Hash)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+		state.localKeySignature = signature
+
+		pkts = append(pkts, &packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+					Message: &handshake.MessageServerKeyExchange{
+						EllipticCurveType:  elliptic.CurveTypeNamedCurve,
+						NamedCurve:         state.namedCurve,
+						PublicKey:          state.localKeypair.PublicKey,
+						HashAlgorithm:      signatureHashAlgo.Hash,
+						SignatureAlgorithm: signatureHashAlgo.Signature,
+						Signature:          state.localKeySignature,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+		})
+
+		if cfg.clientAuth > NoClientCert {
+			// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
+			// the client that it may send any certificate in response
+			// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
+			// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
+			// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
+			var certificateAuthorities [][]byte
+			if cfg.clientCAs != nil {
+				// nolint:staticcheck // ignoring tlsCert.RootCAs.Subjects is deprecated ERR because cert does not come from SystemCertPool and it's ok if certificate authorities is empty.
+				certificateAuthorities = cfg.clientCAs.Subjects()
+			}
+			pkts = append(pkts, &packet{
+				record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+					Header: recordlayer.Header{
+						Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+					},
+					Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+						Message: &handshake.MessageCertificateRequest{
+							CertificateTypes:            []clientcertificate.Type{clientcertificate.RSASign, clientcertificate.ECDSASign},
+							SignatureHashAlgorithms:     cfg.localSignatureSchemes,
+							CertificateAuthoritiesNames: certificateAuthorities,
+						},
+					},
+				},
+			})
+		}
+	case cfg.localPSKIdentityHint != nil || state.cipherSuite.KeyExchangeAlgorithm().Has(CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe):
+		// To help the client in selecting which identity to use, the server
+		// can provide a "PSK identity hint" in the ServerKeyExchange message.
+		// If no hint is provided and cipher suite doesn't use elliptic curve,
+		// the ServerKeyExchange message is omitted.
+		//
+		// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4279#section-2
+		srvExchange := &handshake.MessageServerKeyExchange{
+			IdentityHint: cfg.localPSKIdentityHint,
+		}
+		if state.cipherSuite.KeyExchangeAlgorithm().Has(CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe) {
+			srvExchange.EllipticCurveType = elliptic.CurveTypeNamedCurve
+			srvExchange.NamedCurve = state.namedCurve
+			srvExchange.PublicKey = state.localKeypair.PublicKey
+		}
+		pkts = append(pkts, &packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+					Message: srvExchange,
+				},
+			},
+		})
+	}
+
+	pkts = append(pkts, &packet{
+		record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+			Header: recordlayer.Header{
+				Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+			},
+			Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+				Message: &handshake.MessageServerHelloDone{},
+			},
+		},
+	})
+
+	return pkts, nil, nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/flight5bhandler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/handshake"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+func flight5bParse(_ context.Context, _ flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	_, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence-1, state.cipherSuite,
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, false, false},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		// No valid message received. Keep reading
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	if _, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeFinished].(*handshake.MessageFinished); !ok {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil
+	}
+
+	// Other party may re-transmit the last flight. Keep state to be flight5b.
+	return flight5b, nil, nil
+}
+
+func flight5bGenerate(_ flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) ([]*packet, *alert.Alert, error) { //nolint:gocognit
+	var pkts []*packet
+
+	pkts = append(pkts,
+		&packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: &protocol.ChangeCipherSpec{},
+			},
+		})
+
+	if len(state.localVerifyData) == 0 {
+		plainText := cache.pullAndMerge(
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, false, false},
+		)
+
+		var err error
+		state.localVerifyData, err = prf.VerifyDataClient(state.masterSecret, plainText, state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	pkts = append(pkts,
+		&packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+					Epoch:   1,
+				},
+				Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+					Message: &handshake.MessageFinished{
+						VerifyData: state.localVerifyData,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+			shouldEncrypt:            true,
+			resetLocalSequenceNumber: true,
+		})
+
+	return pkts, nil, nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/flight5handler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,357 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/x509"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/signaturehash"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/handshake"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+func flight5Parse(_ context.Context, c flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	_, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence, state.cipherSuite,
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, false, false},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		// No valid message received. Keep reading
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	var finished *handshake.MessageFinished
+	if finished, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeFinished].(*handshake.MessageFinished); !ok {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil
+	}
+	plainText := cache.pullAndMerge(
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateRequest, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHelloDone, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateVerify, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, true, false},
+	)
+
+	expectedVerifyData, err := prf.VerifyDataServer(state.masterSecret, plainText, state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+	}
+	if !bytes.Equal(expectedVerifyData, finished.VerifyData) {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.HandshakeFailure}, errVerifyDataMismatch
+	}
+
+	if len(state.SessionID) > 0 {
+		s := Session{
+			ID:     state.SessionID,
+			Secret: state.masterSecret,
+		}
+		cfg.log.Tracef("[handshake] save new session: %x", s.ID)
+		if err := cfg.sessionStore.Set(c.sessionKey(), s); err != nil {
+			return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	return flight5, nil, nil
+}
+
+func flight5Generate(c flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) ([]*packet, *alert.Alert, error) { //nolint:gocognit
+	var privateKey crypto.PrivateKey
+	var pkts []*packet
+	if state.remoteRequestedCertificate {
+		_, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence-2, state.cipherSuite,
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateRequest, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false})
+		if !ok {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.HandshakeFailure}, errClientCertificateRequired
+		}
+		reqInfo := CertificateRequestInfo{}
+		if r, ok := msgs[handshake.TypeCertificateRequest].(*handshake.MessageCertificateRequest); ok {
+			reqInfo.AcceptableCAs = r.CertificateAuthoritiesNames
+		} else {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.HandshakeFailure}, errClientCertificateRequired
+		}
+		certificate, err := cfg.getClientCertificate(&reqInfo)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.HandshakeFailure}, err
+		}
+		if certificate == nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.HandshakeFailure}, errNotAcceptableCertificateChain
+		}
+		if certificate.Certificate != nil {
+			privateKey = certificate.PrivateKey
+		}
+		pkts = append(pkts,
+			&packet{
+				record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+					Header: recordlayer.Header{
+						Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+					},
+					Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+						Message: &handshake.MessageCertificate{
+							Certificate: certificate.Certificate,
+						},
+					},
+				},
+			})
+	}
+
+	clientKeyExchange := &handshake.MessageClientKeyExchange{}
+	if cfg.localPSKCallback == nil {
+		clientKeyExchange.PublicKey = state.localKeypair.PublicKey
+	} else {
+		clientKeyExchange.IdentityHint = cfg.localPSKIdentityHint
+	}
+	if state != nil && state.localKeypair != nil && len(state.localKeypair.PublicKey) > 0 {
+		clientKeyExchange.PublicKey = state.localKeypair.PublicKey
+	}
+
+	pkts = append(pkts,
+		&packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+					Message: clientKeyExchange,
+				},
+			},
+		})
+
+	serverKeyExchangeData := cache.pullAndMerge(
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+	)
+
+	serverKeyExchange := &handshake.MessageServerKeyExchange{}
+
+	// handshakeMessageServerKeyExchange is optional for PSK
+	if len(serverKeyExchangeData) == 0 {
+		alertPtr, err := handleServerKeyExchange(c, state, cfg, &handshake.MessageServerKeyExchange{})
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, alertPtr, err
+		}
+	} else {
+		rawHandshake := &handshake.Handshake{
+			KeyExchangeAlgorithm: state.cipherSuite.KeyExchangeAlgorithm(),
+		}
+		err := rawHandshake.Unmarshal(serverKeyExchangeData)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.UnexpectedMessage}, err
+		}
+
+		switch h := rawHandshake.Message.(type) {
+		case *handshake.MessageServerKeyExchange:
+			serverKeyExchange = h
+		default:
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.UnexpectedMessage}, errInvalidContentType
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Append not-yet-sent packets
+	merged := []byte{}
+	seqPred := uint16(state.handshakeSendSequence)
+	for _, p := range pkts {
+		h, ok := p.record.Content.(*handshake.Handshake)
+		if !ok {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, errInvalidContentType
+		}
+		h.Header.MessageSequence = seqPred
+		seqPred++
+		raw, err := h.Marshal()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+		merged = append(merged, raw...)
+	}
+
+	if alertPtr, err := initalizeCipherSuite(state, cache, cfg, serverKeyExchange, merged); err != nil {
+		return nil, alertPtr, err
+	}
+
+	// If the client has sent a certificate with signing ability, a digitally-signed
+	// CertificateVerify message is sent to explicitly verify possession of the
+	// private key in the certificate.
+	if state.remoteRequestedCertificate && privateKey != nil {
+		plainText := append(cache.pullAndMerge(
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateRequest, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHelloDone, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+		), merged...)
+
+		// Find compatible signature scheme
+		signatureHashAlgo, err := signaturehash.SelectSignatureScheme(cfg.localSignatureSchemes, privateKey)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, err
+		}
+
+		certVerify, err := generateCertificateVerify(plainText, privateKey, signatureHashAlgo.Hash)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+		state.localCertificatesVerify = certVerify
+
+		p := &packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+					Message: &handshake.MessageCertificateVerify{
+						HashAlgorithm:      signatureHashAlgo.Hash,
+						SignatureAlgorithm: signatureHashAlgo.Signature,
+						Signature:          state.localCertificatesVerify,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+		}
+		pkts = append(pkts, p)
+
+		h, ok := p.record.Content.(*handshake.Handshake)
+		if !ok {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, errInvalidContentType
+		}
+		h.Header.MessageSequence = seqPred
+		// seqPred++ // this is the last use of seqPred
+		raw, err := h.Marshal()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+		merged = append(merged, raw...)
+	}
+
+	pkts = append(pkts,
+		&packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: &protocol.ChangeCipherSpec{},
+			},
+		})
+
+	if len(state.localVerifyData) == 0 {
+		plainText := cache.pullAndMerge(
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateRequest, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHelloDone, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateVerify, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, true, false},
+		)
+
+		var err error
+		state.localVerifyData, err = prf.VerifyDataClient(state.masterSecret, append(plainText, merged...), state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	pkts = append(pkts,
+		&packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+					Epoch:   1,
+				},
+				Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+					Message: &handshake.MessageFinished{
+						VerifyData: state.localVerifyData,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+			shouldEncrypt:            true,
+			resetLocalSequenceNumber: true,
+		})
+
+	return pkts, nil, nil
+}
+
+func initalizeCipherSuite(state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig, h *handshake.MessageServerKeyExchange, sendingPlainText []byte) (*alert.Alert, error) { //nolint:gocognit
+	if state.cipherSuite.IsInitialized() {
+		return nil, nil //nolint
+	}
+
+	clientRandom := state.localRandom.MarshalFixed()
+	serverRandom := state.remoteRandom.MarshalFixed()
+
+	var err error
+
+	if state.extendedMasterSecret {
+		var sessionHash []byte
+		sessionHash, err = cache.sessionHash(state.cipherSuite.HashFunc(), cfg.initialEpoch, sendingPlainText)
+		if err != nil {
+			return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+
+		state.masterSecret, err = prf.ExtendedMasterSecret(state.preMasterSecret, sessionHash, state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())
+		if err != nil {
+			return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.IllegalParameter}, err
+		}
+	} else {
+		state.masterSecret, err = prf.MasterSecret(state.preMasterSecret, clientRandom[:], serverRandom[:], state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())
+		if err != nil {
+			return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if state.cipherSuite.AuthenticationType() == CipherSuiteAuthenticationTypeCertificate {
+		// Verify that the pair of hash algorithm and signiture is listed.
+		var validSignatureScheme bool
+		for _, ss := range cfg.localSignatureSchemes {
+			if ss.Hash == h.HashAlgorithm && ss.Signature == h.SignatureAlgorithm {
+				validSignatureScheme = true
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		if !validSignatureScheme {
+			return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InsufficientSecurity}, errNoAvailableSignatureSchemes
+		}
+
+		expectedMsg := valueKeyMessage(clientRandom[:], serverRandom[:], h.PublicKey, h.NamedCurve)
+		if err = verifyKeySignature(expectedMsg, h.Signature, h.HashAlgorithm, state.PeerCertificates); err != nil {
+			return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err
+		}
+		var chains [][]*x509.Certificate
+		if !cfg.insecureSkipVerify {
+			if chains, err = verifyServerCert(state.PeerCertificates, cfg.rootCAs, cfg.serverName); err != nil {
+				return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err
+			}
+		}
+		if cfg.verifyPeerCertificate != nil {
+			if err = cfg.verifyPeerCertificate(state.PeerCertificates, chains); err != nil {
+				return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if cfg.verifyConnection != nil {
+		if err = cfg.verifyConnection(state.clone()); err != nil {
+			return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.BadCertificate}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if err = state.cipherSuite.Init(state.masterSecret, clientRandom[:], serverRandom[:], true); err != nil {
+		return &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+	}
+
+	cfg.writeKeyLog(keyLogLabelTLS12, clientRandom[:], state.masterSecret)
+
+	return nil, nil //nolint
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/flight6handler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/handshake"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+func flight6Parse(_ context.Context, _ flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	_, msgs, ok := cache.fullPullMap(state.handshakeRecvSequence-1, state.cipherSuite,
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, true, false},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		// No valid message received. Keep reading
+		return 0, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	if _, ok = msgs[handshake.TypeFinished].(*handshake.MessageFinished); !ok {
+		return 0, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, nil
+	}
+
+	// Other party may re-transmit the last flight. Keep state to be flight6.
+	return flight6, nil, nil
+}
+
+func flight6Generate(_ flightConn, state *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig) ([]*packet, *alert.Alert, error) {
+	var pkts []*packet
+
+	pkts = append(pkts,
+		&packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+				},
+				Content: &protocol.ChangeCipherSpec{},
+			},
+		})
+
+	if len(state.localVerifyData) == 0 {
+		plainText := cache.pullAndMerge(
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateRequest, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHelloDone, cfg.initialEpoch, false, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateVerify, cfg.initialEpoch, true, false},
+			handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeFinished, cfg.initialEpoch + 1, true, false},
+		)
+
+		var err error
+		state.localVerifyData, err = prf.VerifyDataServer(state.masterSecret, plainText, state.cipherSuite.HashFunc())
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	pkts = append(pkts,
+		&packet{
+			record: &recordlayer.RecordLayer{
+				Header: recordlayer.Header{
+					Version: protocol.Version1_2,
+					Epoch:   1,
+				},
+				Content: &handshake.Handshake{
+					Message: &handshake.MessageFinished{
+						VerifyData: state.localVerifyData,
+					},
+				},
+			},
+			shouldEncrypt:            true,
+			resetLocalSequenceNumber: true,
+		},
+	)
+	return pkts, nil, nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/flighthandler.go

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert"
+)
+
+// Parse received handshakes and return next flightVal
+type flightParser func(context.Context, flightConn, *State, *handshakeCache, *handshakeConfig) (flightVal, *alert.Alert, error)
+
+// Generate flights
+type flightGenerator func(flightConn, *State, *handshakeCache, *handshakeConfig) ([]*packet, *alert.Alert, error)
+
+func (f flightVal) getFlightParser() (flightParser, error) {
+	switch f {
+	case flight0:
+		return flight0Parse, nil
+	case flight1:
+		return flight1Parse, nil
+	case flight2:
+		return flight2Parse, nil
+	case flight3:
+		return flight3Parse, nil
+	case flight4:
+		return flight4Parse, nil
+	case flight4b:
+		return flight4bParse, nil
+	case flight5:
+		return flight5Parse, nil
+	case flight5b:
+		return flight5bParse, nil
+	case flight6:
+		return flight6Parse, nil
+	default:
+		return nil, errInvalidFlight
+	}
+}
+
+func (f flightVal) getFlightGenerator() (gen flightGenerator, retransmit bool, err error) {
+	switch f {
+	case flight0:
+		return flight0Generate, true, nil
+	case flight1:
+		return flight1Generate, true, nil
+	case flight2:
+		// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6347#section-3.2.1
+		// HelloVerifyRequests must not be retransmitted.
+		return flight2Generate, false, nil
+	case flight3:
+		return flight3Generate, true, nil
+	case flight4:
+		return flight4Generate, true, nil
+	case flight4b:
+		return flight4bGenerate, true, nil
+	case flight5:
+		return flight5Generate, true, nil
+	case flight5b:
+		return flight5bGenerate, true, nil
+	case flight6:
+		return flight6Generate, true, nil
+	default:
+		return nil, false, errInvalidFlight
+	}
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/fragment_buffer.go

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/handshake"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+// 2 megabytes
+const fragmentBufferMaxSize = 2000000
+
+type fragment struct {
+	recordLayerHeader recordlayer.Header
+	handshakeHeader   handshake.Header
+	data              []byte
+}
+
+type fragmentBuffer struct {
+	// map of MessageSequenceNumbers that hold slices of fragments
+	cache map[uint16][]*fragment
+
+	currentMessageSequenceNumber uint16
+}
+
+func newFragmentBuffer() *fragmentBuffer {
+	return &fragmentBuffer{cache: map[uint16][]*fragment{}}
+}
+
+// current total size of buffer
+func (f *fragmentBuffer) size() int {
+	size := 0
+	for i := range f.cache {
+		for j := range f.cache[i] {
+			size += len(f.cache[i][j].data)
+		}
+	}
+	return size
+}
+
+// Attempts to push a DTLS packet to the fragmentBuffer
+// when it returns true it means the fragmentBuffer has inserted and the buffer shouldn't be handled
+// when an error returns it is fatal, and the DTLS connection should be stopped
+func (f *fragmentBuffer) push(buf []byte) (bool, error) {
+	if f.size()+len(buf) >= fragmentBufferMaxSize {
+		return false, errFragmentBufferOverflow
+	}
+
+	frag := new(fragment)
+	if err := frag.recordLayerHeader.Unmarshal(buf); err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+
+	// fragment isn't a handshake, we don't need to handle it
+	if frag.recordLayerHeader.ContentType != protocol.ContentTypeHandshake {
+		return false, nil
+	}
+
+	for buf = buf[recordlayer.HeaderSize:]; len(buf) != 0; frag = new(fragment) {
+		if err := frag.handshakeHeader.Unmarshal(buf); err != nil {
+			return false, err
+		}
+
+		if _, ok := f.cache[frag.handshakeHeader.MessageSequence]; !ok {
+			f.cache[frag.handshakeHeader.MessageSequence] = []*fragment{}
+		}
+
+		// end index should be the length of handshake header but if the handshake
+		// was fragmented, we should keep them all
+		end := int(handshake.HeaderLength + frag.handshakeHeader.Length)
+		if size := len(buf); end > size {
+			end = size
+		}
+
+		// Discard all headers, when rebuilding the packet we will re-build
+		frag.data = append([]byte{}, buf[handshake.HeaderLength:end]...)
+		f.cache[frag.handshakeHeader.MessageSequence] = append(f.cache[frag.handshakeHeader.MessageSequence], frag)
+		buf = buf[end:]
+	}
+
+	return true, nil
+}
+
+func (f *fragmentBuffer) pop() (content []byte, epoch uint16) {
+	frags, ok := f.cache[f.currentMessageSequenceNumber]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, 0
+	}
+
+	// Go doesn't support recursive lambdas
+	var appendMessage func(targetOffset uint32) bool
+
+	rawMessage := []byte{}
+	appendMessage = func(targetOffset uint32) bool {
+		for _, f := range frags {
+			if f.handshakeHeader.FragmentOffset == targetOffset {
+				fragmentEnd := (f.handshakeHeader.FragmentOffset + f.handshakeHeader.FragmentLength)
+				if fragmentEnd != f.handshakeHeader.Length && f.handshakeHeader.FragmentLength != 0 {
+					if !appendMessage(fragmentEnd) {
+						return false
+					}
+				}
+
+				rawMessage = append(f.data, rawMessage...)
+				return true
+			}
+		}
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// Recursively collect up
+	if !appendMessage(0) {
+		return nil, 0
+	}
+
+	firstHeader := frags[0].handshakeHeader
+	firstHeader.FragmentOffset = 0
+	firstHeader.FragmentLength = firstHeader.Length
+
+	rawHeader, err := firstHeader.Marshal()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, 0
+	}
+
+	messageEpoch := frags[0].recordLayerHeader.Epoch
+
+	delete(f.cache, f.currentMessageSequenceNumber)
+	f.currentMessageSequenceNumber++
+	return append(rawHeader, rawMessage...), messageEpoch
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/handshake_cache.go

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/handshake"
+)
+
+type handshakeCacheItem struct {
+	typ             handshake.Type
+	isClient        bool
+	epoch           uint16
+	messageSequence uint16
+	data            []byte
+}
+
+type handshakeCachePullRule struct {
+	typ      handshake.Type
+	epoch    uint16
+	isClient bool
+	optional bool
+}
+
+type handshakeCache struct {
+	cache []*handshakeCacheItem
+	mu    sync.Mutex
+}
+
+func newHandshakeCache() *handshakeCache {
+	return &handshakeCache{}
+}
+
+func (h *handshakeCache) push(data []byte, epoch, messageSequence uint16, typ handshake.Type, isClient bool) {
+	h.mu.Lock()
+	defer h.mu.Unlock()
+
+	h.cache = append(h.cache, &handshakeCacheItem{
+		data:            append([]byte{}, data...),
+		epoch:           epoch,
+		messageSequence: messageSequence,
+		typ:             typ,
+		isClient:        isClient,
+	})
+}
+
+// returns a list handshakes that match the requested rules
+// the list will contain null entries for rules that can't be satisfied
+// multiple entries may match a rule, but only the last match is returned (ie ClientHello with cookies)
+func (h *handshakeCache) pull(rules ...handshakeCachePullRule) []*handshakeCacheItem {
+	h.mu.Lock()
+	defer h.mu.Unlock()
+
+	out := make([]*handshakeCacheItem, len(rules))
+	for i, r := range rules {
+		for _, c := range h.cache {
+			if c.typ == r.typ && c.isClient == r.isClient && c.epoch == r.epoch {
+				switch {
+				case out[i] == nil:
+					out[i] = c
+				case out[i].messageSequence < c.messageSequence:
+					out[i] = c
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return out
+}
+
+// fullPullMap pulls all handshakes between rules[0] to rules[len(rules)-1] as map.
+func (h *handshakeCache) fullPullMap(startSeq int, cipherSuite CipherSuite, rules ...handshakeCachePullRule) (int, map[handshake.Type]handshake.Message, bool) {
+	h.mu.Lock()
+	defer h.mu.Unlock()
+
+	ci := make(map[handshake.Type]*handshakeCacheItem)
+	for _, r := range rules {
+		var item *handshakeCacheItem
+		for _, c := range h.cache {
+			if c.typ == r.typ && c.isClient == r.isClient && c.epoch == r.epoch {
+				switch {
+				case item == nil:
+					item = c
+				case item.messageSequence < c.messageSequence:
+					item = c
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if !r.optional && item == nil {
+			// Missing mandatory message.
+			return startSeq, nil, false
+		}
+		ci[r.typ] = item
+	}
+	out := make(map[handshake.Type]handshake.Message)
+	seq := startSeq
+	for _, r := range rules {
+		t := r.typ
+		i := ci[t]
+		if i == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		var keyExchangeAlgorithm CipherSuiteKeyExchangeAlgorithm
+		if cipherSuite != nil {
+			keyExchangeAlgorithm = cipherSuite.KeyExchangeAlgorithm()
+		}
+		rawHandshake := &handshake.Handshake{
+			KeyExchangeAlgorithm: keyExchangeAlgorithm,
+		}
+		if err := rawHandshake.Unmarshal(i.data); err != nil {
+			return startSeq, nil, false
+		}
+		if uint16(seq) != rawHandshake.Header.MessageSequence {
+			// There is a gap. Some messages are not arrived.
+			return startSeq, nil, false
+		}
+		seq++
+		out[t] = rawHandshake.Message
+	}
+	return seq, out, true
+}
+
+// pullAndMerge calls pull and then merges the results, ignoring any null entries
+func (h *handshakeCache) pullAndMerge(rules ...handshakeCachePullRule) []byte {
+	merged := []byte{}
+
+	for _, p := range h.pull(rules...) {
+		if p != nil {
+			merged = append(merged, p.data...)
+		}
+	}
+	return merged
+}
+
+// sessionHash returns the session hash for Extended Master Secret support
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06#section-4
+func (h *handshakeCache) sessionHash(hf prf.HashFunc, epoch uint16, additional ...[]byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	merged := []byte{}
+
+	// Order defined by https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.3
+	handshakeBuffer := h.pull(
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientHello, epoch, true, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHello, epoch, false, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, epoch, false, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerKeyExchange, epoch, false, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificateRequest, epoch, false, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeServerHelloDone, epoch, false, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeCertificate, epoch, true, false},
+		handshakeCachePullRule{handshake.TypeClientKeyExchange, epoch, true, false},
+	)
+
+	for _, p := range handshakeBuffer {
+		if p == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		merged = append(merged, p.data...)
+	}
+	for _, a := range additional {
+		merged = append(merged, a...)
+	}
+
+	hash := hf()
+	if _, err := hash.Write(merged); err != nil {
+		return []byte{}, err
+	}
+
+	return hash.Sum(nil), nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/handshaker.go

@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/elliptic"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/signaturehash"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/handshake"
+	"github.com/pion/logging"
+)
+
+// [RFC6347 Section-4.2.4]
+//                      +-----------+
+//                +---> | PREPARING | <--------------------+
+//                |     +-----------+                      |
+//                |           |                            |
+//                |           | Buffer next flight         |
+//                |           |                            |
+//                |          \|/                           |
+//                |     +-----------+                      |
+//                |     |  SENDING  |<------------------+  | Send
+//                |     +-----------+                   |  | HelloRequest
+//        Receive |           |                         |  |
+//           next |           | Send flight             |  | or
+//         flight |  +--------+                         |  |
+//                |  |        | Set retransmit timer    |  | Receive
+//                |  |       \|/                        |  | HelloRequest
+//                |  |  +-----------+                   |  | Send
+//                +--)--|  WAITING  |-------------------+  | ClientHello
+//                |  |  +-----------+   Timer expires   |  |
+//                |  |         |                        |  |
+//                |  |         +------------------------+  |
+//        Receive |  | Send           Read retransmit      |
+//           last |  | last                                |
+//         flight |  | flight                              |
+//                |  |                                     |
+//               \|/\|/                                    |
+//            +-----------+                                |
+//            | FINISHED  | -------------------------------+
+//            +-----------+
+//                 |  /|\
+//                 |   |
+//                 +---+
+//              Read retransmit
+//           Retransmit last flight
+
+type handshakeState uint8
+
+const (
+	handshakeErrored handshakeState = iota
+	handshakePreparing
+	handshakeSending
+	handshakeWaiting
+	handshakeFinished
+)
+
+func (s handshakeState) String() string {
+	switch s {
+	case handshakeErrored:
+		return "Errored"
+	case handshakePreparing:
+		return "Preparing"
+	case handshakeSending:
+		return "Sending"
+	case handshakeWaiting:
+		return "Waiting"
+	case handshakeFinished:
+		return "Finished"
+	default:
+		return "Unknown"
+	}
+}
+
+type handshakeFSM struct {
+	currentFlight flightVal
+	flights       []*packet
+	retransmit    bool
+	state         *State
+	cache         *handshakeCache
+	cfg           *handshakeConfig
+	closed        chan struct{}
+}
+
+type handshakeConfig struct {
+	localPSKCallback            PSKCallback
+	localPSKIdentityHint        []byte
+	localCipherSuites           []CipherSuite             // Available CipherSuites
+	localSignatureSchemes       []signaturehash.Algorithm // Available signature schemes
+	extendedMasterSecret        ExtendedMasterSecretType  // Policy for the Extended Master Support extension
+	localSRTPProtectionProfiles []SRTPProtectionProfile   // Available SRTPProtectionProfiles, if empty no SRTP support
+	serverName                  string
+	supportedProtocols          []string
+	clientAuth                  ClientAuthType // If we are a client should we request a client certificate
+	localCertificates           []tls.Certificate
+	nameToCertificate           map[string]*tls.Certificate
+	insecureSkipVerify          bool
+	verifyPeerCertificate       func(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error
+	verifyConnection            func(*State) error
+	sessionStore                SessionStore
+	rootCAs                     *x509.CertPool
+	clientCAs                   *x509.CertPool
+	retransmitInterval          time.Duration
+	customCipherSuites          func() []CipherSuite
+	ellipticCurves              []elliptic.Curve
+	insecureSkipHelloVerify     bool
+
+	onFlightState func(flightVal, handshakeState)
+	log           logging.LeveledLogger
+	keyLogWriter  io.Writer
+
+	localGetCertificate       func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error)
+	localGetClientCertificate func(*CertificateRequestInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error)
+
+	initialEpoch uint16
+
+	mu sync.Mutex
+}
+
+type flightConn interface {
+	notify(ctx context.Context, level alert.Level, desc alert.Description) error
+	writePackets(context.Context, []*packet) error
+	recvHandshake() <-chan chan struct{}
+	setLocalEpoch(epoch uint16)
+	handleQueuedPackets(context.Context) error
+	sessionKey() []byte
+}
+
+func (c *handshakeConfig) writeKeyLog(label string, clientRandom, secret []byte) {
+	if c.keyLogWriter == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	c.mu.Lock()
+	defer c.mu.Unlock()
+	_, err := c.keyLogWriter.Write([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s %x %x\n", label, clientRandom, secret)))
+	if err != nil {
+		c.log.Debugf("failed to write key log file: %s", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func srvCliStr(isClient bool) string {
+	if isClient {
+		return "client"
+	}
+	return "server"
+}
+
+func newHandshakeFSM(
+	s *State, cache *handshakeCache, cfg *handshakeConfig,
+	initialFlight flightVal,
+) *handshakeFSM {
+	return &handshakeFSM{
+		currentFlight: initialFlight,
+		state:         s,
+		cache:         cache,
+		cfg:           cfg,
+		closed:        make(chan struct{}),
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *handshakeFSM) Run(ctx context.Context, c flightConn, initialState handshakeState) error {
+	state := initialState
+	defer func() {
+		close(s.closed)
+	}()
+	for {
+		s.cfg.log.Tracef("[handshake:%s] %s: %s", srvCliStr(s.state.isClient), s.currentFlight.String(), state.String())
+		if s.cfg.onFlightState != nil {
+			s.cfg.onFlightState(s.currentFlight, state)
+		}
+		var err error
+		switch state {
+		case handshakePreparing:
+			state, err = s.prepare(ctx, c)
+		case handshakeSending:
+			state, err = s.send(ctx, c)
+		case handshakeWaiting:
+			state, err = s.wait(ctx, c)
+		case handshakeFinished:
+			state, err = s.finish(ctx, c)
+		default:
+			return errInvalidFSMTransition
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *handshakeFSM) Done() <-chan struct{} {
+	return s.closed
+}
+
+func (s *handshakeFSM) prepare(ctx context.Context, c flightConn) (handshakeState, error) {
+	s.flights = nil
+	// Prepare flights
+	var (
+		a    *alert.Alert
+		err  error
+		pkts []*packet
+	)
+	gen, retransmit, errFlight := s.currentFlight.getFlightGenerator()
+	if errFlight != nil {
+		err = errFlight
+		a = &alert.Alert{Level: alert.Fatal, Description: alert.InternalError}
+	} else {
+		pkts, a, err = gen(c, s.state, s.cache, s.cfg)
+		s.retransmit = retransmit
+	}
+	if a != nil {
+		if alertErr := c.notify(ctx, a.Level, a.Description); alertErr != nil {
+			if err != nil {
+				err = alertErr
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return handshakeErrored, err
+	}
+
+	s.flights = pkts
+	epoch := s.cfg.initialEpoch
+	nextEpoch := epoch
+	for _, p := range s.flights {
+		p.record.Header.Epoch += epoch
+		if p.record.Header.Epoch > nextEpoch {
+			nextEpoch = p.record.Header.Epoch
+		}
+		if h, ok := p.record.Content.(*handshake.Handshake); ok {
+			h.Header.MessageSequence = uint16(s.state.handshakeSendSequence)
+			s.state.handshakeSendSequence++
+		}
+	}
+	if epoch != nextEpoch {
+		s.cfg.log.Tracef("[handshake:%s] -> changeCipherSpec (epoch: %d)", srvCliStr(s.state.isClient), nextEpoch)
+		c.setLocalEpoch(nextEpoch)
+	}
+	return handshakeSending, nil
+}
+
+func (s *handshakeFSM) send(ctx context.Context, c flightConn) (handshakeState, error) {
+	// Send flights
+	if err := c.writePackets(ctx, s.flights); err != nil {
+		return handshakeErrored, err
+	}
+
+	if s.currentFlight.isLastSendFlight() {
+		return handshakeFinished, nil
+	}
+	return handshakeWaiting, nil
+}
+
+func (s *handshakeFSM) wait(ctx context.Context, c flightConn) (handshakeState, error) { //nolint:gocognit
+	parse, errFlight := s.currentFlight.getFlightParser()
+	if errFlight != nil {
+		if alertErr := c.notify(ctx, alert.Fatal, alert.InternalError); alertErr != nil {
+			if errFlight != nil {
+				return handshakeErrored, alertErr
+			}
+		}
+		return handshakeErrored, errFlight
+	}
+
+	retransmitTimer := time.NewTimer(s.cfg.retransmitInterval)
+	for {
+		select {
+		case done := <-c.recvHandshake():
+			nextFlight, alert, err := parse(ctx, c, s.state, s.cache, s.cfg)
+			close(done)
+			if alert != nil {
+				if alertErr := c.notify(ctx, alert.Level, alert.Description); alertErr != nil {
+					if err != nil {
+						err = alertErr
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			if err != nil {
+				return handshakeErrored, err
+			}
+			if nextFlight == 0 {
+				break
+			}
+			s.cfg.log.Tracef("[handshake:%s] %s -> %s", srvCliStr(s.state.isClient), s.currentFlight.String(), nextFlight.String())
+			if nextFlight.isLastRecvFlight() && s.currentFlight == nextFlight {
+				return handshakeFinished, nil
+			}
+			s.currentFlight = nextFlight
+			return handshakePreparing, nil
+
+		case <-retransmitTimer.C:
+			if !s.retransmit {
+				return handshakeWaiting, nil
+			}
+			return handshakeSending, nil
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return handshakeErrored, ctx.Err()
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *handshakeFSM) finish(ctx context.Context, c flightConn) (handshakeState, error) {
+	parse, errFlight := s.currentFlight.getFlightParser()
+	if errFlight != nil {
+		if alertErr := c.notify(ctx, alert.Fatal, alert.InternalError); alertErr != nil {
+			if errFlight != nil {
+				return handshakeErrored, alertErr
+			}
+		}
+		return handshakeErrored, errFlight
+	}
+
+	retransmitTimer := time.NewTimer(s.cfg.retransmitInterval)
+	select {
+	case done := <-c.recvHandshake():
+		nextFlight, alert, err := parse(ctx, c, s.state, s.cache, s.cfg)
+		close(done)
+		if alert != nil {
+			if alertErr := c.notify(ctx, alert.Level, alert.Description); alertErr != nil {
+				if err != nil {
+					err = alertErr
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return handshakeErrored, err
+		}
+		if nextFlight == 0 {
+			break
+		}
+		if nextFlight.isLastRecvFlight() && s.currentFlight == nextFlight {
+			return handshakeFinished, nil
+		}
+		<-retransmitTimer.C
+		// Retransmit last flight
+		return handshakeSending, nil
+
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+		return handshakeErrored, ctx.Err()
+	}
+	return handshakeFinished, nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/aes_128_ccm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+)
+
+// Aes128Ccm is a base class used by multiple AES-CCM Ciphers
+type Aes128Ccm struct {
+	AesCcm
+}
+
+func newAes128Ccm(clientCertificateType clientcertificate.Type, id ID, psk bool, cryptoCCMTagLen ciphersuite.CCMTagLen, keyExchangeAlgorithm KeyExchangeAlgorithm, ecc bool) *Aes128Ccm {
+	return &Aes128Ccm{
+		AesCcm: AesCcm{
+			clientCertificateType: clientCertificateType,
+			id:                    id,
+			psk:                   psk,
+			cryptoCCMTagLen:       cryptoCCMTagLen,
+			keyExchangeAlgorithm:  keyExchangeAlgorithm,
+			ecc:                   ecc,
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// Init initializes the internal Cipher with keying material
+func (c *Aes128Ccm) Init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, isClient bool) error {
+	const prfKeyLen = 16
+	return c.AesCcm.Init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom, isClient, prfKeyLen)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/aes_256_ccm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+)
+
+// Aes256Ccm is a base class used by multiple AES-CCM Ciphers
+type Aes256Ccm struct {
+	AesCcm
+}
+
+func newAes256Ccm(clientCertificateType clientcertificate.Type, id ID, psk bool, cryptoCCMTagLen ciphersuite.CCMTagLen, keyExchangeAlgorithm KeyExchangeAlgorithm, ecc bool) *Aes256Ccm {
+	return &Aes256Ccm{
+		AesCcm: AesCcm{
+			clientCertificateType: clientCertificateType,
+			id:                    id,
+			psk:                   psk,
+			cryptoCCMTagLen:       cryptoCCMTagLen,
+			keyExchangeAlgorithm:  keyExchangeAlgorithm,
+			ecc:                   ecc,
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+// Init initializes the internal Cipher with keying material
+func (c *Aes256Ccm) Init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, isClient bool) error {
+	const prfKeyLen = 32
+	return c.AesCcm.Init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom, isClient, prfKeyLen)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/aes_ccm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+// AesCcm is a base class used by multiple AES-CCM Ciphers
+type AesCcm struct {
+	ccm                   atomic.Value // *cryptoCCM
+	clientCertificateType clientcertificate.Type
+	id                    ID
+	psk                   bool
+	keyExchangeAlgorithm  KeyExchangeAlgorithm
+	cryptoCCMTagLen       ciphersuite.CCMTagLen
+	ecc                   bool
+}
+
+// CertificateType returns what type of certificate this CipherSuite exchanges
+func (c *AesCcm) CertificateType() clientcertificate.Type {
+	return c.clientCertificateType
+}
+
+// ID returns the ID of the CipherSuite
+func (c *AesCcm) ID() ID {
+	return c.id
+}
+
+func (c *AesCcm) String() string {
+	return c.id.String()
+}
+
+// ECC uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography
+func (c *AesCcm) ECC() bool {
+	return c.ecc
+}
+
+// KeyExchangeAlgorithm controls what key exchange algorithm is using during the handshake
+func (c *AesCcm) KeyExchangeAlgorithm() KeyExchangeAlgorithm {
+	return c.keyExchangeAlgorithm
+}
+
+// HashFunc returns the hashing func for this CipherSuite
+func (c *AesCcm) HashFunc() func() hash.Hash {
+	return sha256.New
+}
+
+// AuthenticationType controls what authentication method is using during the handshake
+func (c *AesCcm) AuthenticationType() AuthenticationType {
+	if c.psk {
+		return AuthenticationTypePreSharedKey
+	}
+	return AuthenticationTypeCertificate
+}
+
+// IsInitialized returns if the CipherSuite has keying material and can
+// encrypt/decrypt packets
+func (c *AesCcm) IsInitialized() bool {
+	return c.ccm.Load() != nil
+}
+
+// Init initializes the internal Cipher with keying material
+func (c *AesCcm) Init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, isClient bool, prfKeyLen int) error {
+	const (
+		prfMacLen = 0
+		prfIvLen  = 4
+	)
+
+	keys, err := prf.GenerateEncryptionKeys(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom, prfMacLen, prfKeyLen, prfIvLen, c.HashFunc())
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	var ccm *ciphersuite.CCM
+	if isClient {
+		ccm, err = ciphersuite.NewCCM(c.cryptoCCMTagLen, keys.ClientWriteKey, keys.ClientWriteIV, keys.ServerWriteKey, keys.ServerWriteIV)
+	} else {
+		ccm, err = ciphersuite.NewCCM(c.cryptoCCMTagLen, keys.ServerWriteKey, keys.ServerWriteIV, keys.ClientWriteKey, keys.ClientWriteIV)
+	}
+	c.ccm.Store(ccm)
+
+	return err
+}
+
+// Encrypt encrypts a single TLS RecordLayer
+func (c *AesCcm) Encrypt(pkt *recordlayer.RecordLayer, raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	cipherSuite, ok := c.ccm.Load().(*ciphersuite.CCM)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w, unable to encrypt", errCipherSuiteNotInit)
+	}
+
+	return cipherSuite.Encrypt(pkt, raw)
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts a single TLS RecordLayer
+func (c *AesCcm) Decrypt(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	cipherSuite, ok := c.ccm.Load().(*ciphersuite.CCM)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w, unable to decrypt", errCipherSuiteNotInit)
+	}
+
+	return cipherSuite.Decrypt(raw)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/ciphersuite.go

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package ciphersuite provides TLS Ciphers as registered with the IANA  https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/types"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+)
+
+var errCipherSuiteNotInit = &protocol.TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("CipherSuite has not been initialized")} //nolint:goerr113
+
+// ID is an ID for our supported CipherSuites
+type ID uint16
+
+func (i ID) String() string {
+	switch i {
+	case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM:
+		return "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM"
+	case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8:
+		return "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"
+	case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+		return "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"
+	case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+		return "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"
+	case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+		return "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"
+	case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+		return "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"
+	case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM:
+		return "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM"
+	case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8:
+		return "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8"
+	case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8:
+		return "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8"
+	case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+		return "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"
+	case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+		return "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"
+	case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+		return "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"
+	case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+		return "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"
+	case TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+		return "TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"
+	default:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("unknown(%v)", uint16(i))
+	}
+}
+
+// Supported Cipher Suites
+const (
+	// AES-128-CCM
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM   ID = 0xc0ac //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 ID = 0xc0ae //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+
+	// AES-128-GCM-SHA256
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ID = 0xc02b //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256   ID = 0xc02f //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ID = 0xc02c //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384   ID = 0xc030 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	// AES-256-CBC-SHA
+	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ID = 0xc00a //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA   ID = 0xc014 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+
+	TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM        ID = 0xc0a4 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8      ID = 0xc0a8 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8      ID = 0xc0a9 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ID = 0x00a8 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+	TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ID = 0x00ae //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+
+	TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 ID = 0xC037 //nolint:revive,stylecheck
+)
+
+// AuthenticationType controls what authentication method is using during the handshake
+type AuthenticationType = types.AuthenticationType
+
+// AuthenticationType Enums
+const (
+	AuthenticationTypeCertificate  AuthenticationType = types.AuthenticationTypeCertificate
+	AuthenticationTypePreSharedKey AuthenticationType = types.AuthenticationTypePreSharedKey
+	AuthenticationTypeAnonymous    AuthenticationType = types.AuthenticationTypeAnonymous
+)
+
+// KeyExchangeAlgorithm controls what exchange algorithm was chosen.
+type KeyExchangeAlgorithm = types.KeyExchangeAlgorithm
+
+// KeyExchangeAlgorithm Bitmask
+const (
+	KeyExchangeAlgorithmNone  KeyExchangeAlgorithm = types.KeyExchangeAlgorithmNone
+	KeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk   KeyExchangeAlgorithm = types.KeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk
+	KeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe KeyExchangeAlgorithm = types.KeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe
+)

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+)
+
+// NewTLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128Ccm constructs a TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM Cipher
+func NewTLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128Ccm() *Aes128Ccm {
+	return newAes128Ccm(clientcertificate.ECDSASign, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, false, ciphersuite.CCMTagLength, KeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe, true)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_ccm8.go

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+)
+
+// NewTLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128Ccm8 creates a new TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 CipherSuite
+func NewTLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128Ccm8() *Aes128Ccm {
+	return newAes128Ccm(clientcertificate.ECDSASign, TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, false, ciphersuite.CCMTagLength8, KeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe, true)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_128_gcm_sha256.go

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+// TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256  represents a TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 CipherSuite
+type TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256 struct {
+	gcm atomic.Value // *cryptoGCM
+}
+
+// CertificateType returns what type of certficate this CipherSuite exchanges
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256) CertificateType() clientcertificate.Type {
+	return clientcertificate.ECDSASign
+}
+
+// KeyExchangeAlgorithm controls what key exchange algorithm is using during the handshake
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256) KeyExchangeAlgorithm() KeyExchangeAlgorithm {
+	return KeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe
+}
+
+// ECC uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256) ECC() bool {
+	return true
+}
+
+// ID returns the ID of the CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256) ID() ID {
+	return TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+}
+
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256) String() string {
+	return "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"
+}
+
+// HashFunc returns the hashing func for this CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256) HashFunc() func() hash.Hash {
+	return sha256.New
+}
+
+// AuthenticationType controls what authentication method is using during the handshake
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256) AuthenticationType() AuthenticationType {
+	return AuthenticationTypeCertificate
+}
+
+// IsInitialized returns if the CipherSuite has keying material and can
+// encrypt/decrypt packets
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256) IsInitialized() bool {
+	return c.gcm.Load() != nil
+}
+
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256) init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, isClient bool, prfMacLen, prfKeyLen, prfIvLen int, hashFunc func() hash.Hash) error {
+	keys, err := prf.GenerateEncryptionKeys(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom, prfMacLen, prfKeyLen, prfIvLen, hashFunc)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	var gcm *ciphersuite.GCM
+	if isClient {
+		gcm, err = ciphersuite.NewGCM(keys.ClientWriteKey, keys.ClientWriteIV, keys.ServerWriteKey, keys.ServerWriteIV)
+	} else {
+		gcm, err = ciphersuite.NewGCM(keys.ServerWriteKey, keys.ServerWriteIV, keys.ClientWriteKey, keys.ClientWriteIV)
+	}
+	c.gcm.Store(gcm)
+	return err
+}
+
+// Init initializes the internal Cipher with keying material
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256) Init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, isClient bool) error {
+	const (
+		prfMacLen = 0
+		prfKeyLen = 16
+		prfIvLen  = 4
+	)
+
+	return c.init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom, isClient, prfMacLen, prfKeyLen, prfIvLen, c.HashFunc())
+}
+
+// Encrypt encrypts a single TLS RecordLayer
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256) Encrypt(pkt *recordlayer.RecordLayer, raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	cipherSuite, ok := c.gcm.Load().(*ciphersuite.GCM)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w, unable to encrypt", errCipherSuiteNotInit)
+	}
+
+	return cipherSuite.Encrypt(pkt, raw)
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts a single TLS RecordLayer
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256) Decrypt(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	cipherSuite, ok := c.gcm.Load().(*ciphersuite.GCM)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w, unable to decrypt", errCipherSuiteNotInit)
+	}
+
+	return cipherSuite.Decrypt(raw)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_256_cbc_sha.go

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha1" //nolint: gosec,gci
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+// TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha represents a TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA CipherSuite
+type TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha struct {
+	cbc atomic.Value // *cryptoCBC
+}
+
+// CertificateType returns what type of certficate this CipherSuite exchanges
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha) CertificateType() clientcertificate.Type {
+	return clientcertificate.ECDSASign
+}
+
+// KeyExchangeAlgorithm controls what key exchange algorithm is using during the handshake
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha) KeyExchangeAlgorithm() KeyExchangeAlgorithm {
+	return KeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe
+}
+
+// ECC uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha) ECC() bool {
+	return true
+}
+
+// ID returns the ID of the CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha) ID() ID {
+	return TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+}
+
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha) String() string {
+	return "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"
+}
+
+// HashFunc returns the hashing func for this CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha) HashFunc() func() hash.Hash {
+	return sha256.New
+}
+
+// AuthenticationType controls what authentication method is using during the handshake
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha) AuthenticationType() AuthenticationType {
+	return AuthenticationTypeCertificate
+}
+
+// IsInitialized returns if the CipherSuite has keying material and can
+// encrypt/decrypt packets
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha) IsInitialized() bool {
+	return c.cbc.Load() != nil
+}
+
+// Init initializes the internal Cipher with keying material
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha) Init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, isClient bool) error {
+	const (
+		prfMacLen = 20
+		prfKeyLen = 32
+		prfIvLen  = 16
+	)
+
+	keys, err := prf.GenerateEncryptionKeys(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom, prfMacLen, prfKeyLen, prfIvLen, c.HashFunc())
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	var cbc *ciphersuite.CBC
+	if isClient {
+		cbc, err = ciphersuite.NewCBC(
+			keys.ClientWriteKey, keys.ClientWriteIV, keys.ClientMACKey,
+			keys.ServerWriteKey, keys.ServerWriteIV, keys.ServerMACKey,
+			sha1.New,
+		)
+	} else {
+		cbc, err = ciphersuite.NewCBC(
+			keys.ServerWriteKey, keys.ServerWriteIV, keys.ServerMACKey,
+			keys.ClientWriteKey, keys.ClientWriteIV, keys.ClientMACKey,
+			sha1.New,
+		)
+	}
+	c.cbc.Store(cbc)
+
+	return err
+}
+
+// Encrypt encrypts a single TLS RecordLayer
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha) Encrypt(pkt *recordlayer.RecordLayer, raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	cipherSuite, ok := c.cbc.Load().(*ciphersuite.CBC)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w, unable to encrypt", errCipherSuiteNotInit)
+	}
+
+	return cipherSuite.Encrypt(pkt, raw)
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts a single TLS RecordLayer
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha) Decrypt(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	cipherSuite, ok := c.cbc.Load().(*ciphersuite.CBC)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w, unable to decrypt", errCipherSuiteNotInit)
+	}
+
+	return cipherSuite.Decrypt(raw)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_ecdhe_ecdsa_with_aes_256_gcm_sha384.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha512"
+	"hash"
+)
+
+// TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256GcmSha384  represents a TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 CipherSuite
+type TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256GcmSha384 struct {
+	TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256
+}
+
+// ID returns the ID of the CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256GcmSha384) ID() ID {
+	return TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+}
+
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256GcmSha384) String() string {
+	return "TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"
+}
+
+// HashFunc returns the hashing func for this CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256GcmSha384) HashFunc() func() hash.Hash {
+	return sha512.New384
+}
+
+// Init initializes the internal Cipher with keying material
+func (c *TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256GcmSha384) Init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, isClient bool) error {
+	const (
+		prfMacLen = 0
+		prfKeyLen = 32
+		prfIvLen  = 4
+	)
+
+	return c.init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom, isClient, prfMacLen, prfKeyLen, prfIvLen, c.HashFunc())
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_ecdhe_psk_with_aes_128_cbc_sha256.go

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+// TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256 implements the TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 CipherSuite
+type TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256 struct {
+	cbc atomic.Value // *cryptoCBC
+}
+
+// NewTLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256 creates TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 cipher.
+func NewTLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256() *TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256 {
+	return &TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256{}
+}
+
+// CertificateType returns what type of certificate this CipherSuite exchanges
+func (c *TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256) CertificateType() clientcertificate.Type {
+	return clientcertificate.Type(0)
+}
+
+// KeyExchangeAlgorithm controls what key exchange algorithm is using during the handshake
+func (c *TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256) KeyExchangeAlgorithm() KeyExchangeAlgorithm {
+	return (KeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk | KeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe)
+}
+
+// ECC uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography
+func (c *TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256) ECC() bool {
+	return true
+}
+
+// ID returns the ID of the CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256) ID() ID {
+	return TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+}
+
+func (c *TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256) String() string {
+	return "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256"
+}
+
+// HashFunc returns the hashing func for this CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256) HashFunc() func() hash.Hash {
+	return sha256.New
+}
+
+// AuthenticationType controls what authentication method is using during the handshake
+func (c *TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256) AuthenticationType() AuthenticationType {
+	return AuthenticationTypePreSharedKey
+}
+
+// IsInitialized returns if the CipherSuite has keying material and can
+// encrypt/decrypt packets
+func (c *TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256) IsInitialized() bool {
+	return c.cbc.Load() != nil
+}
+
+// Init initializes the internal Cipher with keying material
+func (c *TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256) Init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, isClient bool) error {
+	const (
+		prfMacLen = 32
+		prfKeyLen = 16
+		prfIvLen  = 16
+	)
+
+	keys, err := prf.GenerateEncryptionKeys(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom, prfMacLen, prfKeyLen, prfIvLen, c.HashFunc())
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	var cbc *ciphersuite.CBC
+	if isClient {
+		cbc, err = ciphersuite.NewCBC(
+			keys.ClientWriteKey, keys.ClientWriteIV, keys.ClientMACKey,
+			keys.ServerWriteKey, keys.ServerWriteIV, keys.ServerMACKey,
+			c.HashFunc(),
+		)
+	} else {
+		cbc, err = ciphersuite.NewCBC(
+			keys.ServerWriteKey, keys.ServerWriteIV, keys.ServerMACKey,
+			keys.ClientWriteKey, keys.ClientWriteIV, keys.ClientMACKey,
+			c.HashFunc(),
+		)
+	}
+	c.cbc.Store(cbc)
+
+	return err
+}
+
+// Encrypt encrypts a single TLS RecordLayer
+func (c *TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256) Encrypt(pkt *recordlayer.RecordLayer, raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	cipherSuite, ok := c.cbc.Load().(*ciphersuite.CBC)
+	if !ok { // !c.isInitialized()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w, unable to encrypt", errCipherSuiteNotInit)
+	}
+
+	return cipherSuite.Encrypt(pkt, raw)
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts a single TLS RecordLayer
+func (c *TLSEcdhePskWithAes128CbcSha256) Decrypt(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	cipherSuite, ok := c.cbc.Load().(*ciphersuite.CBC)
+	if !ok { // !c.isInitialized()
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w, unable to decrypt", errCipherSuiteNotInit)
+	}
+
+	return cipherSuite.Decrypt(raw)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_ecdhe_rsa_with_aes_128_gcm_sha256.go

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import "github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+
+// TLSEcdheRsaWithAes128GcmSha256 implements the TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 CipherSuite
+type TLSEcdheRsaWithAes128GcmSha256 struct {
+	TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256
+}
+
+// CertificateType returns what type of certificate this CipherSuite exchanges
+func (c *TLSEcdheRsaWithAes128GcmSha256) CertificateType() clientcertificate.Type {
+	return clientcertificate.RSASign
+}
+
+// ID returns the ID of the CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSEcdheRsaWithAes128GcmSha256) ID() ID {
+	return TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+}
+
+func (c *TLSEcdheRsaWithAes128GcmSha256) String() string {
+	return "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_ecdhe_rsa_with_aes_256_cbc_sha.go

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import "github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+
+// TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256CbcSha implements the TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA CipherSuite
+type TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256CbcSha struct {
+	TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256CbcSha
+}
+
+// CertificateType returns what type of certificate this CipherSuite exchanges
+func (c *TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256CbcSha) CertificateType() clientcertificate.Type {
+	return clientcertificate.RSASign
+}
+
+// ID returns the ID of the CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256CbcSha) ID() ID {
+	return TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+}
+
+func (c *TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256CbcSha) String() string {
+	return "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA"
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_ecdhe_rsa_with_aes_256_gcm_sha384.go

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import "github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+
+// TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256GcmSha384 implements the TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 CipherSuite
+type TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256GcmSha384 struct {
+	TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes256GcmSha384
+}
+
+// CertificateType returns what type of certificate this CipherSuite exchanges
+func (c *TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256GcmSha384) CertificateType() clientcertificate.Type {
+	return clientcertificate.RSASign
+}
+
+// ID returns the ID of the CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256GcmSha384) ID() ID {
+	return TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+}
+
+func (c *TLSEcdheRsaWithAes256GcmSha384) String() string {
+	return "TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_psk_with_aes_128_cbc_sha256.go

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+// TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256 implements the TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 CipherSuite
+type TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256 struct {
+	cbc atomic.Value // *cryptoCBC
+}
+
+// CertificateType returns what type of certificate this CipherSuite exchanges
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256) CertificateType() clientcertificate.Type {
+	return clientcertificate.Type(0)
+}
+
+// KeyExchangeAlgorithm controls what key exchange algorithm is using during the handshake
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256) KeyExchangeAlgorithm() KeyExchangeAlgorithm {
+	return KeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk
+}
+
+// ECC uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256) ECC() bool {
+	return false
+}
+
+// ID returns the ID of the CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256) ID() ID {
+	return TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+}
+
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256) String() string {
+	return "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256"
+}
+
+// HashFunc returns the hashing func for this CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256) HashFunc() func() hash.Hash {
+	return sha256.New
+}
+
+// AuthenticationType controls what authentication method is using during the handshake
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256) AuthenticationType() AuthenticationType {
+	return AuthenticationTypePreSharedKey
+}
+
+// IsInitialized returns if the CipherSuite has keying material and can
+// encrypt/decrypt packets
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256) IsInitialized() bool {
+	return c.cbc.Load() != nil
+}
+
+// Init initializes the internal Cipher with keying material
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256) Init(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, isClient bool) error {
+	const (
+		prfMacLen = 32
+		prfKeyLen = 16
+		prfIvLen  = 16
+	)
+
+	keys, err := prf.GenerateEncryptionKeys(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom, prfMacLen, prfKeyLen, prfIvLen, c.HashFunc())
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	var cbc *ciphersuite.CBC
+	if isClient {
+		cbc, err = ciphersuite.NewCBC(
+			keys.ClientWriteKey, keys.ClientWriteIV, keys.ClientMACKey,
+			keys.ServerWriteKey, keys.ServerWriteIV, keys.ServerMACKey,
+			c.HashFunc(),
+		)
+	} else {
+		cbc, err = ciphersuite.NewCBC(
+			keys.ServerWriteKey, keys.ServerWriteIV, keys.ServerMACKey,
+			keys.ClientWriteKey, keys.ClientWriteIV, keys.ClientMACKey,
+			c.HashFunc(),
+		)
+	}
+	c.cbc.Store(cbc)
+
+	return err
+}
+
+// Encrypt encrypts a single TLS RecordLayer
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256) Encrypt(pkt *recordlayer.RecordLayer, raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	cipherSuite, ok := c.cbc.Load().(*ciphersuite.CBC)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w, unable to encrypt", errCipherSuiteNotInit)
+	}
+
+	return cipherSuite.Encrypt(pkt, raw)
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts a single TLS RecordLayer
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128CbcSha256) Decrypt(raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	cipherSuite, ok := c.cbc.Load().(*ciphersuite.CBC)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w, unable to decrypt", errCipherSuiteNotInit)
+	}
+
+	return cipherSuite.Decrypt(raw)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+)
+
+// NewTLSPskWithAes128Ccm returns the TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM CipherSuite
+func NewTLSPskWithAes128Ccm() *Aes128Ccm {
+	return newAes128Ccm(clientcertificate.Type(0), TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, true, ciphersuite.CCMTagLength, KeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk, false)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_psk_with_aes_128_ccm8.go

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+)
+
+// NewTLSPskWithAes128Ccm8 returns the TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 CipherSuite
+func NewTLSPskWithAes128Ccm8() *Aes128Ccm {
+	return newAes128Ccm(clientcertificate.Type(0), TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, true, ciphersuite.CCMTagLength8, KeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk, false)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_psk_with_aes_128_gcm_sha256.go

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import "github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+
+// TLSPskWithAes128GcmSha256 implements the TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 CipherSuite
+type TLSPskWithAes128GcmSha256 struct {
+	TLSEcdheEcdsaWithAes128GcmSha256
+}
+
+// CertificateType returns what type of certificate this CipherSuite exchanges
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128GcmSha256) CertificateType() clientcertificate.Type {
+	return clientcertificate.Type(0)
+}
+
+// KeyExchangeAlgorithm controls what key exchange algorithm is using during the handshake
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128GcmSha256) KeyExchangeAlgorithm() KeyExchangeAlgorithm {
+	return KeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk
+}
+
+// ID returns the ID of the CipherSuite
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128GcmSha256) ID() ID {
+	return TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+}
+
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128GcmSha256) String() string {
+	return "TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"
+}
+
+// AuthenticationType controls what authentication method is using during the handshake
+func (c *TLSPskWithAes128GcmSha256) AuthenticationType() AuthenticationType {
+	return AuthenticationTypePreSharedKey
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/tls_psk_with_aes_256_ccm8.go

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate"
+)
+
+// NewTLSPskWithAes256Ccm8 returns the TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 CipherSuite
+func NewTLSPskWithAes256Ccm8() *Aes256Ccm {
+	return newAes256Ccm(clientcertificate.Type(0), TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, true, ciphersuite.CCMTagLength8, KeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk, false)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/types/authentication_type.go

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package types
+
+// AuthenticationType controls what authentication method is using during the handshake
+type AuthenticationType int
+
+// AuthenticationType Enums
+const (
+	AuthenticationTypeCertificate AuthenticationType = iota + 1
+	AuthenticationTypePreSharedKey
+	AuthenticationTypeAnonymous
+)

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/ciphersuite/types/key_exchange_algorithm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package types provides types for TLS Ciphers
+package types
+
+// KeyExchangeAlgorithm controls what exchange algorithm was chosen.
+type KeyExchangeAlgorithm int
+
+// KeyExchangeAlgorithm Bitmask
+const (
+	KeyExchangeAlgorithmNone KeyExchangeAlgorithm = 0
+	KeyExchangeAlgorithmPsk  KeyExchangeAlgorithm = iota << 1
+	KeyExchangeAlgorithmEcdhe
+)
+
+// Has check if keyExchangeAlgorithm is supported.
+func (a KeyExchangeAlgorithm) Has(v KeyExchangeAlgorithm) bool {
+	return (a & v) == v
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/closer/closer.go

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package closer provides signaling channel for shutdown
+package closer
+
+import (
+	"context"
+)
+
+// Closer allows for each signaling a channel for shutdown
+type Closer struct {
+	ctx       context.Context
+	closeFunc func()
+}
+
+// NewCloser creates a new instance of Closer
+func NewCloser() *Closer {
+	ctx, closeFunc := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	return &Closer{
+		ctx:       ctx,
+		closeFunc: closeFunc,
+	}
+}
+
+// NewCloserWithParent creates a new instance of Closer with a parent context
+func NewCloserWithParent(ctx context.Context) *Closer {
+	ctx, closeFunc := context.WithCancel(ctx)
+	return &Closer{
+		ctx:       ctx,
+		closeFunc: closeFunc,
+	}
+}
+
+// Done returns a channel signaling when it is done
+func (c *Closer) Done() <-chan struct{} {
+	return c.ctx.Done()
+}
+
+// Err returns an error of the context
+func (c *Closer) Err() error {
+	return c.ctx.Err()
+}
+
+// Close sends a signal to trigger the ctx done channel
+func (c *Closer) Close() {
+	c.closeFunc()
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/util/util.go

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package util contains small helpers used across the repo
+package util
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+)
+
+// BigEndianUint24 returns the value of a big endian uint24
+func BigEndianUint24(raw []byte) uint32 {
+	if len(raw) < 3 {
+		return 0
+	}
+
+	rawCopy := make([]byte, 4)
+	copy(rawCopy[1:], raw)
+	return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(rawCopy)
+}
+
+// PutBigEndianUint24 encodes a uint24 and places into out
+func PutBigEndianUint24(out []byte, in uint32) {
+	tmp := make([]byte, 4)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(tmp, in)
+	copy(out, tmp[1:])
+}
+
+// PutBigEndianUint48 encodes a uint64 and places into out
+func PutBigEndianUint48(out []byte, in uint64) {
+	tmp := make([]byte, 8)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(tmp, in)
+	copy(out, tmp[2:])
+}
+
+// Max returns the larger value
+func Max(a, b int) int {
+	if a > b {
+		return a
+	}
+	return b
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/listener.go

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import (
+	"net"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+	"github.com/pion/transport/v2/udp"
+)
+
+// Listen creates a DTLS listener
+func Listen(network string, laddr *net.UDPAddr, config *Config) (net.Listener, error) {
+	if err := validateConfig(config); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	lc := udp.ListenConfig{
+		AcceptFilter: func(packet []byte) bool {
+			pkts, err := recordlayer.UnpackDatagram(packet)
+			if err != nil || len(pkts) < 1 {
+				return false
+			}
+			h := &recordlayer.Header{}
+			if err := h.Unmarshal(pkts[0]); err != nil {
+				return false
+			}
+			return h.ContentType == protocol.ContentTypeHandshake
+		},
+	}
+	parent, err := lc.Listen(network, laddr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &listener{
+		config: config,
+		parent: parent,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// NewListener creates a DTLS listener which accepts connections from an inner Listener.
+func NewListener(inner net.Listener, config *Config) (net.Listener, error) {
+	if err := validateConfig(config); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return &listener{
+		config: config,
+		parent: inner,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// listener represents a DTLS listener
+type listener struct {
+	config *Config
+	parent net.Listener
+}
+
+// Accept waits for and returns the next connection to the listener.
+// You have to either close or read on all connection that are created.
+// Connection handshake will timeout using ConnectContextMaker in the Config.
+// If you want to specify the timeout duration, set ConnectContextMaker.
+func (l *listener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) {
+	c, err := l.parent.Accept()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return Server(c, l.config)
+}
+
+// Close closes the listener.
+// Any blocked Accept operations will be unblocked and return errors.
+// Already Accepted connections are not closed.
+func (l *listener) Close() error {
+	return l.parent.Close()
+}
+
+// Addr returns the listener's network address.
+func (l *listener) Addr() net.Addr {
+	return l.parent.Addr()
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/packet.go

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package dtls
+
+import "github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+
+type packet struct {
+	record                   *recordlayer.RecordLayer
+	shouldEncrypt            bool
+	resetLocalSequenceNumber bool
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ccm/ccm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package ccm implements a CCM, Counter with CBC-MAC
+// as per RFC 3610.
+//
+// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3610
+//
+// This code was lifted from https://github.com/bocajim/dtls/blob/a3300364a283fcb490d28a93d7fcfa7ba437fbbe/ccm/ccm.go
+// and as such was not written by the Pions authors. Like Pions this
+// code is licensed under MIT.
+//
+// A request for including CCM into the Go standard library
+// can be found as issue #27484 on the https://github.com/golang/go/
+// repository.
+package ccm
+
+import (
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"math"
+)
+
+// ccm represents a Counter with CBC-MAC with a specific key.
+type ccm struct {
+	b cipher.Block
+	M uint8
+	L uint8
+}
+
+const ccmBlockSize = 16
+
+// CCM is a block cipher in Counter with CBC-MAC mode.
+// Providing authenticated encryption with associated data via the cipher.AEAD interface.
+type CCM interface {
+	cipher.AEAD
+	// MaxLength returns the maxium length of plaintext in calls to Seal.
+	// The maximum length of ciphertext in calls to Open is MaxLength()+Overhead().
+	// The maximum length is related to CCM's `L` parameter (15-noncesize) and
+	// is 1<<(8*L) - 1 (but also limited by the maxium size of an int).
+	MaxLength() int
+}
+
+var (
+	errInvalidBlockSize = errors.New("ccm: NewCCM requires 128-bit block cipher")
+	errInvalidTagSize   = errors.New("ccm: tagsize must be 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, or 16")
+	errInvalidNonceSize = errors.New("ccm: invalid nonce size")
+)
+
+// NewCCM returns the given 128-bit block cipher wrapped in CCM.
+// The tagsize must be an even integer between 4 and 16 inclusive
+// and is used as CCM's `M` parameter.
+// The noncesize must be an integer between 7 and 13 inclusive,
+// 15-noncesize is used as CCM's `L` parameter.
+func NewCCM(b cipher.Block, tagsize, noncesize int) (CCM, error) {
+	if b.BlockSize() != ccmBlockSize {
+		return nil, errInvalidBlockSize
+	}
+	if tagsize < 4 || tagsize > 16 || tagsize&1 != 0 {
+		return nil, errInvalidTagSize
+	}
+	lensize := 15 - noncesize
+	if lensize < 2 || lensize > 8 {
+		return nil, errInvalidNonceSize
+	}
+	c := &ccm{b: b, M: uint8(tagsize), L: uint8(lensize)}
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+func (c *ccm) NonceSize() int { return 15 - int(c.L) }
+func (c *ccm) Overhead() int  { return int(c.M) }
+func (c *ccm) MaxLength() int { return maxlen(c.L, c.Overhead()) }
+
+func maxlen(l uint8, tagsize int) int {
+	max := (uint64(1) << (8 * l)) - 1
+	if m64 := uint64(math.MaxInt64) - uint64(tagsize); l > 8 || max > m64 {
+		max = m64 // The maximum lentgh on a 64bit arch
+	}
+	if max != uint64(int(max)) {
+		return math.MaxInt32 - tagsize // We have only 32bit int's
+	}
+	return int(max)
+}
+
+// MaxNonceLength returns the maximum nonce length for a given plaintext length.
+// A return value <= 0 indicates that plaintext length is too large for
+// any nonce length.
+func MaxNonceLength(pdatalen int) int {
+	const tagsize = 16
+	for L := 2; L <= 8; L++ {
+		if maxlen(uint8(L), tagsize) >= pdatalen {
+			return 15 - L
+		}
+	}
+	return 0
+}
+
+func (c *ccm) cbcRound(mac, data []byte) {
+	for i := 0; i < ccmBlockSize; i++ {
+		mac[i] ^= data[i]
+	}
+	c.b.Encrypt(mac, mac)
+}
+
+func (c *ccm) cbcData(mac, data []byte) {
+	for len(data) >= ccmBlockSize {
+		c.cbcRound(mac, data[:ccmBlockSize])
+		data = data[ccmBlockSize:]
+	}
+	if len(data) > 0 {
+		var block [ccmBlockSize]byte
+		copy(block[:], data)
+		c.cbcRound(mac, block[:])
+	}
+}
+
+var errPlaintextTooLong = errors.New("ccm: plaintext too large")
+
+func (c *ccm) tag(nonce, plaintext, adata []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	var mac [ccmBlockSize]byte
+
+	if len(adata) > 0 {
+		mac[0] |= 1 << 6
+	}
+	mac[0] |= (c.M - 2) << 2
+	mac[0] |= c.L - 1
+	if len(nonce) != c.NonceSize() {
+		return nil, errInvalidNonceSize
+	}
+	if len(plaintext) > c.MaxLength() {
+		return nil, errPlaintextTooLong
+	}
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(mac[ccmBlockSize-8:], uint64(len(plaintext)))
+	copy(mac[1:ccmBlockSize-c.L], nonce)
+	c.b.Encrypt(mac[:], mac[:])
+
+	var block [ccmBlockSize]byte
+	if n := uint64(len(adata)); n > 0 {
+		// First adata block includes adata length
+		i := 2
+		if n <= 0xfeff {
+			binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(block[:i], uint16(n))
+		} else {
+			block[0] = 0xfe
+			block[1] = 0xff
+			if n < uint64(1<<32) {
+				i = 2 + 4
+				binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(block[2:i], uint32(n))
+			} else {
+				i = 2 + 8
+				binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(block[2:i], n)
+			}
+		}
+		i = copy(block[i:], adata)
+		c.cbcRound(mac[:], block[:])
+		c.cbcData(mac[:], adata[i:])
+	}
+
+	if len(plaintext) > 0 {
+		c.cbcData(mac[:], plaintext)
+	}
+
+	return mac[:c.M], nil
+}
+
+// sliceForAppend takes a slice and a requested number of bytes. It returns a
+// slice with the contents of the given slice followed by that many bytes and a
+// second slice that aliases into it and contains only the extra bytes. If the
+// original slice has sufficient capacity then no allocation is performed.
+// From crypto/cipher/gcm.go
+func sliceForAppend(in []byte, n int) (head, tail []byte) {
+	if total := len(in) + n; cap(in) >= total {
+		head = in[:total]
+	} else {
+		head = make([]byte, total)
+		copy(head, in)
+	}
+	tail = head[len(in):]
+	return
+}
+
+// Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext, authenticates the
+// additional data and appends the result to dst, returning the updated
+// slice. The nonce must be NonceSize() bytes long and unique for all
+// time, for a given key.
+// The plaintext must be no longer than MaxLength() bytes long.
+//
+// The plaintext and dst may alias exactly or not at all.
+func (c *ccm) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, adata []byte) []byte {
+	tag, err := c.tag(nonce, plaintext, adata)
+	if err != nil {
+		// The cipher.AEAD interface doesn't allow for an error return.
+		panic(err) // nolint
+	}
+
+	var iv, s0 [ccmBlockSize]byte
+	iv[0] = c.L - 1
+	copy(iv[1:ccmBlockSize-c.L], nonce)
+	c.b.Encrypt(s0[:], iv[:])
+	for i := 0; i < int(c.M); i++ {
+		tag[i] ^= s0[i]
+	}
+	iv[len(iv)-1] |= 1
+	stream := cipher.NewCTR(c.b, iv[:])
+	ret, out := sliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+int(c.M))
+	stream.XORKeyStream(out, plaintext)
+	copy(out[len(plaintext):], tag)
+	return ret
+}
+
+var (
+	errOpen               = errors.New("ccm: message authentication failed")
+	errCiphertextTooShort = errors.New("ccm: ciphertext too short")
+	errCiphertextTooLong  = errors.New("ccm: ciphertext too long")
+)
+
+func (c *ccm) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, adata []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(ciphertext) < int(c.M) {
+		return nil, errCiphertextTooShort
+	}
+	if len(ciphertext) > c.MaxLength()+c.Overhead() {
+		return nil, errCiphertextTooLong
+	}
+
+	tag := make([]byte, int(c.M))
+	copy(tag, ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-int(c.M):])
+	ciphertextWithoutTag := ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-int(c.M)]
+
+	var iv, s0 [ccmBlockSize]byte
+	iv[0] = c.L - 1
+	copy(iv[1:ccmBlockSize-c.L], nonce)
+	c.b.Encrypt(s0[:], iv[:])
+	for i := 0; i < int(c.M); i++ {
+		tag[i] ^= s0[i]
+	}
+	iv[len(iv)-1] |= 1
+	stream := cipher.NewCTR(c.b, iv[:])
+
+	// Cannot decrypt directly to dst since we're not supposed to
+	// reveal the plaintext to the caller if authentication fails.
+	plaintext := make([]byte, len(ciphertextWithoutTag))
+	stream.XORKeyStream(plaintext, ciphertextWithoutTag)
+	expectedTag, err := c.tag(nonce, plaintext, adata)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tag, expectedTag) != 1 {
+		return nil, errOpen
+	}
+	return append(dst, plaintext...), nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite/cbc.go

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import ( //nolint:gci
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"hash"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/internal/util"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+// block ciphers using cipher block chaining.
+type cbcMode interface {
+	cipher.BlockMode
+	SetIV([]byte)
+}
+
+// CBC Provides an API to Encrypt/Decrypt DTLS 1.2 Packets
+type CBC struct {
+	writeCBC, readCBC cbcMode
+	writeMac, readMac []byte
+	h                 prf.HashFunc
+}
+
+// NewCBC creates a DTLS CBC Cipher
+func NewCBC(localKey, localWriteIV, localMac, remoteKey, remoteWriteIV, remoteMac []byte, h prf.HashFunc) (*CBC, error) {
+	writeBlock, err := aes.NewCipher(localKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	readBlock, err := aes.NewCipher(remoteKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	writeCBC, ok := cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(writeBlock, localWriteIV).(cbcMode)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, errFailedToCast
+	}
+
+	readCBC, ok := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(readBlock, remoteWriteIV).(cbcMode)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, errFailedToCast
+	}
+
+	return &CBC{
+		writeCBC: writeCBC,
+		writeMac: localMac,
+
+		readCBC: readCBC,
+		readMac: remoteMac,
+		h:       h,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// Encrypt encrypt a DTLS RecordLayer message
+func (c *CBC) Encrypt(pkt *recordlayer.RecordLayer, raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	payload := raw[recordlayer.HeaderSize:]
+	raw = raw[:recordlayer.HeaderSize]
+	blockSize := c.writeCBC.BlockSize()
+
+	// Generate + Append MAC
+	h := pkt.Header
+
+	MAC, err := c.hmac(h.Epoch, h.SequenceNumber, h.ContentType, h.Version, payload, c.writeMac, c.h)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	payload = append(payload, MAC...)
+
+	// Generate + Append padding
+	padding := make([]byte, blockSize-len(payload)%blockSize)
+	paddingLen := len(padding)
+	for i := 0; i < paddingLen; i++ {
+		padding[i] = byte(paddingLen - 1)
+	}
+	payload = append(payload, padding...)
+
+	// Generate IV
+	iv := make([]byte, blockSize)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(iv); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Set IV + Encrypt + Prepend IV
+	c.writeCBC.SetIV(iv)
+	c.writeCBC.CryptBlocks(payload, payload)
+	payload = append(iv, payload...)
+
+	// Prepend unencrypte header with encrypted payload
+	raw = append(raw, payload...)
+
+	// Update recordLayer size to include IV+MAC+Padding
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(raw[recordlayer.HeaderSize-2:], uint16(len(raw)-recordlayer.HeaderSize))
+
+	return raw, nil
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts a DTLS RecordLayer message
+func (c *CBC) Decrypt(in []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	body := in[recordlayer.HeaderSize:]
+	blockSize := c.readCBC.BlockSize()
+	mac := c.h()
+
+	var h recordlayer.Header
+	err := h.Unmarshal(in)
+	switch {
+	case err != nil:
+		return nil, err
+	case h.ContentType == protocol.ContentTypeChangeCipherSpec:
+		// Nothing to encrypt with ChangeCipherSpec
+		return in, nil
+	case len(body)%blockSize != 0 || len(body) < blockSize+util.Max(mac.Size()+1, blockSize):
+		return nil, errNotEnoughRoomForNonce
+	}
+
+	// Set + remove per record IV
+	c.readCBC.SetIV(body[:blockSize])
+	body = body[blockSize:]
+
+	// Decrypt
+	c.readCBC.CryptBlocks(body, body)
+
+	// Padding+MAC needs to be checked in constant time
+	// Otherwise we reveal information about the level of correctness
+	paddingLen, paddingGood := examinePadding(body)
+	if paddingGood != 255 {
+		return nil, errInvalidMAC
+	}
+
+	macSize := mac.Size()
+	if len(body) < macSize {
+		return nil, errInvalidMAC
+	}
+
+	dataEnd := len(body) - macSize - paddingLen
+
+	expectedMAC := body[dataEnd : dataEnd+macSize]
+	actualMAC, err := c.hmac(h.Epoch, h.SequenceNumber, h.ContentType, h.Version, body[:dataEnd], c.readMac, c.h)
+
+	// Compute Local MAC and compare
+	if err != nil || !hmac.Equal(actualMAC, expectedMAC) {
+		return nil, errInvalidMAC
+	}
+
+	return append(in[:recordlayer.HeaderSize], body[:dataEnd]...), nil
+}
+
+func (c *CBC) hmac(epoch uint16, sequenceNumber uint64, contentType protocol.ContentType, protocolVersion protocol.Version, payload []byte, key []byte, hf func() hash.Hash) ([]byte, error) {
+	h := hmac.New(hf, key)
+
+	msg := make([]byte, 13)
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg, epoch)
+	util.PutBigEndianUint48(msg[2:], sequenceNumber)
+	msg[8] = byte(contentType)
+	msg[9] = protocolVersion.Major
+	msg[10] = protocolVersion.Minor
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(msg[11:], uint16(len(payload)))
+
+	if _, err := h.Write(msg); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	} else if _, err := h.Write(payload); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return h.Sum(nil), nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite/ccm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ccm"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+// CCMTagLen is the length of Authentication Tag
+type CCMTagLen int
+
+// CCM Enums
+const (
+	CCMTagLength8  CCMTagLen = 8
+	CCMTagLength   CCMTagLen = 16
+	ccmNonceLength           = 12
+)
+
+// CCM Provides an API to Encrypt/Decrypt DTLS 1.2 Packets
+type CCM struct {
+	localCCM, remoteCCM         ccm.CCM
+	localWriteIV, remoteWriteIV []byte
+	tagLen                      CCMTagLen
+}
+
+// NewCCM creates a DTLS GCM Cipher
+func NewCCM(tagLen CCMTagLen, localKey, localWriteIV, remoteKey, remoteWriteIV []byte) (*CCM, error) {
+	localBlock, err := aes.NewCipher(localKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	localCCM, err := ccm.NewCCM(localBlock, int(tagLen), ccmNonceLength)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	remoteBlock, err := aes.NewCipher(remoteKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	remoteCCM, err := ccm.NewCCM(remoteBlock, int(tagLen), ccmNonceLength)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return &CCM{
+		localCCM:      localCCM,
+		localWriteIV:  localWriteIV,
+		remoteCCM:     remoteCCM,
+		remoteWriteIV: remoteWriteIV,
+		tagLen:        tagLen,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// Encrypt encrypt a DTLS RecordLayer message
+func (c *CCM) Encrypt(pkt *recordlayer.RecordLayer, raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	payload := raw[recordlayer.HeaderSize:]
+	raw = raw[:recordlayer.HeaderSize]
+
+	nonce := append(append([]byte{}, c.localWriteIV[:4]...), make([]byte, 8)...)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(nonce[4:]); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	additionalData := generateAEADAdditionalData(&pkt.Header, len(payload))
+	encryptedPayload := c.localCCM.Seal(nil, nonce, payload, additionalData)
+
+	encryptedPayload = append(nonce[4:], encryptedPayload...)
+	raw = append(raw, encryptedPayload...)
+
+	// Update recordLayer size to include explicit nonce
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(raw[recordlayer.HeaderSize-2:], uint16(len(raw)-recordlayer.HeaderSize))
+	return raw, nil
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts a DTLS RecordLayer message
+func (c *CCM) Decrypt(in []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	var h recordlayer.Header
+	err := h.Unmarshal(in)
+	switch {
+	case err != nil:
+		return nil, err
+	case h.ContentType == protocol.ContentTypeChangeCipherSpec:
+		// Nothing to encrypt with ChangeCipherSpec
+		return in, nil
+	case len(in) <= (8 + recordlayer.HeaderSize):
+		return nil, errNotEnoughRoomForNonce
+	}
+
+	nonce := append(append([]byte{}, c.remoteWriteIV[:4]...), in[recordlayer.HeaderSize:recordlayer.HeaderSize+8]...)
+	out := in[recordlayer.HeaderSize+8:]
+
+	additionalData := generateAEADAdditionalData(&h, len(out)-int(c.tagLen))
+	out, err = c.remoteCCM.Open(out[:0], nonce, out, additionalData)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", errDecryptPacket, err) //nolint:errorlint
+	}
+	return append(in[:recordlayer.HeaderSize], out...), nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite/ciphersuite.go

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package ciphersuite provides the crypto operations needed for a DTLS CipherSuite
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+var (
+	errNotEnoughRoomForNonce = &protocol.InternalError{Err: errors.New("buffer not long enough to contain nonce")} //nolint:goerr113
+	errDecryptPacket         = &protocol.TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("failed to decrypt packet")}               //nolint:goerr113
+	errInvalidMAC            = &protocol.TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("invalid mac")}                            //nolint:goerr113
+	errFailedToCast          = &protocol.FatalError{Err: errors.New("failed to cast")}                             //nolint:goerr113
+)
+
+func generateAEADAdditionalData(h *recordlayer.Header, payloadLen int) []byte {
+	var additionalData [13]byte
+	// SequenceNumber MUST be set first
+	// we only want uint48, clobbering an extra 2 (using uint64, Golang doesn't have uint48)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(additionalData[:], h.SequenceNumber)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(additionalData[:], h.Epoch)
+	additionalData[8] = byte(h.ContentType)
+	additionalData[9] = h.Version.Major
+	additionalData[10] = h.Version.Minor
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(additionalData[len(additionalData)-2:], uint16(payloadLen))
+
+	return additionalData[:]
+}
+
+// examinePadding returns, in constant time, the length of the padding to remove
+// from the end of payload. It also returns a byte which is equal to 255 if the
+// padding was valid and 0 otherwise. See RFC 2246, Section 6.2.3.2.
+//
+// https://github.com/golang/go/blob/039c2081d1178f90a8fa2f4e6958693129f8de33/src/crypto/tls/conn.go#L245
+func examinePadding(payload []byte) (toRemove int, good byte) {
+	if len(payload) < 1 {
+		return 0, 0
+	}
+
+	paddingLen := payload[len(payload)-1]
+	t := uint(len(payload)-1) - uint(paddingLen)
+	// if len(payload) >= (paddingLen - 1) then the MSB of t is zero
+	good = byte(int32(^t) >> 31)
+
+	// The maximum possible padding length plus the actual length field
+	toCheck := 256
+	// The length of the padded data is public, so we can use an if here
+	if toCheck > len(payload) {
+		toCheck = len(payload)
+	}
+
+	for i := 0; i < toCheck; i++ {
+		t := uint(paddingLen) - uint(i)
+		// if i <= paddingLen then the MSB of t is zero
+		mask := byte(int32(^t) >> 31)
+		b := payload[len(payload)-1-i]
+		good &^= mask&paddingLen ^ mask&b
+	}
+
+	// We AND together the bits of good and replicate the result across
+	// all the bits.
+	good &= good << 4
+	good &= good << 2
+	good &= good << 1
+	good = uint8(int8(good) >> 7)
+
+	toRemove = int(paddingLen) + 1
+
+	return toRemove, good
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/ciphersuite/gcm.go

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package ciphersuite
+
+import (
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/recordlayer"
+)
+
+const (
+	gcmTagLength   = 16
+	gcmNonceLength = 12
+)
+
+// GCM Provides an API to Encrypt/Decrypt DTLS 1.2 Packets
+type GCM struct {
+	localGCM, remoteGCM         cipher.AEAD
+	localWriteIV, remoteWriteIV []byte
+}
+
+// NewGCM creates a DTLS GCM Cipher
+func NewGCM(localKey, localWriteIV, remoteKey, remoteWriteIV []byte) (*GCM, error) {
+	localBlock, err := aes.NewCipher(localKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	localGCM, err := cipher.NewGCM(localBlock)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	remoteBlock, err := aes.NewCipher(remoteKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	remoteGCM, err := cipher.NewGCM(remoteBlock)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return &GCM{
+		localGCM:      localGCM,
+		localWriteIV:  localWriteIV,
+		remoteGCM:     remoteGCM,
+		remoteWriteIV: remoteWriteIV,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// Encrypt encrypt a DTLS RecordLayer message
+func (g *GCM) Encrypt(pkt *recordlayer.RecordLayer, raw []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	payload := raw[recordlayer.HeaderSize:]
+	raw = raw[:recordlayer.HeaderSize]
+
+	nonce := make([]byte, gcmNonceLength)
+	copy(nonce, g.localWriteIV[:4])
+	if _, err := rand.Read(nonce[4:]); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	additionalData := generateAEADAdditionalData(&pkt.Header, len(payload))
+	encryptedPayload := g.localGCM.Seal(nil, nonce, payload, additionalData)
+	r := make([]byte, len(raw)+len(nonce[4:])+len(encryptedPayload))
+	copy(r, raw)
+	copy(r[len(raw):], nonce[4:])
+	copy(r[len(raw)+len(nonce[4:]):], encryptedPayload)
+
+	// Update recordLayer size to include explicit nonce
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(r[recordlayer.HeaderSize-2:], uint16(len(r)-recordlayer.HeaderSize))
+	return r, nil
+}
+
+// Decrypt decrypts a DTLS RecordLayer message
+func (g *GCM) Decrypt(in []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	var h recordlayer.Header
+	err := h.Unmarshal(in)
+	switch {
+	case err != nil:
+		return nil, err
+	case h.ContentType == protocol.ContentTypeChangeCipherSpec:
+		// Nothing to encrypt with ChangeCipherSpec
+		return in, nil
+	case len(in) <= (8 + recordlayer.HeaderSize):
+		return nil, errNotEnoughRoomForNonce
+	}
+
+	nonce := make([]byte, 0, gcmNonceLength)
+	nonce = append(append(nonce, g.remoteWriteIV[:4]...), in[recordlayer.HeaderSize:recordlayer.HeaderSize+8]...)
+	out := in[recordlayer.HeaderSize+8:]
+
+	additionalData := generateAEADAdditionalData(&h, len(out)-gcmTagLength)
+	out, err = g.remoteGCM.Open(out[:0], nonce, out, additionalData)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", errDecryptPacket, err) //nolint:errorlint
+	}
+	return append(in[:recordlayer.HeaderSize], out...), nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/clientcertificate/client_certificate.go

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package clientcertificate provides all the support Client Certificate types
+package clientcertificate
+
+// Type is used to communicate what
+// type of certificate is being transported
+//
+// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-2
+type Type byte
+
+// ClientCertificateType enums
+const (
+	RSASign   Type = 1
+	ECDSASign Type = 64
+)
+
+// Types returns all valid ClientCertificate Types
+func Types() map[Type]bool {
+	return map[Type]bool{
+		RSASign:   true,
+		ECDSASign: true,
+	}
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/elliptic/elliptic.go

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package elliptic provides elliptic curve cryptography for DTLS
+package elliptic
+
+import (
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
+)
+
+var errInvalidNamedCurve = errors.New("invalid named curve")
+
+// CurvePointFormat is used to represent the IANA registered curve points
+//
+// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-9
+type CurvePointFormat byte
+
+// CurvePointFormat enums
+const (
+	CurvePointFormatUncompressed CurvePointFormat = 0
+)
+
+// Keypair is a Curve with a Private/Public Keypair
+type Keypair struct {
+	Curve      Curve
+	PublicKey  []byte
+	PrivateKey []byte
+}
+
+// CurveType is used to represent the IANA registered curve types for TLS
+//
+// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-10
+type CurveType byte
+
+// CurveType enums
+const (
+	CurveTypeNamedCurve CurveType = 0x03
+)
+
+// CurveTypes returns all known curves
+func CurveTypes() map[CurveType]struct{} {
+	return map[CurveType]struct{}{
+		CurveTypeNamedCurve: {},
+	}
+}
+
+// Curve is used to represent the IANA registered curves for TLS
+//
+// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-8
+type Curve uint16
+
+// Curve enums
+const (
+	P256   Curve = 0x0017
+	P384   Curve = 0x0018
+	X25519 Curve = 0x001d
+)
+
+func (c Curve) String() string {
+	switch c {
+	case P256:
+		return "P-256"
+	case P384:
+		return "P-384"
+	case X25519:
+		return "X25519"
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%#x", uint16(c))
+}
+
+// Curves returns all curves we implement
+func Curves() map[Curve]bool {
+	return map[Curve]bool{
+		X25519: true,
+		P256:   true,
+		P384:   true,
+	}
+}
+
+// GenerateKeypair generates a keypair for the given Curve
+func GenerateKeypair(c Curve) (*Keypair, error) {
+	switch c { //nolint:revive
+	case X25519:
+		tmp := make([]byte, 32)
+		if _, err := rand.Read(tmp); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+
+		var public, private [32]byte
+		copy(private[:], tmp)
+
+		curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&public, &private)
+		return &Keypair{X25519, public[:], private[:]}, nil
+	case P256:
+		return ellipticCurveKeypair(P256, elliptic.P256(), elliptic.P256())
+	case P384:
+		return ellipticCurveKeypair(P384, elliptic.P384(), elliptic.P384())
+	default:
+		return nil, errInvalidNamedCurve
+	}
+}
+
+func ellipticCurveKeypair(nc Curve, c1, c2 elliptic.Curve) (*Keypair, error) {
+	privateKey, x, y, err := elliptic.GenerateKey(c1, rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return &Keypair{nc, elliptic.Marshal(c2, x, y), privateKey}, nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/fingerprint/fingerprint.go

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package fingerprint provides a helper to create fingerprint string from certificate
+package fingerprint
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+)
+
+var (
+	errHashUnavailable          = errors.New("fingerprint: hash algorithm is not linked into the binary")
+	errInvalidFingerprintLength = errors.New("fingerprint: invalid fingerprint length")
+)
+
+// Fingerprint creates a fingerprint for a certificate using the specified hash algorithm
+func Fingerprint(cert *x509.Certificate, algo crypto.Hash) (string, error) {
+	if !algo.Available() {
+		return "", errHashUnavailable
+	}
+	h := algo.New()
+	for i := 0; i < len(cert.Raw); {
+		n, _ := h.Write(cert.Raw[i:])
+		// Hash.Writer is specified to be never returning an error.
+		// https://golang.org/pkg/hash/#Hash
+		i += n
+	}
+	digest := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%x", h.Sum(nil)))
+
+	digestlen := len(digest)
+	if digestlen == 0 {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	if digestlen%2 != 0 {
+		return "", errInvalidFingerprintLength
+	}
+	res := make([]byte, digestlen>>1+digestlen-1)
+
+	pos := 0
+	for i, c := range digest {
+		res[pos] = c
+		pos++
+		if (i)%2 != 0 && i < digestlen-1 {
+			res[pos] = byte(':')
+			pos++
+		}
+	}
+
+	return string(res), nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/fingerprint/hash.go

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package fingerprint
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+var errInvalidHashAlgorithm = errors.New("fingerprint: invalid hash algorithm")
+
+func nameToHash() map[string]crypto.Hash {
+	return map[string]crypto.Hash{
+		"md5":     crypto.MD5,    // [RFC3279]
+		"sha-1":   crypto.SHA1,   // [RFC3279]
+		"sha-224": crypto.SHA224, // [RFC4055]
+		"sha-256": crypto.SHA256, // [RFC4055]
+		"sha-384": crypto.SHA384, // [RFC4055]
+		"sha-512": crypto.SHA512, // [RFC4055]
+	}
+}
+
+// HashFromString allows looking up a hash algorithm by it's string representation
+func HashFromString(s string) (crypto.Hash, error) {
+	if h, ok := nameToHash()[strings.ToLower(s)]; ok {
+		return h, nil
+	}
+	return 0, errInvalidHashAlgorithm
+}
+
+// StringFromHash allows looking up a string representation of the crypto.Hash.
+func StringFromHash(hash crypto.Hash) (string, error) {
+	for s, h := range nameToHash() {
+		if h == hash {
+			return s, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return "", errInvalidHashAlgorithm
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/hash/hash.go

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package hash provides TLS HashAlgorithm as defined in TLS 1.2
+package hash
+
+import ( //nolint:gci
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/md5"  //nolint:gosec
+	"crypto/sha1" //nolint:gosec
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/sha512"
+)
+
+// Algorithm is used to indicate the hash algorithm used
+// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-18
+type Algorithm uint16
+
+// Supported hash algorithms
+const (
+	None    Algorithm = 0 // Blacklisted
+	MD5     Algorithm = 1 // Blacklisted
+	SHA1    Algorithm = 2 // Blacklisted
+	SHA224  Algorithm = 3
+	SHA256  Algorithm = 4
+	SHA384  Algorithm = 5
+	SHA512  Algorithm = 6
+	Ed25519 Algorithm = 8
+)
+
+// String makes hashAlgorithm printable
+func (a Algorithm) String() string {
+	switch a {
+	case None:
+		return "none"
+	case MD5:
+		return "md5" // [RFC3279]
+	case SHA1:
+		return "sha-1" // [RFC3279]
+	case SHA224:
+		return "sha-224" // [RFC4055]
+	case SHA256:
+		return "sha-256" // [RFC4055]
+	case SHA384:
+		return "sha-384" // [RFC4055]
+	case SHA512:
+		return "sha-512" // [RFC4055]
+	case Ed25519:
+		return "null"
+	default:
+		return "unknown or unsupported hash algorithm"
+	}
+}
+
+// Digest performs a digest on the passed value
+func (a Algorithm) Digest(b []byte) []byte {
+	switch a {
+	case None:
+		return nil
+	case MD5:
+		hash := md5.Sum(b) // #nosec
+		return hash[:]
+	case SHA1:
+		hash := sha1.Sum(b) // #nosec
+		return hash[:]
+	case SHA224:
+		hash := sha256.Sum224(b)
+		return hash[:]
+	case SHA256:
+		hash := sha256.Sum256(b)
+		return hash[:]
+	case SHA384:
+		hash := sha512.Sum384(b)
+		return hash[:]
+	case SHA512:
+		hash := sha512.Sum512(b)
+		return hash[:]
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+// Insecure returns if the given HashAlgorithm is considered secure in DTLS 1.2
+func (a Algorithm) Insecure() bool {
+	switch a {
+	case None, MD5, SHA1:
+		return true
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+// CryptoHash returns the crypto.Hash implementation for the given HashAlgorithm
+func (a Algorithm) CryptoHash() crypto.Hash {
+	switch a {
+	case None:
+		return crypto.Hash(0)
+	case MD5:
+		return crypto.MD5
+	case SHA1:
+		return crypto.SHA1
+	case SHA224:
+		return crypto.SHA224
+	case SHA256:
+		return crypto.SHA256
+	case SHA384:
+		return crypto.SHA384
+	case SHA512:
+		return crypto.SHA512
+	case Ed25519:
+		return crypto.Hash(0)
+	default:
+		return crypto.Hash(0)
+	}
+}
+
+// Algorithms returns all the supported Hash Algorithms
+func Algorithms() map[Algorithm]struct{} {
+	return map[Algorithm]struct{}{
+		None:    {},
+		MD5:     {},
+		SHA1:    {},
+		SHA224:  {},
+		SHA256:  {},
+		SHA384:  {},
+		SHA512:  {},
+		Ed25519: {},
+	}
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/prf/prf.go

@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package prf implements TLS 1.2 Pseudorandom functions
+package prf
+
+import ( //nolint:gci
+	ellipticStdlib "crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"hash"
+	"math"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/elliptic"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
+)
+
+const (
+	masterSecretLabel         = "master secret"
+	extendedMasterSecretLabel = "extended master secret"
+	keyExpansionLabel         = "key expansion"
+	verifyDataClientLabel     = "client finished"
+	verifyDataServerLabel     = "server finished"
+)
+
+// HashFunc allows callers to decide what hash is used in PRF
+type HashFunc func() hash.Hash
+
+// EncryptionKeys is all the state needed for a TLS CipherSuite
+type EncryptionKeys struct {
+	MasterSecret   []byte
+	ClientMACKey   []byte
+	ServerMACKey   []byte
+	ClientWriteKey []byte
+	ServerWriteKey []byte
+	ClientWriteIV  []byte
+	ServerWriteIV  []byte
+}
+
+var errInvalidNamedCurve = &protocol.FatalError{Err: errors.New("invalid named curve")} //nolint:goerr113
+
+func (e *EncryptionKeys) String() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf(`encryptionKeys:
+- masterSecret: %#v
+- clientMACKey: %#v
+- serverMACKey: %#v
+- clientWriteKey: %#v
+- serverWriteKey: %#v
+- clientWriteIV: %#v
+- serverWriteIV: %#v
+`,
+		e.MasterSecret,
+		e.ClientMACKey,
+		e.ServerMACKey,
+		e.ClientWriteKey,
+		e.ServerWriteKey,
+		e.ClientWriteIV,
+		e.ServerWriteIV)
+}
+
+// PSKPreMasterSecret generates the PSK Premaster Secret
+// The premaster secret is formed as follows: if the PSK is N octets
+// long, concatenate a uint16 with the value N, N zero octets, a second
+// uint16 with the value N, and the PSK itself.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4279#section-2
+func PSKPreMasterSecret(psk []byte) []byte {
+	pskLen := uint16(len(psk))
+
+	out := append(make([]byte, 2+pskLen+2), psk...)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, pskLen)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[2+pskLen:], pskLen)
+
+	return out
+}
+
+// EcdhePSKPreMasterSecret implements TLS 1.2 Premaster Secret generation given a psk, a keypair and a curve
+//
+// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5489#section-2
+func EcdhePSKPreMasterSecret(psk, publicKey, privateKey []byte, curve elliptic.Curve) ([]byte, error) {
+	preMasterSecret, err := PreMasterSecret(publicKey, privateKey, curve)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	out := make([]byte, 2+len(preMasterSecret)+2+len(psk))
+
+	// write preMasterSecret length
+	offset := 0
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[offset:], uint16(len(preMasterSecret)))
+	offset += 2
+
+	// write preMasterSecret
+	copy(out[offset:], preMasterSecret)
+	offset += len(preMasterSecret)
+
+	// write psk length
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[offset:], uint16(len(psk)))
+	offset += 2
+
+	// write psk
+	copy(out[offset:], psk)
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// PreMasterSecret implements TLS 1.2 Premaster Secret generation given a keypair and a curve
+func PreMasterSecret(publicKey, privateKey []byte, curve elliptic.Curve) ([]byte, error) {
+	switch curve {
+	case elliptic.X25519:
+		return curve25519.X25519(privateKey, publicKey)
+	case elliptic.P256:
+		return ellipticCurvePreMasterSecret(publicKey, privateKey, ellipticStdlib.P256(), ellipticStdlib.P256())
+	case elliptic.P384:
+		return ellipticCurvePreMasterSecret(publicKey, privateKey, ellipticStdlib.P384(), ellipticStdlib.P384())
+	default:
+		return nil, errInvalidNamedCurve
+	}
+}
+
+func ellipticCurvePreMasterSecret(publicKey, privateKey []byte, c1, c2 ellipticStdlib.Curve) ([]byte, error) {
+	x, y := ellipticStdlib.Unmarshal(c1, publicKey)
+	if x == nil || y == nil {
+		return nil, errInvalidNamedCurve
+	}
+
+	result, _ := c2.ScalarMult(x, y, privateKey)
+	preMasterSecret := make([]byte, (c2.Params().BitSize+7)>>3)
+	resultBytes := result.Bytes()
+	copy(preMasterSecret[len(preMasterSecret)-len(resultBytes):], resultBytes)
+	return preMasterSecret, nil
+}
+
+// PHash is PRF is the SHA-256 hash function is used for all cipher suites
+// defined in this TLS 1.2 document and in TLS documents published prior to this
+// document when TLS 1.2 is negotiated.  New cipher suites MUST explicitly
+// specify a PRF and, in general, SHOULD use the TLS PRF with SHA-256 or a
+// stronger standard hash function.
+//
+//	P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) +
+//	                       HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) +
+//	                       HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ...
+//
+// A() is defined as:
+//
+//	A(0) = seed
+//	A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1))
+//
+// P_hash can be iterated as many times as necessary to produce the
+// required quantity of data.  For example, if P_SHA256 is being used to
+// create 80 bytes of data, it will have to be iterated three times
+// (through A(3)), creating 96 bytes of output data; the last 16 bytes
+// of the final iteration will then be discarded, leaving 80 bytes of
+// output data.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346w
+func PHash(secret, seed []byte, requestedLength int, h HashFunc) ([]byte, error) {
+	hmacSHA256 := func(key, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+		mac := hmac.New(h, key)
+		if _, err := mac.Write(data); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return mac.Sum(nil), nil
+	}
+
+	var err error
+	lastRound := seed
+	out := []byte{}
+
+	iterations := int(math.Ceil(float64(requestedLength) / float64(h().Size())))
+	for i := 0; i < iterations; i++ {
+		lastRound, err = hmacSHA256(secret, lastRound)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		withSecret, err := hmacSHA256(secret, append(lastRound, seed...))
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		out = append(out, withSecret...)
+	}
+
+	return out[:requestedLength], nil
+}
+
+// ExtendedMasterSecret generates a Extended MasterSecret as defined in
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7627
+func ExtendedMasterSecret(preMasterSecret, sessionHash []byte, h HashFunc) ([]byte, error) {
+	seed := append([]byte(extendedMasterSecretLabel), sessionHash...)
+	return PHash(preMasterSecret, seed, 48, h)
+}
+
+// MasterSecret generates a TLS 1.2 MasterSecret
+func MasterSecret(preMasterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, h HashFunc) ([]byte, error) {
+	seed := append(append([]byte(masterSecretLabel), clientRandom...), serverRandom...)
+	return PHash(preMasterSecret, seed, 48, h)
+}
+
+// GenerateEncryptionKeys is the final step TLS 1.2 PRF. Given all state generated so far generates
+// the final keys need for encryption
+func GenerateEncryptionKeys(masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, macLen, keyLen, ivLen int, h HashFunc) (*EncryptionKeys, error) {
+	seed := append(append([]byte(keyExpansionLabel), serverRandom...), clientRandom...)
+	keyMaterial, err := PHash(masterSecret, seed, (2*macLen)+(2*keyLen)+(2*ivLen), h)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	clientMACKey := keyMaterial[:macLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
+
+	serverMACKey := keyMaterial[:macLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
+
+	clientWriteKey := keyMaterial[:keyLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
+
+	serverWriteKey := keyMaterial[:keyLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
+
+	clientWriteIV := keyMaterial[:ivLen]
+	keyMaterial = keyMaterial[ivLen:]
+
+	serverWriteIV := keyMaterial[:ivLen]
+
+	return &EncryptionKeys{
+		MasterSecret:   masterSecret,
+		ClientMACKey:   clientMACKey,
+		ServerMACKey:   serverMACKey,
+		ClientWriteKey: clientWriteKey,
+		ServerWriteKey: serverWriteKey,
+		ClientWriteIV:  clientWriteIV,
+		ServerWriteIV:  serverWriteIV,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+func prfVerifyData(masterSecret, handshakeBodies []byte, label string, hashFunc HashFunc) ([]byte, error) {
+	h := hashFunc()
+	if _, err := h.Write(handshakeBodies); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	seed := append([]byte(label), h.Sum(nil)...)
+	return PHash(masterSecret, seed, 12, hashFunc)
+}
+
+// VerifyDataClient is caled on the Client Side to either verify or generate the VerifyData message
+func VerifyDataClient(masterSecret, handshakeBodies []byte, h HashFunc) ([]byte, error) {
+	return prfVerifyData(masterSecret, handshakeBodies, verifyDataClientLabel, h)
+}
+
+// VerifyDataServer is caled on the Server Side to either verify or generate the VerifyData message
+func VerifyDataServer(masterSecret, handshakeBodies []byte, h HashFunc) ([]byte, error) {
+	return prfVerifyData(masterSecret, handshakeBodies, verifyDataServerLabel, h)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/signature/signature.go

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package signature provides our implemented Signature Algorithms
+package signature
+
+// Algorithm as defined in TLS 1.2
+// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-16
+type Algorithm uint16
+
+// SignatureAlgorithm enums
+const (
+	Anonymous Algorithm = 0
+	RSA       Algorithm = 1
+	ECDSA     Algorithm = 3
+	Ed25519   Algorithm = 7
+)
+
+// Algorithms returns all implemented Signature Algorithms
+func Algorithms() map[Algorithm]struct{} {
+	return map[Algorithm]struct{}{
+		Anonymous: {},
+		RSA:       {},
+		ECDSA:     {},
+		Ed25519:   {},
+	}
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/signaturehash/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package signaturehash
+
+import "errors"
+
+var (
+	errNoAvailableSignatureSchemes = errors.New("connection can not be created, no SignatureScheme satisfy this Config")
+	errInvalidSignatureAlgorithm   = errors.New("invalid signature algorithm")
+	errInvalidHashAlgorithm        = errors.New("invalid hash algorithm")
+)

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/signaturehash/signaturehash.go

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package signaturehash provides the SignatureHashAlgorithm as defined in TLS 1.2
+package signaturehash
+
+import (
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/ed25519"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/tls"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/hash"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/signature"
+)
+
+// Algorithm is a signature/hash algorithm pairs which may be used in
+// digital signatures.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
+type Algorithm struct {
+	Hash      hash.Algorithm
+	Signature signature.Algorithm
+}
+
+// Algorithms are all the know SignatureHash Algorithms
+func Algorithms() []Algorithm {
+	return []Algorithm{
+		{hash.SHA256, signature.ECDSA},
+		{hash.SHA384, signature.ECDSA},
+		{hash.SHA512, signature.ECDSA},
+		{hash.SHA256, signature.RSA},
+		{hash.SHA384, signature.RSA},
+		{hash.SHA512, signature.RSA},
+		{hash.Ed25519, signature.Ed25519},
+	}
+}
+
+// SelectSignatureScheme returns most preferred and compatible scheme.
+func SelectSignatureScheme(sigs []Algorithm, privateKey crypto.PrivateKey) (Algorithm, error) {
+	for _, ss := range sigs {
+		if ss.isCompatible(privateKey) {
+			return ss, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return Algorithm{}, errNoAvailableSignatureSchemes
+}
+
+// isCompatible checks that given private key is compatible with the signature scheme.
+func (a *Algorithm) isCompatible(privateKey crypto.PrivateKey) bool {
+	switch privateKey.(type) {
+	case ed25519.PrivateKey:
+		return a.Signature == signature.Ed25519
+	case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+		return a.Signature == signature.ECDSA
+	case *rsa.PrivateKey:
+		return a.Signature == signature.RSA
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+}
+
+// ParseSignatureSchemes translates []tls.SignatureScheme to []signatureHashAlgorithm.
+// It returns default signature scheme list if no SignatureScheme is passed.
+func ParseSignatureSchemes(sigs []tls.SignatureScheme, insecureHashes bool) ([]Algorithm, error) {
+	if len(sigs) == 0 {
+		return Algorithms(), nil
+	}
+	out := []Algorithm{}
+	for _, ss := range sigs {
+		sig := signature.Algorithm(ss & 0xFF)
+		if _, ok := signature.Algorithms()[sig]; !ok {
+			return nil,
+				fmt.Errorf("SignatureScheme %04x: %w", ss, errInvalidSignatureAlgorithm)
+		}
+		h := hash.Algorithm(ss >> 8)
+		if _, ok := hash.Algorithms()[h]; !ok || (ok && h == hash.None) {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("SignatureScheme %04x: %w", ss, errInvalidHashAlgorithm)
+		}
+		if h.Insecure() && !insecureHashes {
+			continue
+		}
+		out = append(out, Algorithm{
+			Hash:      h,
+			Signature: sig,
+		})
+	}
+
+	if len(out) == 0 {
+		return nil, errNoAvailableSignatureSchemes
+	}
+
+	return out, nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/alert/alert.go

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package alert implements TLS alert protocol https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.2
+package alert
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+)
+
+var errBufferTooSmall = &protocol.TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("buffer is too small")} //nolint:goerr113
+
+// Level is the level of the TLS Alert
+type Level byte
+
+// Level enums
+const (
+	Warning Level = 1
+	Fatal   Level = 2
+)
+
+func (l Level) String() string {
+	switch l {
+	case Warning:
+		return "Warning"
+	case Fatal:
+		return "Fatal"
+	default:
+		return "Invalid alert level"
+	}
+}
+
+// Description is the extended info of the TLS Alert
+type Description byte
+
+// Description enums
+const (
+	CloseNotify            Description = 0
+	UnexpectedMessage      Description = 10
+	BadRecordMac           Description = 20
+	DecryptionFailed       Description = 21
+	RecordOverflow         Description = 22
+	DecompressionFailure   Description = 30
+	HandshakeFailure       Description = 40
+	NoCertificate          Description = 41
+	BadCertificate         Description = 42
+	UnsupportedCertificate Description = 43
+	CertificateRevoked     Description = 44
+	CertificateExpired     Description = 45
+	CertificateUnknown     Description = 46
+	IllegalParameter       Description = 47
+	UnknownCA              Description = 48
+	AccessDenied           Description = 49
+	DecodeError            Description = 50
+	DecryptError           Description = 51
+	ExportRestriction      Description = 60
+	ProtocolVersion        Description = 70
+	InsufficientSecurity   Description = 71
+	InternalError          Description = 80
+	UserCanceled           Description = 90
+	NoRenegotiation        Description = 100
+	UnsupportedExtension   Description = 110
+	NoApplicationProtocol  Description = 120
+)
+
+func (d Description) String() string {
+	switch d {
+	case CloseNotify:
+		return "CloseNotify"
+	case UnexpectedMessage:
+		return "UnexpectedMessage"
+	case BadRecordMac:
+		return "BadRecordMac"
+	case DecryptionFailed:
+		return "DecryptionFailed"
+	case RecordOverflow:
+		return "RecordOverflow"
+	case DecompressionFailure:
+		return "DecompressionFailure"
+	case HandshakeFailure:
+		return "HandshakeFailure"
+	case NoCertificate:
+		return "NoCertificate"
+	case BadCertificate:
+		return "BadCertificate"
+	case UnsupportedCertificate:
+		return "UnsupportedCertificate"
+	case CertificateRevoked:
+		return "CertificateRevoked"
+	case CertificateExpired:
+		return "CertificateExpired"
+	case CertificateUnknown:
+		return "CertificateUnknown"
+	case IllegalParameter:
+		return "IllegalParameter"
+	case UnknownCA:
+		return "UnknownCA"
+	case AccessDenied:
+		return "AccessDenied"
+	case DecodeError:
+		return "DecodeError"
+	case DecryptError:
+		return "DecryptError"
+	case ExportRestriction:
+		return "ExportRestriction"
+	case ProtocolVersion:
+		return "ProtocolVersion"
+	case InsufficientSecurity:
+		return "InsufficientSecurity"
+	case InternalError:
+		return "InternalError"
+	case UserCanceled:
+		return "UserCanceled"
+	case NoRenegotiation:
+		return "NoRenegotiation"
+	case UnsupportedExtension:
+		return "UnsupportedExtension"
+	case NoApplicationProtocol:
+		return "NoApplicationProtocol"
+	default:
+		return "Invalid alert description"
+	}
+}
+
+// Alert is one of the content types supported by the TLS record layer.
+// Alert messages convey the severity of the message
+// (warning or fatal) and a description of the alert.  Alert messages
+// with a level of fatal result in the immediate termination of the
+// connection.  In this case, other connections corresponding to the
+// session may continue, but the session identifier MUST be invalidated,
+// preventing the failed session from being used to establish new
+// connections.  Like other messages, alert messages are encrypted and
+// compressed, as specified by the current connection state.
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.2
+type Alert struct {
+	Level       Level
+	Description Description
+}
+
+// ContentType returns the ContentType of this Content
+func (a Alert) ContentType() protocol.ContentType {
+	return protocol.ContentTypeAlert
+}
+
+// Marshal returns the encoded alert
+func (a *Alert) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	return []byte{byte(a.Level), byte(a.Description)}, nil
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the alert from binary data
+func (a *Alert) Unmarshal(data []byte) error {
+	if len(data) != 2 {
+		return errBufferTooSmall
+	}
+
+	a.Level = Level(data[0])
+	a.Description = Description(data[1])
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (a *Alert) String() string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("Alert %s: %s", a.Level, a.Description)
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/application_data.go

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package protocol
+
+// ApplicationData messages are carried by the record layer and are
+// fragmented, compressed, and encrypted based on the current connection
+// state.  The messages are treated as transparent data to the record
+// layer.
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-10
+type ApplicationData struct {
+	Data []byte
+}
+
+// ContentType returns the ContentType of this content
+func (a ApplicationData) ContentType() ContentType {
+	return ContentTypeApplicationData
+}
+
+// Marshal encodes the ApplicationData to binary
+func (a *ApplicationData) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	return append([]byte{}, a.Data...), nil
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the ApplicationData from binary
+func (a *ApplicationData) Unmarshal(data []byte) error {
+	a.Data = append([]byte{}, data...)
+	return nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/change_cipher_spec.go

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package protocol
+
+// ChangeCipherSpec protocol exists to signal transitions in
+// ciphering strategies.  The protocol consists of a single message,
+// which is encrypted and compressed under the current (not the pending)
+// connection state.  The message consists of a single byte of value 1.
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.1
+type ChangeCipherSpec struct{}
+
+// ContentType returns the ContentType of this content
+func (c ChangeCipherSpec) ContentType() ContentType {
+	return ContentTypeChangeCipherSpec
+}
+
+// Marshal encodes the ChangeCipherSpec to binary
+func (c *ChangeCipherSpec) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	return []byte{0x01}, nil
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the ChangeCipherSpec from binary
+func (c *ChangeCipherSpec) Unmarshal(data []byte) error {
+	if len(data) == 1 && data[0] == 0x01 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return errInvalidCipherSpec
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/compression_method.go

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package protocol
+
+// CompressionMethodID is the ID for a CompressionMethod
+type CompressionMethodID byte
+
+const (
+	compressionMethodNull CompressionMethodID = 0
+)
+
+// CompressionMethod represents a TLS Compression Method
+type CompressionMethod struct {
+	ID CompressionMethodID
+}
+
+// CompressionMethods returns all supported CompressionMethods
+func CompressionMethods() map[CompressionMethodID]*CompressionMethod {
+	return map[CompressionMethodID]*CompressionMethod{
+		compressionMethodNull: {ID: compressionMethodNull},
+	}
+}
+
+// DecodeCompressionMethods the given compression methods
+func DecodeCompressionMethods(buf []byte) ([]*CompressionMethod, error) {
+	if len(buf) < 1 {
+		return nil, errBufferTooSmall
+	}
+	compressionMethodsCount := int(buf[0])
+	c := []*CompressionMethod{}
+	for i := 0; i < compressionMethodsCount; i++ {
+		if len(buf) <= i+1 {
+			return nil, errBufferTooSmall
+		}
+		id := CompressionMethodID(buf[i+1])
+		if compressionMethod, ok := CompressionMethods()[id]; ok {
+			c = append(c, compressionMethod)
+		}
+	}
+	return c, nil
+}
+
+// EncodeCompressionMethods the given compression methods
+func EncodeCompressionMethods(c []*CompressionMethod) []byte {
+	out := []byte{byte(len(c))}
+	for i := len(c); i > 0; i-- {
+		out = append(out, byte(c[i-1].ID))
+	}
+	return out
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/content.go

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package protocol
+
+// ContentType represents the IANA Registered ContentTypes
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4346#section-6.2.1
+type ContentType uint8
+
+// ContentType enums
+const (
+	ContentTypeChangeCipherSpec ContentType = 20
+	ContentTypeAlert            ContentType = 21
+	ContentTypeHandshake        ContentType = 22
+	ContentTypeApplicationData  ContentType = 23
+)
+
+// Content is the top level distinguisher for a DTLS Datagram
+type Content interface {
+	ContentType() ContentType
+	Marshal() ([]byte, error)
+	Unmarshal(data []byte) error
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package protocol
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+)
+
+var (
+	errBufferTooSmall    = &TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("buffer is too small")} //nolint:goerr113
+	errInvalidCipherSpec = &FatalError{Err: errors.New("cipher spec invalid")}     //nolint:goerr113
+)
+
+// FatalError indicates that the DTLS connection is no longer available.
+// It is mainly caused by wrong configuration of server or client.
+type FatalError struct {
+	Err error
+}
+
+// InternalError indicates and internal error caused by the implementation, and the DTLS connection is no longer available.
+// It is mainly caused by bugs or tried to use unimplemented features.
+type InternalError struct {
+	Err error
+}
+
+// TemporaryError indicates that the DTLS connection is still available, but the request was failed temporary.
+type TemporaryError struct {
+	Err error
+}
+
+// TimeoutError indicates that the request was timed out.
+type TimeoutError struct {
+	Err error
+}
+
+// HandshakeError indicates that the handshake failed.
+type HandshakeError struct {
+	Err error
+}
+
+// Timeout implements net.Error.Timeout()
+func (*FatalError) Timeout() bool { return false }
+
+// Temporary implements net.Error.Temporary()
+func (*FatalError) Temporary() bool { return false }
+
+// Unwrap implements Go1.13 error unwrapper.
+func (e *FatalError) Unwrap() error { return e.Err }
+
+func (e *FatalError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("dtls fatal: %v", e.Err) }
+
+// Timeout implements net.Error.Timeout()
+func (*InternalError) Timeout() bool { return false }
+
+// Temporary implements net.Error.Temporary()
+func (*InternalError) Temporary() bool { return false }
+
+// Unwrap implements Go1.13 error unwrapper.
+func (e *InternalError) Unwrap() error { return e.Err }
+
+func (e *InternalError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("dtls internal: %v", e.Err) }
+
+// Timeout implements net.Error.Timeout()
+func (*TemporaryError) Timeout() bool { return false }
+
+// Temporary implements net.Error.Temporary()
+func (*TemporaryError) Temporary() bool { return true }
+
+// Unwrap implements Go1.13 error unwrapper.
+func (e *TemporaryError) Unwrap() error { return e.Err }
+
+func (e *TemporaryError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("dtls temporary: %v", e.Err) }
+
+// Timeout implements net.Error.Timeout()
+func (*TimeoutError) Timeout() bool { return true }
+
+// Temporary implements net.Error.Temporary()
+func (*TimeoutError) Temporary() bool { return true }
+
+// Unwrap implements Go1.13 error unwrapper.
+func (e *TimeoutError) Unwrap() error { return e.Err }
+
+func (e *TimeoutError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("dtls timeout: %v", e.Err) }
+
+// Timeout implements net.Error.Timeout()
+func (e *HandshakeError) Timeout() bool {
+	var netErr net.Error
+	if errors.As(e.Err, &netErr) {
+		return netErr.Timeout()
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// Temporary implements net.Error.Temporary()
+func (e *HandshakeError) Temporary() bool {
+	var netErr net.Error
+	if errors.As(e.Err, &netErr) {
+		return netErr.Temporary() //nolint
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// Unwrap implements Go1.13 error unwrapper.
+func (e *HandshakeError) Unwrap() error { return e.Err }
+
+func (e *HandshakeError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("handshake error: %v", e.Err) }

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension/alpn.go

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package extension
+
+import (
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
+)
+
+// ALPN is a TLS extension for application-layer protocol negotiation within
+// the TLS handshake.
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301
+type ALPN struct {
+	ProtocolNameList []string
+}
+
+// TypeValue returns the extension TypeValue
+func (a ALPN) TypeValue() TypeValue {
+	return ALPNTypeValue
+}
+
+// Marshal encodes the extension
+func (a *ALPN) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	var b cryptobyte.Builder
+	b.AddUint16(uint16(a.TypeValue()))
+	b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+			for _, proto := range a.ProtocolNameList {
+				p := proto // Satisfy range scope lint
+				b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+					b.AddBytes([]byte(p))
+				})
+			}
+		})
+	})
+	return b.Bytes()
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the extension from encoded data
+func (a *ALPN) Unmarshal(data []byte) error {
+	val := cryptobyte.String(data)
+
+	var extension uint16
+	val.ReadUint16(&extension)
+	if TypeValue(extension) != a.TypeValue() {
+		return errInvalidExtensionType
+	}
+
+	var extData cryptobyte.String
+	val.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData)
+
+	var protoList cryptobyte.String
+	if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&protoList) || protoList.Empty() {
+		return ErrALPNInvalidFormat
+	}
+	for !protoList.Empty() {
+		var proto cryptobyte.String
+		if !protoList.ReadUint8LengthPrefixed(&proto) || proto.Empty() {
+			return ErrALPNInvalidFormat
+		}
+		a.ProtocolNameList = append(a.ProtocolNameList, string(proto))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// ALPNProtocolSelection negotiates a shared protocol according to #3.2 of rfc7301
+func ALPNProtocolSelection(supportedProtocols, peerSupportedProtocols []string) (string, error) {
+	if len(supportedProtocols) == 0 || len(peerSupportedProtocols) == 0 {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	for _, s := range supportedProtocols {
+		for _, c := range peerSupportedProtocols {
+			if s == c {
+				return s, nil
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return "", errALPNNoAppProto
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension/errors.go

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package extension
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol"
+)
+
+var (
+	// ErrALPNInvalidFormat is raised when the ALPN format is invalid
+	ErrALPNInvalidFormat    = &protocol.FatalError{Err: errors.New("invalid alpn format")}                             //nolint:goerr113
+	errALPNNoAppProto       = &protocol.FatalError{Err: errors.New("no application protocol")}                         //nolint:goerr113
+	errBufferTooSmall       = &protocol.TemporaryError{Err: errors.New("buffer is too small")}                         //nolint:goerr113
+	errInvalidExtensionType = &protocol.FatalError{Err: errors.New("invalid extension type")}                          //nolint:goerr113
+	errInvalidSNIFormat     = &protocol.FatalError{Err: errors.New("invalid server name format")}                      //nolint:goerr113
+	errLengthMismatch       = &protocol.InternalError{Err: errors.New("data length and declared length do not match")} //nolint:goerr113
+)

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension/extension.go

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package extension implements the extension values in the ClientHello/ServerHello
+package extension
+
+import "encoding/binary"
+
+// TypeValue is the 2 byte value for a TLS Extension as registered in the IANA
+//
+// https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
+type TypeValue uint16
+
+// TypeValue constants
+const (
+	ServerNameTypeValue                   TypeValue = 0
+	SupportedEllipticCurvesTypeValue      TypeValue = 10
+	SupportedPointFormatsTypeValue        TypeValue = 11
+	SupportedSignatureAlgorithmsTypeValue TypeValue = 13
+	UseSRTPTypeValue                      TypeValue = 14
+	ALPNTypeValue                         TypeValue = 16
+	UseExtendedMasterSecretTypeValue      TypeValue = 23
+	RenegotiationInfoTypeValue            TypeValue = 65281
+)
+
+// Extension represents a single TLS extension
+type Extension interface {
+	Marshal() ([]byte, error)
+	Unmarshal(data []byte) error
+	TypeValue() TypeValue
+}
+
+// Unmarshal many extensions at once
+func Unmarshal(buf []byte) ([]Extension, error) {
+	switch {
+	case len(buf) == 0:
+		return []Extension{}, nil
+	case len(buf) < 2:
+		return nil, errBufferTooSmall
+	}
+
+	declaredLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf)
+	if len(buf)-2 != int(declaredLen) {
+		return nil, errLengthMismatch
+	}
+
+	extensions := []Extension{}
+	unmarshalAndAppend := func(data []byte, e Extension) error {
+		err := e.Unmarshal(data)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		extensions = append(extensions, e)
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	for offset := 2; offset < len(buf); {
+		if len(buf) < (offset + 2) {
+			return nil, errBufferTooSmall
+		}
+		var err error
+		switch TypeValue(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[offset:])) {
+		case ServerNameTypeValue:
+			err = unmarshalAndAppend(buf[offset:], &ServerName{})
+		case SupportedEllipticCurvesTypeValue:
+			err = unmarshalAndAppend(buf[offset:], &SupportedEllipticCurves{})
+		case UseSRTPTypeValue:
+			err = unmarshalAndAppend(buf[offset:], &UseSRTP{})
+		case ALPNTypeValue:
+			err = unmarshalAndAppend(buf[offset:], &ALPN{})
+		case UseExtendedMasterSecretTypeValue:
+			err = unmarshalAndAppend(buf[offset:], &UseExtendedMasterSecret{})
+		case RenegotiationInfoTypeValue:
+			err = unmarshalAndAppend(buf[offset:], &RenegotiationInfo{})
+		default:
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		if len(buf) < (offset + 4) {
+			return nil, errBufferTooSmall
+		}
+		extensionLength := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(buf[offset+2:])
+		offset += (4 + int(extensionLength))
+	}
+	return extensions, nil
+}
+
+// Marshal many extensions at once
+func Marshal(e []Extension) ([]byte, error) {
+	extensions := []byte{}
+	for _, e := range e {
+		raw, err := e.Marshal()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		extensions = append(extensions, raw...)
+	}
+	out := []byte{0x00, 0x00}
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, uint16(len(extensions)))
+	return append(out, extensions...), nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension/renegotiation_info.go

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package extension
+
+import "encoding/binary"
+
+const (
+	renegotiationInfoHeaderSize = 5
+)
+
+// RenegotiationInfo allows a Client/Server to
+// communicate their renegotation support
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746
+type RenegotiationInfo struct {
+	RenegotiatedConnection uint8
+}
+
+// TypeValue returns the extension TypeValue
+func (r RenegotiationInfo) TypeValue() TypeValue {
+	return RenegotiationInfoTypeValue
+}
+
+// Marshal encodes the extension
+func (r *RenegotiationInfo) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	out := make([]byte, renegotiationInfoHeaderSize)
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, uint16(r.TypeValue()))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[2:], uint16(1)) // length
+	out[4] = r.RenegotiatedConnection
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the extension from encoded data
+func (r *RenegotiationInfo) Unmarshal(data []byte) error {
+	if len(data) < renegotiationInfoHeaderSize {
+		return errBufferTooSmall
+	} else if TypeValue(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data)) != r.TypeValue() {
+		return errInvalidExtensionType
+	}
+
+	r.RenegotiatedConnection = data[4]
+
+	return nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension/server_name.go

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package extension
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
+)
+
+const serverNameTypeDNSHostName = 0
+
+// ServerName allows the client to inform the server the specific
+// name it wishes to contact. Useful if multiple DNS names resolve
+// to one IP
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3
+type ServerName struct {
+	ServerName string
+}
+
+// TypeValue returns the extension TypeValue
+func (s ServerName) TypeValue() TypeValue {
+	return ServerNameTypeValue
+}
+
+// Marshal encodes the extension
+func (s *ServerName) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	var b cryptobyte.Builder
+	b.AddUint16(uint16(s.TypeValue()))
+	b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+		b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+			b.AddUint8(serverNameTypeDNSHostName)
+			b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+				b.AddBytes([]byte(s.ServerName))
+			})
+		})
+	})
+	return b.Bytes()
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the extension from encoded data
+func (s *ServerName) Unmarshal(data []byte) error {
+	val := cryptobyte.String(data)
+	var extension uint16
+	val.ReadUint16(&extension)
+	if TypeValue(extension) != s.TypeValue() {
+		return errInvalidExtensionType
+	}
+
+	var extData cryptobyte.String
+	val.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&extData)
+
+	var nameList cryptobyte.String
+	if !extData.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&nameList) || nameList.Empty() {
+		return errInvalidSNIFormat
+	}
+	for !nameList.Empty() {
+		var nameType uint8
+		var serverName cryptobyte.String
+		if !nameList.ReadUint8(&nameType) ||
+			!nameList.ReadUint16LengthPrefixed(&serverName) ||
+			serverName.Empty() {
+			return errInvalidSNIFormat
+		}
+		if nameType != serverNameTypeDNSHostName {
+			continue
+		}
+		if len(s.ServerName) != 0 {
+			// Multiple names of the same name_type are prohibited.
+			return errInvalidSNIFormat
+		}
+		s.ServerName = string(serverName)
+		// An SNI value may not include a trailing dot.
+		if strings.HasSuffix(s.ServerName, ".") {
+			return errInvalidSNIFormat
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension/srtp_protection_profile.go

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package extension
+
+// SRTPProtectionProfile defines the parameters and options that are in effect for the SRTP processing
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5764#section-4.1.2
+type SRTPProtectionProfile uint16
+
+const (
+	SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 SRTPProtectionProfile = 0x0001 // nolint
+	SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 SRTPProtectionProfile = 0x0002 // nolint
+	SRTP_AES256_CM_SHA1_80      SRTPProtectionProfile = 0x0003 // nolint
+	SRTP_AES256_CM_SHA1_32      SRTPProtectionProfile = 0x0004 // nolint
+	SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80      SRTPProtectionProfile = 0x0005 // nolint
+	SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32      SRTPProtectionProfile = 0x0006 // nolint
+	SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM       SRTPProtectionProfile = 0x0007 // nolint
+	SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM       SRTPProtectionProfile = 0x0008 // nolint
+)
+
+func srtpProtectionProfiles() map[SRTPProtectionProfile]bool {
+	return map[SRTPProtectionProfile]bool{
+		SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: true,
+		SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: true,
+		SRTP_AES256_CM_SHA1_80:      true,
+		SRTP_AES256_CM_SHA1_32:      true,
+		SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:      true,
+		SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32:      true,
+		SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM:       true,
+		SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM:       true,
+	}
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension/supported_elliptic_curves.go

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package extension
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/elliptic"
+)
+
+const (
+	supportedGroupsHeaderSize = 6
+)
+
+// SupportedEllipticCurves allows a Client/Server to communicate
+// what curves they both support
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8422#section-5.1.1
+type SupportedEllipticCurves struct {
+	EllipticCurves []elliptic.Curve
+}
+
+// TypeValue returns the extension TypeValue
+func (s SupportedEllipticCurves) TypeValue() TypeValue {
+	return SupportedEllipticCurvesTypeValue
+}
+
+// Marshal encodes the extension
+func (s *SupportedEllipticCurves) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	out := make([]byte, supportedGroupsHeaderSize)
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, uint16(s.TypeValue()))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[2:], uint16(2+(len(s.EllipticCurves)*2)))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[4:], uint16(len(s.EllipticCurves)*2))
+
+	for _, v := range s.EllipticCurves {
+		out = append(out, []byte{0x00, 0x00}...)
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[len(out)-2:], uint16(v))
+	}
+
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the extension from encoded data
+func (s *SupportedEllipticCurves) Unmarshal(data []byte) error {
+	if len(data) <= supportedGroupsHeaderSize {
+		return errBufferTooSmall
+	} else if TypeValue(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data)) != s.TypeValue() {
+		return errInvalidExtensionType
+	}
+
+	groupCount := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[4:]) / 2)
+	if supportedGroupsHeaderSize+(groupCount*2) > len(data) {
+		return errLengthMismatch
+	}
+
+	for i := 0; i < groupCount; i++ {
+		supportedGroupID := elliptic.Curve(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[(supportedGroupsHeaderSize + (i * 2)):]))
+		if _, ok := elliptic.Curves()[supportedGroupID]; ok {
+			s.EllipticCurves = append(s.EllipticCurves, supportedGroupID)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension/supported_point_formats.go

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package extension
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/elliptic"
+)
+
+const (
+	supportedPointFormatsSize = 5
+)
+
+// SupportedPointFormats allows a Client/Server to negotiate
+// the EllipticCurvePointFormats
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2
+type SupportedPointFormats struct {
+	PointFormats []elliptic.CurvePointFormat
+}
+
+// TypeValue returns the extension TypeValue
+func (s SupportedPointFormats) TypeValue() TypeValue {
+	return SupportedPointFormatsTypeValue
+}
+
+// Marshal encodes the extension
+func (s *SupportedPointFormats) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	out := make([]byte, supportedPointFormatsSize)
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, uint16(s.TypeValue()))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[2:], uint16(1+(len(s.PointFormats))))
+	out[4] = byte(len(s.PointFormats))
+
+	for _, v := range s.PointFormats {
+		out = append(out, byte(v))
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the extension from encoded data
+func (s *SupportedPointFormats) Unmarshal(data []byte) error {
+	if len(data) <= supportedPointFormatsSize {
+		return errBufferTooSmall
+	} else if TypeValue(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data)) != s.TypeValue() {
+		return errInvalidExtensionType
+	}
+
+	pointFormatCount := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[4:]))
+	if supportedGroupsHeaderSize+(pointFormatCount) > len(data) {
+		return errLengthMismatch
+	}
+
+	for i := 0; i < pointFormatCount; i++ {
+		p := elliptic.CurvePointFormat(data[supportedPointFormatsSize+i])
+		switch p {
+		case elliptic.CurvePointFormatUncompressed:
+			s.PointFormats = append(s.PointFormats, p)
+		default:
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension/supported_signature_algorithms.go

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package extension
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/hash"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/signature"
+	"github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/crypto/signaturehash"
+)
+
+const (
+	supportedSignatureAlgorithmsHeaderSize = 6
+)
+
+// SupportedSignatureAlgorithms allows a Client/Server to
+// negotiate what SignatureHash Algorithms they both support
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1
+type SupportedSignatureAlgorithms struct {
+	SignatureHashAlgorithms []signaturehash.Algorithm
+}
+
+// TypeValue returns the extension TypeValue
+func (s SupportedSignatureAlgorithms) TypeValue() TypeValue {
+	return SupportedSignatureAlgorithmsTypeValue
+}
+
+// Marshal encodes the extension
+func (s *SupportedSignatureAlgorithms) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	out := make([]byte, supportedSignatureAlgorithmsHeaderSize)
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, uint16(s.TypeValue()))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[2:], uint16(2+(len(s.SignatureHashAlgorithms)*2)))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[4:], uint16(len(s.SignatureHashAlgorithms)*2))
+	for _, v := range s.SignatureHashAlgorithms {
+		out = append(out, []byte{0x00, 0x00}...)
+		out[len(out)-2] = byte(v.Hash)
+		out[len(out)-1] = byte(v.Signature)
+	}
+
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the extension from encoded data
+func (s *SupportedSignatureAlgorithms) Unmarshal(data []byte) error {
+	if len(data) <= supportedSignatureAlgorithmsHeaderSize {
+		return errBufferTooSmall
+	} else if TypeValue(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data)) != s.TypeValue() {
+		return errInvalidExtensionType
+	}
+
+	algorithmCount := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[4:]) / 2)
+	if supportedSignatureAlgorithmsHeaderSize+(algorithmCount*2) > len(data) {
+		return errLengthMismatch
+	}
+	for i := 0; i < algorithmCount; i++ {
+		supportedHashAlgorithm := hash.Algorithm(data[supportedSignatureAlgorithmsHeaderSize+(i*2)])
+		supportedSignatureAlgorithm := signature.Algorithm(data[supportedSignatureAlgorithmsHeaderSize+(i*2)+1])
+		if _, ok := hash.Algorithms()[supportedHashAlgorithm]; ok {
+			if _, ok := signature.Algorithms()[supportedSignatureAlgorithm]; ok {
+				s.SignatureHashAlgorithms = append(s.SignatureHashAlgorithms, signaturehash.Algorithm{
+					Hash:      supportedHashAlgorithm,
+					Signature: supportedSignatureAlgorithm,
+				})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension/use_master_secret.go

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package extension
+
+import "encoding/binary"
+
+const (
+	useExtendedMasterSecretHeaderSize = 4
+)
+
+// UseExtendedMasterSecret defines a TLS extension that contextually binds the
+// master secret to a log of the full handshake that computes it, thus
+// preventing MITM attacks.
+type UseExtendedMasterSecret struct {
+	Supported bool
+}
+
+// TypeValue returns the extension TypeValue
+func (u UseExtendedMasterSecret) TypeValue() TypeValue {
+	return UseExtendedMasterSecretTypeValue
+}
+
+// Marshal encodes the extension
+func (u *UseExtendedMasterSecret) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	if !u.Supported {
+		return []byte{}, nil
+	}
+
+	out := make([]byte, useExtendedMasterSecretHeaderSize)
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, uint16(u.TypeValue()))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[2:], uint16(0)) // length
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the extension from encoded data
+func (u *UseExtendedMasterSecret) Unmarshal(data []byte) error {
+	if len(data) < useExtendedMasterSecretHeaderSize {
+		return errBufferTooSmall
+	} else if TypeValue(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data)) != u.TypeValue() {
+		return errInvalidExtensionType
+	}
+
+	u.Supported = true
+
+	return nil
+}

server/vendor/github.com/pion/dtls/v2/pkg/protocol/extension/use_srtp.go

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 The Pion community <https://pion.ly>
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package extension
+
+import "encoding/binary"
+
+const (
+	useSRTPHeaderSize = 6
+)
+
+// UseSRTP allows a Client/Server to negotiate what SRTPProtectionProfiles
+// they both support
+//
+// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8422
+type UseSRTP struct {
+	ProtectionProfiles []SRTPProtectionProfile
+}
+
+// TypeValue returns the extension TypeValue
+func (u UseSRTP) TypeValue() TypeValue {
+	return UseSRTPTypeValue
+}
+
+// Marshal encodes the extension
+func (u *UseSRTP) Marshal() ([]byte, error) {
+	out := make([]byte, useSRTPHeaderSize)
+
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out, uint16(u.TypeValue()))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[2:], uint16(2+(len(u.ProtectionProfiles)*2)+ /* MKI Length */ 1))
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[4:], uint16(len(u.ProtectionProfiles)*2))
+
+	for _, v := range u.ProtectionProfiles {
+		out = append(out, []byte{0x00, 0x00}...)
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(out[len(out)-2:], uint16(v))
+	}
+
+	out = append(out, 0x00) /* MKI Length */
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// Unmarshal populates the extension from encoded data
+func (u *UseSRTP) Unmarshal(data []byte) error {
+	if len(data) <= useSRTPHeaderSize {
+		return errBufferTooSmall
+	} else if TypeValue(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data)) != u.TypeValue() {
+		return errInvalidExtensionType
+	}
+
+	profileCount := int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[4:]) / 2)
+	if supportedGroupsHeaderSize+(profileCount*2) > len(data) {
+		return errLengthMismatch
+	}
+
+	for i := 0; i < profileCount; i++ {
+		supportedProfile := SRTPProtectionProfile(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[(useSRTPHeaderSize + (i * 2)):]))
+		if _, ok := srtpProtectionProfiles()[supportedProfile]; ok {
+			u.ProtectionProfiles = append(u.ProtectionProfiles, supportedProfile)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}